essential feature of the open-door principle.

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The Persians are undertaking a task which has been and still is baffling and discouraging even to the politically gifted and experienced AngloSaxons. They are molding a nation, which they hope may be unified and independent; they are making a government, which they wish to be a representative, respectable, and efficient instrument of economic and social progress. They are apparently getting ahead in their task in spite of formidable difficulties. The geographical situation of the country is, of course, one of its handicaps. As a young and none too reverent Persian once remarked to me, "God had become careless when he got around to make Persia." Largely because of geography, it is necessary at this late date for Persia to modernize its primitive culture and to develop neglected resources while working out the problem of self-government.

To complicate her problem, the Great War broke War broke upon upon Persia, strangled her commerce and her revenues, violated her territory, devastated her villages, and demoralized her politics. As a result Persia finds herself to-day bearing a burden of post-war reconstruction comparable in relative magnitude to that of any of the belligerent countries.

In judging the capacity of Persia to work out its own salvation, one must take into consideration its human and psychological resources. Persia has an admixture of various racial elements, but the core of the population is Aryan. An ancient inscription calls King Darius "an Aryan of Aryan race"; and the word "Iran" suggests

its own derivation. The Persians are in general dark, but there are many blonds among them.

A visitor to the country is naturally most impressed at first by its points of contrast with the West, and it is only after becoming accustomed to the new surroundings that one perceives and appreciates the points of likeness. The tribal instinct, unless a conscious effort is made to correct it, leads us to consider any foreigner as an "inferior." Travelers and press correspondents in Persia are naturally disposed to play up the strange and the sensational. Diplomats in Teheran seem inclined to attribute to "Oriental" character the annoying delays, which, however, occur in negotiations in all capitals and should be particularly expected in a country where the lessons of diplomatic history point especially to the value of caution. Absorption in a task of administrative reform tends to bring evils into relief and to create feelings of antagonism. Moreover, when we first went to Persia, almost every Persian with whom we talked, having some particular disappointing experience or subjective interest, leveled a withering indictment at all Persians except himself. Nothing seems to me more useful, therefore, in reaching reasoned conclusions regarding the character of a foreign people than the mustering by the observer of as much judicial temperament as possible, a sense of historical perspective, and a willingness to make comparisons.

Persia can be fairly termed a backward country, but in my opinion its backwardness is due to conditions which are subject to change rather than to any inherent and ineradicable defects in the character of the people. We have seen in America how in va

rious sections of the country, because of hard living, the institution of slavery, climate, isolation, frontier conditions, or what not, certain definable and recognizable local types of personality and character have taken shape. It would not be surprising if the peculiar conditions-historical, geographical, topographical, climatic, economic, and social-which have existed in Persia should have developed certain special characteristics in the people. These special characteristics unquestionably exist; but they partly or wholly disappear in the case of Persians who have lived during the formative periods of their lives in western countries or have been educated abroad or in the American School at Teheran. One Persian differs in character from another precisely as Americans differ; but, apart from the superficialities of dress and manners, they look, think, talk, and act like the rest of us. They are human beings, having their individual virtues and faults. They are certainly, in general, not an "inferior" people.

It is impossible to describe a whole people, as it is to indict them; but there are traits that are common among the Persians and which perceptibly affect their political and economic functioning. The average Persian is invariably polite and hospitable, particularly to foreigners. He goes about his work leisurely, taking more intellectual interest in philosophy and poetry than in more practical subjects. He talks much, particularly of politics, but his conversation concerns itself for the most part with persons and only slightly with principles. He shows at all times a quick intelligence and ready wit, and, when submitted a proposal, reveals an unsurpassed gift of criticism.

He is prone to inaccuracy in handling facts. He usually hesitates long before coming to a decision or taking action and is disposed to procrastinate. In negotiation he shows himself a shrewd bargainer. He is temperamentally emotional but seldom acts on impulse. He is essentially more conservative than the average American and less likely to be changeable in public matters.

