remove that difficulty: He then proposed the 7th July for another interview; but afterwards put it off till the ninth. On the 6th I reduced the notes to form, for constituting a part of the treaty. On the 9th of July I called on the minister; and he inquired whether I had received his letter of that morning: I answered in the negative, and desired to know the contents; he replied, a discussion of two other points of the consular convention; on which I want your opinion in writing. I informed him, that I had stated the views of the United States without discussion, and expected the same of him on the part of France; that when this was done, I would proceed to a conference on each point, but not to an epistolary discussion; that such a mode would require, of diligent negotiation, three months, and with his official engagements, double that time: he said, no; that it would not require as much time as I had conceived; that there were at most but six other points. On your side, I replied, but many on ours. He answered "pas dăvântáge," none besides. I said that I was glad to hear it; but to such a discussion as he proposed, I should prefer treating effectually. Some of the conversation was repeated which we had on the 7th, and I renewed my demand for the passport. He answered, that my refusal to discuss must first be given in writing, and we parted. This is the substance of the two interviews. On the same day, I received the letter mentioned at the interview, (No. 21) dated the 18th Messidor, (6th July) in which, speaking of his general plan in No. 16, he says "but it is not sufficient to send these propositions to your government; they are only the basis of discussions, necessary on each question of detail: the solution of which, we ought to find," although, in the last mentioned number, he had said in reference to them, "I am persuaded that you will transmit to your government exact documents: it will be its province, to take the best measures for accomplishing a speedy reconciliation." In the letter first mentioned, the minister also observes, "I have apprized you, that it would be inconvenient to charge with this discussion, a minister plenipotentiary at Philadelphia. Circumstances have rendered this inconvenience more serious: and I do not conceal from you, that I fear new incidents." The fact was, as I ascertained to my satisfaction, that after the arrival of the despatches and other intelligence from the United States, the Executive Directory apprehended if a minister was sent there, that he would not be accredited; and that overtures, or any plan unaccompanied by a minister, would meet a similar fate. On the 10th July, in my letter No. 22, I refused an epistolary discussion; and demanded a definitive answer to my applicaton for a passport and other documents. On the 15th July, I received the minister's letter of the 24th Messidor, (the 12th July) No. 23, in which he appeals to me, for the truth of his assertion, "that if nothing had prevented me from pursuing with him, the examination of the grievances, which separate the two countries, we should have needed nothing more than their respective ratifications." Before the arri val of the despatches of the envoys, the minister appeared to me sincere, and anxious to obtain a reconciliation. He had proposed by his secretary, an assumption of the debts due to American citizens; which I rejected: but he had made no other proposition of a loan whatever; and never renewed that. Indeed his views in general, as far as I could then ascertain them, were liberal in regard to a treaty: it is neverthless impossible for me to determine whether we should have united in opinion, on every point of dispute between the republicks. I had a full expectation, that by the middle of June at farthest, we should have agreed on the plan of a treaty; and that a French minister would have been sent to America for completing it. I was likewise informed of the candidate: but after the arrival of the despatches, although the minister, in the name of the Executive Directory, declared that they persevered in their pacifick intentions, he probably for the reasons stated in explaining No. 21, abandoned the plan we had at first agreed on, substituted a general plan of negotiation, discussed some articles thereof in writing, and insisted, contrary to stipula tions, on my answering him in the same mode. At this period, a reconciliation being quite problematical, one of his ob. jects evidently was, to prepare materials for a manifesto, in the event of a war, to show that it was a matter of necessity, and not of choice. He says "that after the arrival of the Sophia, I was disposed to depart; till that time, he had never conceived that I had a design to embark, before we should have agreed on the definitive articles, to be ratified by my government." Be. fore and after the arrival of the Sophia, I had announced my intention to embark early in June; conceiving that the arrangements might be made by that period. I had no design, however, of departing before they were completed: provided, there should have been no reason to doubt of the minister's disposition, or of the success of our endeavours, for obtaining a reconciliation. His general conduct would have been the criterion of the first, and our progress in this business, of the last point but having abandoned our original plan, he has not given me an opportunity to judge effectually of either. On the 20th July, I sent the minister No. 24, and received on the 22d, his reply, No. 25. In this he declines a contest in regard to the facts stated by me in No. 24, which I was ready to support: he complains of my proposition for lopping from any future negotiation, every preliminary of a loan, and of explanations upon speeches; and refers to his letter of the 30th of Prairial, No. 16, to prove that this step was unnecessary. But although the first point of his plan in that letter is silent on these demands, they might as I conceived, be hereafter revived, and were for this reason brought again into view: by these means they were effectually renounced. The minister, having the day before I left Paris, published his letter, No. 23, rendered necessary the publication of my answer, No. 24, and the note No. 26, as a preliminary thereto. On the 8th of August, I received at Havre, the minister's letter, No. 27, to which No. 28 is an answer: the former contained the arrêté No. 29; and his desire to send it by the Sophia, probably produced the official impediments which for several days prevented her sailing. The minister is unwilling to admit that the arrêté was the effect of my representations: I believe there is no doubt of the fact; but it is a matter of little consequence. No. 30 and 31, will show that Mr. Hautval in his letter to the minister, relative to our first interview, committed some errours, and candidly corrected them. No. 32 and 33, require no explanation. No. 34, will show the object of the Dutch minister in his conference with