CHAPTER VII THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF Sciences. RELIGION § 73. THERE are three sets of problems whose general philosophical importance depends upon the The Normative place which metaphysics assigns to the human critical faculties. Man passes judgment upon that which claims to be true, beautiful, or good, thus referring to ideals and standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment, have resulted in the development of the three so-called normative sciences: logic, aesthetics, and ethics. These sciences are said to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic attitude.1 In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue between Socrates and the master sophist Pro Cf. § 68. tagoras, is concerning the possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless one knows what is meant by it. Even the possession of such a meaning was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence, which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms, virtue is knowledge. The interest which Socrates here shows in the reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate conceptions. The recog nition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense, indeed, the whole labor of Soc rates was in the cause of the logical interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be true, and constitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue of the possession of which belief is knowledge. § 74. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes itself from the psychological ac The Affilia tions of Logic. count of the elements of the believing state.2 But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then become the most general truth, belonging to the absolute, archetypal realm, or to the mind of God. When the general principles of certainty are so regarded, logic can be 2 The Socratic distinction between the logical and the psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in Plato's Gorgias, especially, 454, 455. Cf. also § 29. Thus, e. g. Hegel. See § 179. Cf. also §§ 199, 200. distinguished from metaphysics only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of logic belongs to the study of this attainment of truth, as the terms æsthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty and goodness. It is evident that logic will have a peculiar importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its special subjectmatter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of philosophy. $75. Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of special subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief. Since logic General Con- is concerned with truth only in so far Logic Deals with the Most ditions of Truth in Belief. as it is predicated of belief, and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be defined as the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge. The principles so for• Cf. § 84. 4 mulated would be those virtually used to justify belief or to disprove the imputation of error. § 76. What is called formal logic is animated with the hope of extracting these formulations The Parts of directly from an analysis of the proFormal Logic. cedure of thought. The most general Definition, Self-evidence, Inference, and logical principles which have appeared Observation. in the historical development of formal logic are definition, self-evidence, inference, and observation. Each of these has been given special study, and each has given rise to special issues. Definition has to do with the formation of concepts, or determinate and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen, investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great realistic-nominalistic controversy." A large part of the logical discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier eristic,” a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity. It is natural that in its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of definite terms. The perpetual importance of defi' See § 69, note. • The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in Plato's Euthydemus, 275. |