In the mind of the average Persian the sense of patriotism and of social responsibility is rudimentary. In the past he has belonged to a family which has been to him an almost complete and self-sufficient social and economic organization. He instinctively gives his allegiance, therefore, to his family. rather than to the state. He is likely to have little confidence in any one outside his own family, and it is difficult if not impossible to induce him to organize or join a stock-company or other commercial society. Communistic propaganda makes little headway with him. He lacks the Anglo-Saxon conception of the sacredness of law and contracts; and, while neither cruel nor heartless, he rarely manifests any deep sentiment of humanitarianism. Those of his actions which spring from loyalty to family and lack of public spirit are often cited by foreigners to prove his dishonesty and incapacity; but it should be recalled, before casting the first stone at him, that the standard of honesty is relative; that, measured by their own standards, there is widespread dishonesty among western people; that it was only two hundred years ago that Walpole, surveying Parliament, remarked, "All of these men have their price." The Persian loyalty to family is no more immoral than the choice made by Robert E. Lee

when he decided to serve Virginia against the United States. When we hear of a tribal uprising in Persia we should recall, therefore, that such disorder is no evidence of incapacity for self-government; that the country is in a well-advanced state of transition from separatism to nationalism; that occasional growing-pains are to be expected; that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy likewise had their periods of transition and unification; and that even the United States, within the memory of men now living, went through a sanguinary war before it attained national solidarity.

It is my opinion that most of the Persian characteristics which are of public significance and which are condemned by foreigners will undergo rapid modification as nationalism and industrialism develop in the country. The Persians are adaptable and peculiarly amenable to example and leadership. They are intelligent and industrious. After transportation, they place universal education first in their program of progress. Personally neat and cleanly, they are every year extending and improving their means of public sanitation. Persians of the official class are liberal and tolerant in their religious thinking. In Persian womanhood there is a store of tremendous energy, not now fully available, which will eventually add its force to the progressive and stabilizing influences in the country.

There is, moreover, in the Parliament and in the ministries a growing number of Persians who in intelligence, energy, honesty, and public spirit compare favorably with statesmen of any country. These steadfast friends of reform in general and of the American Mission in particular exercise an in

fluence in Parliament and among the people which is at times of crisis practically decisive.

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In Reza Khan Pahlevi, moreover, the new Persia has produced the necessary leader. My first glimpse of this extraordinary man, who, like the progressives that I have just referred to, embodies most of the strong points and few of the weaknesses of the average Persian, was in a garden outside the city on a December day in 1922 at the end of his long journey from Bushire, where he had met the Shah on the return of the latter from Paris. Reza Khan was walking among his officers— a tall, straight, powerful figure, a strong ruddy face, eyes and nose like those of an eagle. There was much in his face to indicate strong will; I was to learn later of his courtesy, cordiality, humor, and common sense. He has been Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Minister of War since 1921; since the fall of 1923 he has been Prime Minister. Endowed with unusual powers of decision and discipline, possessing organizing ability of no mean order, he has created and maintained a welldrilled and well-equipped army, and, beginning with the Kurds of the northwest, has successfully prosecuted a policy of subjugation and disarming of the tribes. He is cementing the Persian nation. He belongs, in many respects, to the class of statesmen of which Henry II of England and Philip Augustus of France were the prototypes. He has supplied the personal and military force which is necessary to establish the authority of the central government, without which there could be no secure basis for economic progress.

Persia's economic problem-her case of arrested development-gets its first explanation in geography and its second in history.

The westward-moving tide of world trade and industry left Persia, figuratively and literally, high and dry. With the exception of the Caspian provinces and the shores of the Persian Gulf, Persia is a table-land, buttressed and crossed by mountain ranges. Save for the Karun, in the extreme southwest, there are no navigable rivers in Persia. The meager streams of the plateau flow toward the interior and lose themselves in salt deserts. Moreover, the topographical conditions which present obstacles to commerce are no doubt important factors in determining the climate of Persia. The rainfall between the Caspian coast and the Elburz Mountains is too abundant, but in the interior it rarely exceeds six inches. As a result, while dry farming is possible in a few regions, the agriculture of Persia has depended for the most part on artificial irrigation; and, although agriculture has remained the chief industry of the country, it has, because of transportation difficulties, played little part in

commerce.

