because of his adherence to the general empir postulate that knowledge is limited to the i vidual content of its own individual states. is a universally received maxim,” he says, everything which exists is particular." Now: truth of mathematical reckoning is not particu but is valid wherever the conditions to which refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, it is to be particular, must be regarded as particular act or state of some thinker. Its tru must then be construed as relative to the interes of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an i strumental rather than a purely cognitive value This conclusion cannot be disputed short of a rad ical stand against the general epistemological pri ciple to which Berkeley is so far true, the princip that the reality which is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself.

The Transition

§ 132. This concludes the purely phenomenal istic strain of Berkeley's thought. He has take the immediate apprehension of sensible to Spiritualism. objects in a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an individual, to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that knowledge cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result is that the

niverse is composed of private perceptions and deas. Strictly on the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in regarding this conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his own position had been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit that the real is unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the knowable as relative to the individual. But the supplementary metaphysics which had hitherto been kept in the background is now revealed. It is maintained that though perceptions know no external world, they do nevertheless reveal a spiritual substance of which they are the states. Although it has hitherto been argued that the esse of things is in their percipi, this is now replaced by the more fundamental principle that the esse of things is in their percipere or velle. The real world consists not in perceptions, but in perceivers.

§ 133. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory which has been Berkeley's dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument is no longer available. And those

Further At

tempts to Maintain Phenomenal

ism.

who have cared more for this theory than for metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point, and so to construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its own

grounds. Such attempts are so instructive a make it worth our while to review them be proceeding with the development of the spirit istic motive in subjectivism.

The world is to be regarded as made up of se perceptions, ideas, or phenomena. What is to accepted as the fundamental category which g to all of these terms their subjectivistic sign cance? So far there seems to be nothing in vi save the principle of relativity. The type to whi these were reduced was that of the peculiar c unsharable experience best represented by an ir dividual's pleasure and pain. But relativity wi not work as a general principle of being. It corsigns the individual to his private mind, and car not provide for the validity of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then. must be followed. Perception may be given psycho-physical definition, which employs physical terms as fundamental; 12 but this flagrantly contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or. reality may be regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of thought But this definition of certain objective entities of

12 Cf. Pearson: Grammar of Science, Chap. II. See above, § 118.

ind, of beings attributed to intelligence because their intrinsic intelligibility, is inconsistent ith empiricism, if indeed it does not lead eventully to a realism of the Platonic type.13 Finally, nd most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their orignal meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume, e. g., are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions, for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a realistic philosophy of experience.14 Any one, then, of these three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the principle esse est percipi.

13 See Chap. XI. Cf. also § 140.

14 The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities of sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of actual perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to be in perception. In either case they are not perceptions.

In Ernst Mach's Analysis of Sensations, the reader will find an interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the substitution of the term Bestandtheil for Empfindung. (See Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, § 207.

Berkeley's

Spiritualism.
Immediate

Knowledge of

§ 134. Let us now follow the fortu of the other phase of subjectivis the Perceiver. that which develops the conception the perceiver rather than the perceived. W Berkeley holds that

"all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth. a word, all those bodies which compose the migh frame of the world, have not any subsistence wither a Mind,"

his thought has transcended the epistemology wit which he overthrew the conception of material sub stance, in two directions. For neither mind of the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived But the first of these may yet be regarded as direct empirical datum, even though sharply dis tinguished from an object of perception. In the third dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge:

"I own I have properly no idea, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do never theless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms I and myself; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."

" 16

15 Berkeley: Op. cit., p. 447.