me, and requires no comment. I was before informed that this gentleman, if requested, would interpose his good offices; but did not think it proper to make the application. No. 35, has already been the subject of some general remarks. To No. 9, a verbal answer was sent by the minister, that the letters and despatches therein mentioned, " had never reached the government.' On the 26th of July, I left Paris; and from the best information which I could obtain relative to the disposition of the Executive Directory (for I never had any direct communication with them) they were very desirous of a reconciliation between the republicks. Every impediment to my departure had been adopted by the French minister; and he would have prevented it, had he succeeded in his plan of an epistolary dis cussion his object was, as I conceived, to gain time for ascertaining, whether the United States were then disposed to a treaty; of this he manifested doubts, being persuaded that their resentment was too great to admit of it. He seemed also to apprehend, that in consequence of the incredible exertions of Great Britain, and the unequivocal evidence she had given of her ability to defend herself, they were inclined to avenge their injuries, by an alliance with her and that should France come forward with overtures, or the plan of a treaty, she would fail therein, and compromit her honour. I was nevertheless of opinion, that should France be just and liberal in her measures, the government of the United States would still meet her on the ground of accommodation. My judgment was the result of their instructions; for I had never received any other official intelligence since my departure from America I have therefore uniformly inculcated that senti ment. Having been thus in a situation, wherein, amidst a series of events, each has been productive of fresh embarrassments, I have invariably pursued what to me appeared the honour, interest and welfare of my country, and been guided by the sense of the government, as far as I could ascertain it. If the door is still open to peace, the establishment of it must be an happy event to the United States, as it will exempt them from calamities, which notwithstanding delusive appearances, will with short intervals probably continue for half a century, to exhaust and depopulate Europe. But if the national pulse beats high for war, and the wise and constitutional councils of the United States shall consider it as the only safe and honourable alternative, may that Omnipotent Being, who controls events, protect them; and may they commence the war with ardour, continue it with vigour, and termi. nate it with glory. That this will be the issue there can be no doubt, whilst the American republick shall choose UNION for her MOTTO; and profiting by the misfortunes of other nations, shall be convinced that discord will ensure dependence, and concord independence in war and peace. I shall probably when at leisure, give you some other details of less consequence, and in the interim remain, sir, with much esteem and respect, your very humble servant. Timothy Pickering, Esq. Secretary of State of the United States. E. GERRY. No. 1. Paris, May 12, 1798. SIR,-Being informed that Messrs. Prince and Brownfield who expected to sail in the same ship with Gen. Marshall are yet at Bordeaux, I embrace the only favourable opportunity which has occurred since his departure, to enclose you a copy of a note, which I received from Mr. Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Relations, dated the 14th Germinal (April 3d.) of my answer the 4th of April, and of my letter of the 20th of the same month, being the day after Gen. Pinckney left Paris. I had intended to have sent Dr. Tazewell, who is now in my family as secretary, with my despatches to our government, that no time might be lost in obtaining from it such arrangements for supplying my place, as might have enabled me immediately on his return to leave France; but the measure is become unnecessary, by the prospect which I have of being able soon to embark for the United States, with the acquiescence of this government. The decision of the Executive Directory with respect to my colleagues, after we had obtained, what we had been informed in our first conference with Mr. Bellamy was impracticable, a joint interview with the Minister of Foreign Relations, and after the latter had seemed disposed to suspend mat VOL. 111. 42 ters, until we could obtain from our government an answer to our letters, was not less perplexing, than surprising; and their proposition to treat with me separately, was inadmissible. It was a proposition to which I had given my negative above a month before, when made to me under an injunction of secrecy, by the minister of Foreign Relations. I was then informed that an immediate rupture would be the result of my departure from France; and the same communication being again made, with information, that if I was determined not to negotiate separately, this government would be satisfied with my residence here, until the government of the United States could take their measures. I consented to this from publick considerations solely; for every private one was opposed to it. In my embarrassed situation, not losing sight of the great object of our mission, a reconciliation with this powerful republick, I have taken a position, by which I mean to ascertain, if possible, without compromitting the government of the United States or myself, the ultimate views of France with respect to them. It would have been impossible for me under existing circumstances to have consented to a separate negotiation, had the provision been made in our powers and instructions for two of my colleagues, one from the southern, and the other from the middle states, having been sent back, I could have had no prospect of forming a treaty, which would have given general satisfaction to my country; and I could never have undertaken any negotiation, without that prospect. It is therefore incumbent on me to declare that should the result of my present endeavours present to our government, more pleasing prospects, it is nevertheless my firm determination to proceed no further in this negotiation. The want of time and health preventing further communications at present, I have the honour to remain, sir, with great esteem and respect, Your most obedient, &c. E. GERRY. To the Secretary of State of the No. 2. Paris, May 13, 1798. DEAR SIR, I have the honour to inform you, that the Brigantine Sophia arrived at Havre the 11th inst. and last evening at the moment of enclosing my despatches to you of yesterday, Mr. Humphreys delivered me your letter of instructions of the 23d of March, which shall be duly observed. The arrival of this vessel is a fortunate circumstance for me, and I shall embark in her for the United States, in lieu of taking my passage as I had proposed, in one of the American merchantmen now in the ports of France. The ultimate views of this government, |