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presence of Masonic and Jewish influences in the Salonica Committee. Atheists and Jews, native and foreign, it is said, are exploiting the true believers and ruining the Empire for their own benefit. In proof of this assertion is cited the fact that, while all other communities, Moslem and Christian alike, are complaining, the Jewish community alone seems satisfied with the actual state of affairs. Nor is this anti-Jewish feeling confined to the Turks. The Greeks regard their Jewish competitors at Salonica as the real instigators of the commercial boycott from which the latter alone have profited. The Armenians charge the Jews with the design of robbing the victims of the last massacre of their lands with a view to settling Jewish colonies upon them. The efforts of the Zionists to take advantage of the Constitution in order to further the realisation of their dream of a new Palestinian State have aroused keen resentment among the Arabs. Among all these elements a suspicion prevails that the revolution is nothing else than the product of a Judæo-Turkish intrigue on a gigantic scale-Jewish brains directing Turkish brutality for the promotion of ends very remotely, if at all, connected with the prosperity of the Ottoman Empire.
Thus the mishaps which have befallen the Empire under the new régime, and the misdeeds of which its rulers have been guilty, have combined to discredit the innovators, to increase the numbers of malcontents both in Europe and Asia, and to foster the belief that it is, on the whole, better to be ruled by one strong man than by a multitude of irresponsible charlatans who do not know their own minds from day to day, who consider arrogance an adequate substitute for competence, and who have not only failed to heal the old wounds, but have opened new ones in the Ottoman body politic.
For all that, it would be unwise to overrate the force of popular feeling in a country where the popular mind is at once so undisciplined and so unenterprising as in Turkey. A similar feeling existed for many years against Abdul Hamid, but it did not express itself in action until it permeated the men who controlled the army. The Committee may therefore consider itself safe so long as it enjoys the confidence of the army. But the officers who brought about the revolution no longer
unanimous in their support of the Committee. In the struggle between Mahmud Shevket Pasha, Minister of War, and Djavid Bey, Minister of Finance and one of the principal leaders of the Salonica clique, the majority of the officers sided with the former and caused the fall of the latter. Again, the most recent split in the ranks of the Committee was brought about by the defection of Colonel Sadik and other soldiers. It is important to remember that these men, in overthrowing Abdul Hamid, sought thereby to reanimate their country's military power; and it is a matter of comparative indifference to them whether such a reanimation is to be effected through the Padishah or through a Parliament. In the heir presumptive to the throne the officers have a prince after their own heart-a soldier credited with great ambition and autocratic tendencies, a kind of Turkish Kaiser. It is not impossible that the majority of them may soon grasp the fact that to the military efficiency of the Empire parliamentary institutions are not indispensable. When that takes place, the days of the Salonica doctrinaires will be numbered.
The chaos prevailing in the political world of Turkey appeared to be approaching its climax when the unexpected invasion of Tripoli came to divert the attention of Turkish politicians from their internecine feuds to external dangers. The first effect of this event was to supply the Committee's enemies with a fresh weapon of attack; but the successful resistance which the Turkish forces in Tripoli have offered to the Italian arms has helped to restore in a measure the Committee's reputation for the moment. It would, nevertheless, be idle to consider the improvement in the internal situation as other than transient. The war, if prolonged and extended to the Turkish coasts, may lead to events which will not only shake the Young Turk edifice to its foundations, but may even threaten the existence of the Ottoman Empire.
