of historical record, that Pope Sylvester sacrificed to the devil, that Pope Formosus obtained the chair by perjury, that his holiness, Sergius III., caused another Pope's body to be digged up out of his grave, the head to be cut off and thrown into the Tiber, and that Pope Boniface imprisoned his infallible predecessor and plucked out his eyes?

These are but a few samples of the immaculate orthodoxy of the successors of St. Peter! Atheists and blasphemers, rebels and murderers, conjurors and adulterers supply not a few of the links of this apostolical chain! No wonder that not a man who has ever occupied the papal throne has ever presumed to bear the name of Peter after his inauguration; even when they had formerly been known by that name, they changed it at their accession to the chair! Thus Peter de Tarantasia became Innocent IV.; Peter Carafa changed his name to Paul V.; and Sergius III. was once a Peter too. This fact would seem to imply that these men must have been conscious of the vast disparity between Peter the Pope, and Peter the apostle! It is not without reason, certainly, that the anecdote is related of the famous painter, Raphael Urbin, who, when reproved by the Pope for putting too much colour on the faces of Peter and Paul, replied, that he did it on purpose to represent them as blushing in heaven to see what successors they had on the earth!

CHAPTER XXV.

THE Treatises on the virtue of hope and the virtue of charity, which constitute the 2d and 3d parts of the second volume, although marked by a few peculiarities, contain nothing which would be specially interesting to the general reader, and I therefore omit them. The Treatise concerning Right and Justice, which occupies a large portion of the third

volume, presents amongst other things sound practical casuistry in a variety of cases in which restitution should be made, about which, however, there could be very little debate among men of common honesty. The 88th, and the following sections of this treatise may speak for themselves.

Concerning the grievousness of the sin of theft and rapine. (88.)

"How great a sin are theft and rapine?

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“Ans. They are from their very nature mortal sins. It is proved from 1 Cor. vi. 10., where it is said: thieves, nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God:' besides they are grievously repugnant to the love and justice of our neighbour, and tend to overturn the common peace.

"Obj. Prov. vi. 30. It is said, 'The fault is not so great, when a man hath stolen: for he stealeth to fill his hungry soul.'

"St. Thomas replies to this: I. 'It must be said that theft is declared to be not a great fault for a twofold reason. First, indeed, on account of the necessity inducing to theft, which diminishes or totally removes the fault. And hence, it is added: for he stealeth to fill his hungry soul. Theft is said in another mode not to be a great fault by compari son with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death. And hence it is added, concerning the thief, that if he be taken he shall restore sevenfold: but he that is an adulterer shall destroy his own soul.'

"In how many ways may theft be venial?

"Principally in two ways: namely, from the imperfect deliberation of the act; and from the trifling value of the

matter.

"The former mode is not easily imagined in the external removal of the property of another, but it may more readily be done by inflicting injury, and by internal acts. The theft, for instance, of a single farthing is venial by reason of the small value of the thing.

"Some add two other modes, 1. From ignorance slightly culpable, that the thing was the property of another.

"2. That the owner in an important matter is not much

opposed, but is unwilling only as to the mode of taking it. But these two ways may be absolutely reduced to the trifling value of the thing; because, although a thing may be important in itself, yet in the degree of this theft, it may be said to be of little moment.

“The theft of a trifling thing may become mortal in various ways, as will be shown hereafter.

"What quantity is requisite before a theft can be mortal in regard to its matter?

"Ans. Certain authors refer the quantity respectively to the persons, upon whom the loss is inflicted: so that a thing may be a mortal matter if it is taken from a poor person, which would not be mortal if it were taken from a rich man : but this in our day appears antiquated, and the absolute quantity is now usually determined not by considering whether the person from whom it may be taken is rich or poor: the reason is that the richer has not a less right over his property than the poorer person; and, therefore, when an equal quantity is taken from both sides, injury is in so far inflicted, not less on the richer than on the poorer.

