locus for the perceptions to which Berkeley hi reduced the outer world. And perceptions which are not the states of any subject, retain only their intrinsic character and become a series of elements. When there is nothing beyond, which appears, and nothing within to which it appears, there ceases to be any sense in using such terms as appearance, phenomenon, or impression. The term sensation is at present employed in the same ill-considered But empirical idealism has come gradually to insist upon the importance of the content of perception, rather than the relation of percep tion to a self as its state. The terms element and experience, which are replacing the subjectivistic terms, are frankly realistic.10 manner. 206. There is a similar realistic trend in the development of absolute idealism. The pure Realistic Absolute The Conception Hegelian philosophy was notably objective. The principles of development in which it centres were conceived by of Experience. Hegel himself to manifest themselves most clearly in the progressions of nature and history. Many of Hegel's followers have been led by moral and religious interests to emphasize con 10 Cf. Ernst Mach: Analysis of Sensation. Translation by Williams. ciousness, and, upon epistemological grounds, to lay great stress upon the necessity of the union of the parts of experience within an enveloping self. But absolute idealism has much at heart the overcoming of relativism, and the absolute is defined in order to meet the demand for a being that shall not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of finite thought. So it is quite possible for this philosophy, while maintaining its traditions on the whole, to abandon the term self to the finite subject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational and universal principles-self-sufficient because externally independent and internally necessary. Hence the renewed study of categories as logical, mathematical, or mechanical principles, and entirely apart from their being the acts of a thinking self. Furthermore, it has been recognized that the general demand of idealism is met when reality is regarded as not outside of or other than knowledge, whatever be true of the question of dependence. Thus the conception of experience is equally convenient here, in that it signifies what is immediately present in knowledge, without affirming it to consist in being so presented.11 11 Cf. F. H. Bradley: Appearance and Reality. § 207. And at this point idealism is met by : latter-day realism. The traditional modern realism springing from Descartes wa Idealistic in Realism. The Immanence dualistic. It was supposed that reality in itself was essentially extra-mental, Philosophy. and thus under the necessity of being either represented or misrepresented in thought. But the one of these alternatives is dogmatic, in that thought can never test the validity of its relation to that which is perpetually outside of it; while the other is agnostic, providing only for the knowledge of a world of appearance, an improper knowledge that is in fact not knowledge at all. But realism is not necessarily dualistic, since it requires only that being shall not be dependent upon being known. Furthermore, since empiricism is congenial to naturalism, it is an easy step to say that nature is directly known in perception. This first takes the form of positivism, or the theory that only such nature as can be directly known can be really known. But this agnostic provision for an unknown world beyond, inevitably falls away and leaves reality as that which is directly known, but not conditioned by knowledge. Again the term experience is the most useful, and provides a common ground for idealistic realism with realistic idealism. A new epistemological movement makes this conception of experience its starting-point. What is known as the immanence philosophy defines reality as experience, and means by experience the subject matter of all knowledge -not defined as such, but regarded as capable of being such. Experience is conceived to be both in and out of selves, cognition being but one of the special systems into which experience may enter.12 § 208. Does this eclecticism of the age open any philosophical prospect? Is it more than a The Interpre- general compromise-a confession of tation of Tra- failure on the part of each and every dition as the New Con struction. Basis for a radical and clear-cut doctrine of metaphysics and epistemology? There is no final answer to such a question short of an in 12 Cf. Carstanjen: Richard Avenarius, and his General Theory of Knowledge, Empiriocriticism. Translation by H. Bosanquet, in Mind, Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: Does Consciousness Exist? and A World of Pure Experience, in Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth., Vol. I; The Thing and its Relations, ibid., Vol. II. The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately not available in English. Among the more important writings are: R. Avenarius: Kritik der reinen Erfahrung; Der menschliche Weltbegriff, and other works. Joseph Petzoldt: Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung. Ernst Mach: Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verhältniss des Physischen zum Psychischen, 2. Auff. Wilhelm Schuppe: Grund But dependent construction, and such procedure woul! exceed the scope of the present discussion. there is an evident interpretation of tradition that suggests a possible basis for such construction. 8 209. Suppose it to be granted that the cate gories of nature are quite self-sufficient. This The Truth of would mean that there might conceiv the Physical System, but ably be a strictly physical order, gov. Failure of At duce All Ex tempt to Re- erned only by mechanical principles, perience to it. and by the more general logical and mathematical principles. The body of physical science so extended as to include such general conceptions as identity, difference, number, quality, space, and time, is the account of such an order. This order need have no value, and need not be known. But reality as a whole is evidently not such a strictly physical order, for the definition of the physical order involves the rejection of many of the most familiar aspects of experience, such as its value and its being known in conscious selves. Materialism, in that it proposes to conceive the whole of reality as physical, must attempt to re riss der Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik. Friedrich Carstanjen: Einführung in die "Kritik der reinen Erfahrung”- -an exposition of Avenarius. Also articles by the above, R. Willy, R. v. Schubert-Soldern, and others, in the Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. |