Opinion of the Court. employment of officers over whom they are given control, they may select such persons, under appropriate regulations, as they may deem suitable and competent for the discharge of the duties pertaining to such offices, without regard to their possessing the qualifications prescribed by said § 354. Moreover, we think, the reasons actuating Congress in 1867 and in the 43d Congress, for requiring that a member of the District police should be an honorably discharged soldier or sailor, did not exist, at least in the same degree, in 1878. When this qualificational provision was first enacted, the war had not been long ended, and it was but in harmony with the general liberal policy of the government of the United States towards those who had fought in its army and navy during that conflict, that a discrimination should be made in their favor, in the matter of appointments to various places of trust in the nation's capital. Their appointment on the police force would serve also to imbue that force with at least some of the precision and attention to duty found in all well regulated military companies that have seen actual service. But in 1878, the war had been over a number of years, and those who had participated in its struggles were growing old, and were becoming less able physically to perform all the duties of a member of the police force. Under those conditions, it is entirely consistent with the policy of Congress to hold that they intended to abolish the qualificational standard orginating in the act of 1867. That standard of qualification was for the benefit, as we have said, of those who had served in the war; and to carry it along indefinitely would make it apply to those who had enlisted and been discharged in time of peace, as well as to those for whose benefit it was originally intended. As was said by the court below, "it is not likely that Congress intended to discriminate between the citizen and the soldier or sailor of a peace establishment." We are not unmindful of the rule that repeals by implication. are not favored. But there is another rule of construction equally sound and well settled which we think applies to this case. Stated in the language of this court in United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 92, it is this: "When there are two acts Opinion of the Court. on the same subject the rule is to give effect to both if possible. But if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first; and even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act." See also Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 617; Tracy v. Tuffly, 134 U. S. 206, 223; Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 459. It is contended, however, that by the act of January 31, 1883, (22 Stat. 412, c. 41; Sup. to Rev. Stat. 2d edition, 397,) Congress recognized said § 354 as a still subsisting law, and that that consideration should compel a reversal of the judgment below. We are not impressed with this contention. The object of the act just referred to was to abolish the detective force established by § 340 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, and to increase the police force in certain respects. The fourth section, which is the one relied on as sustaining the view contended for, is as follows: "That the commissioners may, and they are hereby, authorized to appoint not more than six privates, to be members of the police force, from among citizens of the United States, who have or have not served in the army and navy of the United States, but who shall possess all the other qualifications prescribed by section three hundred and fifty-four of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia." It is manifest, however, from an inspection of this section. that there was no recognition in it by Congress that said § 354 was still subsisting law. But even if Congress had supposed that that section was still the law, when, as a matter of fact, it had been repealed, it would make no difference in this consideration. Postmaster General v. Early, 12 Wheat. 136, 148; Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 270; United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546, 548. The question is, was said § 354 repealed by the act of 1878? That is a judicial question, to be determined by the courts, upon a proper construction of that section and subsequent legislation upon the same subject Syllabus. matter, and is not for the legislative branch of the government to determine. Authorities last cited. The act of January 31, 1883, did not profess to reënact the provisions of § 354, and we do not think there is anything in that act running counter to the view we have taken in this case of the repeal of that section by the act of 1878. It is further argued that if said § 354 be considered repealed by the act of 1878, then certain other named sections of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia must also be held to be repealed, and that certain evil consequences will flow from such ruling with respect to those specified sections. That, however, is a consideration not properly involved in this case. Whether those specified sections or any others of said Revised Statutes were repealed by the act of 1878 we do not now decide. Our decision and judgment has reference solely to section 354. It will be time enough to consider other questions when they are properly before us. Judgment affirmed. NATIONAL STEAMSHIP COMPANY v. TUGMAN. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 150. Argued January 11, 1892. - Decided February 1, 1892. In a case reversed in this court and remanded to a state court upon the ground that that court had lost its jurisdiction by petition and bond for removal, the propriety of staying proceedings in the Circuit Court after removal, until costs adjudged in the state court are paid, is purely a matter of discretion in the Circuit Court. On the trial of an action to recover from a carrier freights improperly collected from the consignees on shipments by plaintiff, plaintiff, who was his own witness, was asked several questions with the apparent design of showing that he had had other transactions with the defendant, upon which he was indebted to defendant, and that there was a judgment pending against him in favor of defendant. Held, that these questions were not admissible. It being shown that a paper was served as a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the defendant, with an order to show cause in the action on trial, it is Opinion of the Court. thereby sufficiently authenticated to enable it to be read in evidence against him, and it is competent evidence on behalf of the plaintiff as an admission by the defendant that the facts stated in the affidavit are true. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John Chetwood for plaintiff in error. Mr. Delos McCurdy for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action at law originally begun in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, by the plaintiff Tugman, to recover of the National Steamship Company, defendant, for the conversion of freights alleged to have been wrongfully and fraudulently collected from the consignees of certain cargoes shipped by the plaintiff upon the defendant's vessels. Upon entering its appearance the defendant filed a petition and bond for the removal of the action to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, upon the ground of the citizenship of the plaintiff and its own alienage. The removal was denied by the state court, the case tried and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the General Term, and again by the Court of Appeals. A writ of error was thereupon sued out from this court, and the case reversed with $108.34 costs, upon the ground that the state court lost its jurisdiction by the petition and bond for removal. The case was remanded to the state court with direction to accept the bond and “proceed no further in the cause." 106 U. S. 118. On filing the mandate of this court in the Supreme Court of New York, the defendant steamship company had its costs taxed at $1206.33, including an extra allowance of $500 ordered by the court, and a judgment was entered in that court for this sum. A transcript having been filed in the Circuit Court of the United States, and the case coming on for trial, the defendant moved for a stay of proceedings until its costs were paid, and the court ordered a stay until the payment of the costs, $108.34, in this court only. 30 Fed. Rep. 802. Defendant Opinion of the Court. declined to receive this amount, whereupon the stay was vacated, the case went to trial, and plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment under the direction of the court for $7549.59. To reverse this judgment the defendant sued out a writ of error from this court. (1) The first assignment of error of the steamship company is to the refusal of the court to stay proceedings on the part of the plaintiff until the payment of the costs in the state courts, as taxed. We do not deem it necessary to express an opinion whether, in view of our mandate to accept the bond for removal and proceed no further in the case, the state court had jurisdiction to enter up a judgment for costs against the plaintiff in that court, since the propriety of staying proceedings until payment of these costs, whether evidenced by a judgment or by a simple taxation, was purely a matter of discretion in the court below. There were certain reasons why, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that court might refuse such stay. The plaintiff had obtained a judgment in the state court which had been affirmed by the General Term and the Court of Appeals. Such judgment, it is true, had been reversed by this court, not by reason of any want of merits, however, but for the failure of that court to recognize a removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States. Under such circumstances, and in view of the apparent inability of the plaintiff to pay these costs, it was perfectly competent for the court to permit him to go on with the case upon the assumption that, if he succeeded in obtaining a judgment, the right, if it had any, of defendant to such costs could be secured by deducting them from such judgment. The result of the trial having been again adverse to the defendant, it certainly has no right to complain of that which could work it no possible injury. (2) Upon the examination of the plaintiff, who was his own witness, he was asked several questions with the apparent design of showing that he had had transactions with the defendant in New York, upon which he was indebted to it, and that there was a judgment pending against him in favor of the defendant. This was clearly immaterial. The fact that he |