§ 129. Berkeley, then, beginning with the threeworld of Descartes and of common-sense, old he Refuta on of Material proposes to apply Locke's theory of knowledge to the discomfiture of corubstance. poreal nature. It was a radical docrine, because it meant for him and for his contemporaries the denial of all finite objects outside the mind. But at the same time it meant a restoration of the homogeneity of experience, the reëstablishment of the qualitative world of everyday living, and so had its basis of appeal to The encounter between Hylas, the advocate of the traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the author himself, begins with an exchange of the charge of innovation. common-sense. Hyl. I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you. Phil. Pray, what were those? Hyl. You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as material substance in the world. Phil. That there is no such thing as what philosophers call material substance, I am seriously persuaded: but if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion. Hyl. What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common-Sense, or a more manifest of Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing. matter? Phil. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should pr that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opin a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes £ repugnances to Common-Sense, than I who believe: such thing?? Philonous now proceeds with his case. Begis ning by obtaining from Hylas the admission thx pleasure and pain are essentially relative and sub jective, he argues that sensations such as heat since they are inseparable from these feelings must be similarly regarded. And he is about to annex other qualities in turn to this core of subjectivity, when Hylas enters a genera demurrer: "Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this time. You asked me whether heat and cold. sweetness and bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished:those qualities as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no hest in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or 'Berkeley: Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 380-381. 130. Here the argument touches upon pround issues. Philonous now assumes the extreme e Applica n of the pistemologi empirical contention that knowledge applies only to its own psychological 1 Principle. moment, that its object in no way exends beyond that individual situation which we all the state of knowing. The full import of such n epistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he s clearly employing it here, and the overthrow of Hylas is inevitable so long as he does not challenge it or turn it against his opponent. This, however, as a protagonist of Berkeley's own making, he fails to do, and he plays into Philonous's hands by admitting that what is known only in perception must for that reason consist in perception. He frankly owns "that it is vain to stand out any longer," that "colors, sounds, tastes, in a word, all those termed secondary qualities, have certainly no existence without the mind." 9 Hylas has now arrived at the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. "Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest" are the attributes of an external substance which is the cause of sensations. But the same epistemological principle readily reduces these also to * Ibid., p. 397. dependence on mind, for, like the secondary qu ties, their content is given only in percep Hylas is then driven to defend a general mate substratum, which is the cause of ideas, but which none of the definite content of these i can be attributed. In short, he has put all content of knowledge on the one side, and admit its inseparability from the perceiving spirit, left the being of things standing empty and f lorn on the other. This amounts, as Philonous ? minds him, to the denial of the reality of t known world. "You are therefore, by your principles, forced deny the reality of sensible things; since you made it consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to show your principles led to Scepticism." 10 § 131. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for phenomenalism, Berkeley now give The Refuta- the rationalistic motive an opportunity to express itself in the queries of Hylas tion of a Conceived as to whether there be not an absolute extension," somehow abstracted by thought from the relativities of perception. Is there not at least a conceivable world independent of perception! 10 Ibid., p. 418. "he answers of Philonous throw much light upon he Berkeleyan position. He admits that thought s capable of separating the primary from the secndary qualities in certain operations, but at the ame time denies that this is forming an idea of hem as separate. "I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualiLies, without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, co consider or treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word motion by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention of great or small, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension." "1 Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because, although we do actually deal with these and find them intelligible, we can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He applies this psychological test " Ibid., pp. 403-404. |