"With these remarks the fact agrees that the penitent in confession ought to declare, whether he has taken the thing from a poor or from a rich man: but this is not in regard to the theft, but on account of the inconvenience and the consequences, which usually proceed from a theft committed on a poor man; as, his earnings being suspended, loss accruing, hunger, grief, &c.: but all these things are apart from the theft.

"If you say that a rich man is not so unwilling as to the theft of, for instance, 24 farthings: I reply that he must be presumed to be unwilling in proportion to the amount. That if it is admitted that the owner is not much opposed, then indeed it may become venial, as was said above: but independently of the question, whether the owner is rich or poor. "What quantity appears absolutely sufficient for mortal theft in regard to amount?

"The more common and plausible opinion reckons that the hire or daily wages of a man labouring in some honourable trade is sufficient; that is three or four shillings for this time and for this country; because, in proportion as daily labour is accounted severe, the pay is correspondent.

"It is said, three or four shillings; because this quantity cannot be physically or mathematically determined, but only morally; and perhaps it is concealed for this reason,' says St. August. (Bk. xxi. de Civ. Dei. last chap.,) 'lest the desire might abate of improving so as to avoid all sins.' And 17th chap. of Enchirid. he says: there are certain things, which it is more useful not to know than to know.'

"It is said, also, for this time and for this country; because, where money is more plenty or more scarce, a greater or less quantity is requisite, and in the time in which money was more scarce here, a less quantity was sufficient; as in accordance with these things, the daily pay of a labourer is usually increased or diminished."

Concerning the palliations or Excuses of thefts. (89.)

"There are two principal claims, under which thests are wont to be covered; namely, the claims of necessity, and of just compensation. Hence it is asked:

"Whether it is lawful to steal in a case of necessity: or rather, whether it is lawful to take another's property on account of necessity?

"I. Observe. It is important to distinguish a threefold necessity: extreme, in which life is in danger: urgent, in which health, or station is endangered; and common, which the poor suffer everywhere.

II. Ans. It is lawful to take another man's property, either secretly or openly, in so far as there is necessity for supplying extreme want: the reason is, because then all things are common.

"If this was lawful in order to supply my own extreme necessity, the same will be lawful for the necessity of my neighbour; unless I can succour him from my own means.

This case alone is excepted, namely, when by taking another man's property, the owner would be also brought into similar necessity.

"Is he thought to be in extreme necessity, who by asking or begging can relieve his extreme necessity?

"Ans. No: for no one is thought to be in extreme necessity, who may relieve it by lawful means, nor should this means be called unbecoming for an honourable man: for nothing is dishonourable for necessity. Besides such a pre

text would open the door for many thefts and for disturbance of the state.

"Should those things which are taken away through necessity be restored?

"If the thing taken away still remains after the necessity is over, it is doubtless to be restored: because extreme necessity does not confer a right to another man's property except in so far as is necessary for its relief: and hence if, in order to escape death, you have made use of another man's horse, you ought to restore it when the exigency is over.

"If the thing be consumed, for instance, wine, bread, &c., he ought to restore nothing, even if after suffering want he should come into better fortune. Except unless he has goods elsewhere, and thus may be supposed rather to take another's property by way of borrowing; for then it should be restored: nor is such a one properly in extreme necessity, but only in respect to some thing.

"What must be said concerning common and urgent necessity?

"It is agreed among all that it is not lawful to take another's property on account of common necessity.

"Nor is it lawful to take what is another's on account of any pressing necessity whatsoever, distinct from extreme; because goods do not become common on account of such a necessity; the reason is, because as cases of urgent necessity are very common, disturbance of the state would easily ensue if then it were lawful to steal the property of another. "Hence this 36th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI. It is permitted to steal not only in extreme but also in urgent necessity.'

:

"Yet authors agree that the sin of him who steals from urgent necessity is diminished so much the more as the necessity is greater.

66

Obj. St. Thomas does not distinguish between extreme and urgent necessity, therefore, &c.

"Ans. I deny the antecedent. It is plain from Art. 7, in corp., &c.

"Obj. II. The things which some persons have superabundantly, are due by natural law to the support of the poor, says St. Thomas: but this is true, not only in extreme, but