Among the great forces of disintegration from within, the Arabian and Albanian nationalist movements stand foremost; and it is instructive to note that, while among the Arabs aggression from an infidel quarter upon an Arab-speaking province has kindled a religious fervour which, for the time being, has cast political animosities
into the background, among the Albanians that aggression has had a totally different effect. The Malissori, exasperated by the Porte's failure to fulfil its promises of compensation for the property damaged during the last insurrection, and goaded by their sufferings from exposure to cold and rain which that failure involved, are ready to rise again. The other tribes are scarcely better disposed towards the Turks. Shortly before the Italian war, the Moslems of Rozaj had revolted, killed the Kaimakam, and captured the Turkish garrison. A few days earlier the Moslems of Djakova had also revolted and taken prisoner the Vali. When, on the outbreak of hostilities with Italy, the governor of Skutari called upon the Moslems of his province for 5000 volunteers, he found only fifteen individuals willing to respond to his appeal. Such is the attitude even of the Moslem Albanians, who have so often in the past shed their blood readily for the defence of the Empire. Among their Christian fellowcountrymen Italy's action has roused wild hopes of deliverance; and while the Tosks of the south look to that Power for help, the Catholic clans of the north entertain expectations of assistance from Austria, both sections agreeing that it matters little who succeeds the Turkish ruler, provided that ruler disappears. Already sporadic risings, inspired by the Porte's preoccupation in Tripoli, have taken place; and in the Lyuma district there occurred in November a serious conflict between Albanian insurgents and Turkish troops. Should the Albanian ferment culminate in another insurrection on a considerable scale, it is almost certain to be followed by external complications of the gravest character. As M. Pinon observes ("L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie,' p. 348): From the international point of view, the intervention of Russia in favour of Montenegro, and that of Austria in favour of Albania, are important events. The action of Russia shows the resolution of the St Petersburg cabinet not to abandon its Slay clients. The intervention of Count. Aehrenthal, followed by such prompt results, was a fresh success for Austrian policy. Austrian influence in Albania is thereby enhanced materially and morally. At the same time Italy suffered a set-back. Recent events, therefore,... disclose the great importance of the Albanian question, both for the Ottoman Empire and for Europe,'
The aggressive spirit manifested by the Young Turks immediately after the establishment of the Constitution has alarmed all the States which at one time formed provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and which have never lost sight of the ambition to liberate the portions of their respective races still under Ottoman domination. Their alarm has expressed itself in vigorous preparations for self-defence and self-expansion. Both Greece and Bulgaria have hastened to revise their Constitutions. The Bulgarian army, always good, has been brought to a greater degree of efficiency. The Greek army and navy, for many years in a deplorable condition, are now reorganised by French and British experts. Servia also is strengthening her military resources. Montenegro, thanks to the shrewd part which King Nicholas has played in the Albanian insurrection, has increased its prestige. None of these States has any cause to feel well-inclined towards Turkey. The Turco-Bulgarian negotiations for a commercial treaty, intended to establish the financial relations between the two countries on a firm basis, have so far been barren of result, the Porte refusing to continue towards Bulgarian imports the treatment which they enjoyed before the complete severance of that State from the Ottoman Empire in 1908. Greece is indignant against the Young Turks owing chiefly to the Cretan question, the solution of which, in accordance with Hellenic aspirations, has been so far frustrated by Turkish opposition. Montenegro has not yet obtained the rectification of its frontier promised by Turkey as a reward for King Nicholas's mediation with the Albanians. Further, all these States seem to have renounced for the present the mutual jealousies which once separated them, and are now in a condition of eager expectancy, each declaring that it will not be the first to set the spark to the inflammable material, but all admitting that, once the spark has been set, they will try to derive the maximum of profit from the conflagration at Turkey's expense.
The Ottoman Empire might view with comparative equanimity the preparations inade by its smaller neighbours, were it not for the fact that the Great Powers beyond are intimately connected with those developments. Italy has already thrown off the mask as regards her anxiety to expand in Africa at Turkey's cost. She is known to cherish a similar desire of expansion in southern Albania and to have aided the rebels last summer with arms. Austria and, possibly, Russia nourish ambitions of a similar nature. The Turkish revolution had brought about a temporary suspension in their activity. But the sinister course of events inside Turkey has rendered the continuance of a neutral attitude impossible. Last summer Austria not only aided the northAlbanian insurgents secretly with arms, but openly expressed herself in sympathy with them.
Russia encouraged the King of Montenegro in his protection of the Albanian refugees and furnished him with funds for the purpose. Both Vienna and St Petersburg addressed to the Porte minatory Notes, which did more than Albanian valour to persuade the Young Turks that a timely concession was the only alternative to AustroRussian intervention. If these Powers abstained from such intervention a few months ago, the causes of their abstention must be sought outside the Balkan Peninsula. The Moroccan imbroglio obliged Austria to keep her hands free in order to support her German ally, should necessity arise. The Persian imbroglio engrossed Russia's attention. But the rôle these Powers played, openly and secretly, in the Albanian trouble indicates in an unambiguous manner the part they are prepared to take in other Balkan troubles that may arise in the immediate future through the Turco-Italian war.
Other indications pointing in the same direction are not wanting. Austria has lately established with Bulgaria a close diplomatic and commercial understanding, which, with Roumania already bound to the Triple Alliance by a military convention, greatly strengthens the Austrian position in the Balkan peninsula. Since the declaration of Turco-Italian hostilities, the Austro-Hungarian Government has found it necessary to reinforce its garrisons along the Novibazar frontier on a scale very little removed from mobilisation.
Russia, on her part, has not remained idle. Besides her traditional friendship with Montenegro, she has recently confirmed her influence over Servia, not only through the marriage of a Servian princess to a Russian Grand Duke, but also, there are reasons to believe, by a political and military alliance.