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Persia in the time of Cyrus and Darius was a world empire characterized by splendid power and creative civilization. Darius's post-road was a transportation wonder of the ancient world; even now one can see from the Hamadan-Kazvin-Teheran highway

the huge earth-mounds said to have been thrown up by Shah Abbas in the sixteenth century to serve as a chain of signal-communication across the country; unbelievable tales are told of the

speed of Persian couriers. Persia, nevertheless, has never been either externally or internally a commercial country. The development of a true commerce has lain to the west, with Phenicia, Athens, Venice, the Hanse towns, Holland, and England.

The medieval trade-routes to India and China passed down the Red Sea from Alexandria, or overland from Antioch or Damascus through Bagdad and down the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, or from Trebizond on the Black Sea along the south end of the Caspian through Bokhara and Samarkand in present-day Russian Turkestan. The ships and caravans of the time naturally took the lines of least resistance; they merely skirted Persia; they did not originate in the country or pass through it except at the borders. The discovery of the westward route to India and China did not seem, from the economic point of view, likely to improve the situation of Persia. In course of time, however, the British Empire, assuming the governance of India, became a neighbor of Persia, and the tide of Russian expansion reached the borders of Persia in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this pregnant period, Persia not only came into territorial contact with two western powers but she began to sense the significance of the recently acquired world positions of the United States and Germany. During this period Persia became to other countries an object of intensive economic interest.

The tide of commerce had rolled back on Persia. Modern industrial civilization with its potent political accessories had found Persia in its path. West and East had met again, but not as in the time of Cyrus and

Xerxes, of Alexander, and of Crassus. Persia was no longer an empire among empires. She had now become a buffer-state and one of the world's last and most unique frontiers.

In 1872 British telegraph lines crossed Persia; in the following year the Shah for the first time visited Europe; in 1876 a concession for the Caspian fisheries was given to a Russian subject; in 1888 the first railway in Persia, a short line from Teheran to the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim, was constructed; in the following year a concession was granted to British interests for a state bank, including exclusive mineral rights; and in 1890 the British obtained a tobacco concession. From that year, which, by the way, marks the dismissal of Bismarck, Persia became increasingly more important in the economic policies of foreign powers, and, for the last thirty-five years, the question of transportation in the Middle East has repeatedly arisen in international negotiations, as well as in Persia's plans for its own economic development. The imminence of the problem to Persia, as well as its international significance, was shown at the end of the nineteenth century, when the Turkish links of the railroad from Berlin to the Persian Gulf began to become actualities. Later, the British obtained railroad options in the south of Persia; and the Russians, highway concessions in the north. It became clear that transportation offered the key to Persia's economic future.

With the exception of opium and fresh and dried fruits, Persia, although she is primarily an agricultural country with a varied climate and rich soil, exports at the present time only negligible quantities of agricultural and animal products. Nevertheless, the

large-scale stimulation of agricultural production in Persia by the extension of irrigation and the introduction of machinery does not appear to be economically desirable or possible until improved transportation facilities have been provided to carry the surplus products to the markets.

The vital need of better transportation in Persia has been impressed upon the American Mission through our administration of the Alimentation Service. Surplus wheat and barley may be rotting in the fields in one part of Persia while six hundred miles away the population may be suffering from a bread-famine. Such a famine at the close of the war compelled the Government to establish throughout Teheran and adjacent provinces a monopoly of grain, fixing the price of its purchase from the landowners and of its sale to the bakers, as well as the price of bread, assuming at the same time the control of grain transport and of the bakeries. The administration of this monopoly at present constitutes one of our most responsible and delicate duties.

Similarly, Persia's contribution to the solution of the world opium problem depends in large part on the improvement of transportation in Persia. Opium cultivation is one of the important agricultural industries of the country and the only one which at present makes any substantial contribution to the export trade. The reason is that opium when prepared for export is a compact commodity, representing large value in small bulk, and it can be transported long distances by packanimals and wagons at a profit. The opium poppy is raised in eighteen of the twenty-six provinces; its cultivation is scattered over an area of four hundred thousand square miles.