Puslapio vaizdai
PDF
„ePub“

-

from motives, but follows instinctively his natural tendencies, and obeys them without the least reflection. He is not properly moral in this epoch, performs, in fact, no moral act, and is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, is not a man with faculties, but a thing with properties. This epoch is of uncertain duration, but with many, perhaps the majority, it lasts through life.-2. The selfish epoch; in which man governs his tendencies by reason and directs them to a common end, to wit, his own individual interest. He now acts from a rational motive, but not a moral motive. — 3. The benevolent epoch; in which man seeks to subordinate his own interest to the interest of other beings beside himself, and to make the general good of other beings the motive of his conduct. In this epoch he is translated out of selfishness, but hardly into the region of morality. 4. The moral epoch. In this epoch, his reason developed, man perceives that the universe tends to a common end, to wit, universal order, or absolute good. The realization of absolute good becomes now his motive, the end to which he directs all his efforts. Now he is moral, virtuous, meritorious.

1. This sounds well, but it will hardly bear examination. Virtue, we grant, is in the will or motive from which we act; but we are not able to act from purely disinterested motives, as M. Jouffroy himself seems to admit; consequently, we cannot will this absolute good in the purely disinterested sense demanded. It is impossible for man to will without more or less reference to himself. In our moments of exaltation we may fancy we put ourselves entirely out of the question, and can will our own damnation, as our Hopkinsian friends teach; but we deceive ourselves. We do not even love God disinterestedly. Some one says,

"God! I would fear thee, though I feared not hell; And love thee, though I had no hopes of heaven," and with truth, if he means no other hell than that of not loving, and no other heaven than that of loving. We always seek to possess what we love, and in some sense do possess it. In loving God, we in some degree participate of his infinite beauty and goodness, and if we did not, we would not and could not love him. In love, charity, we are united to him, and he to us; we become one with him. Is not this the highest reward we can conceive of? and what but reference to this reward, this ineffable joy which we experience in this love, makes us will to persist in loving? What but the desire of possessing this in a still greater degree draws us nearer and nearer to God, and fills

us more and more with his divine charity? Assume that in loving God we found not this reward, this ineffable joy, that we in fact gained nothing, tasted nothing, could we love him? Nay, what is more to our purpose, could we will to love him? What would be the motive of such a will?

Moreover, virtue and duty are closely related, for virtue is always obligatory, and may be enforced as a duty. But how enforce a duty without appeal to rewards or punishments? If I gain nothing by doing my duty, and lose nothing by not doing it, I am the same whether I do it or not. How, then, find any motives to persuade me to do it, or to dissuade me from neglecting it? The good I am to will is absolute good; then it is independent of me, and remains unaffected, let me will what I may. What motives, then, can influence me to will it, save such motives as appeal directly or indirectly to my own good or evil?

But we may be told, this good we are to will is the good of others, and that the motive to do good to others without hope. of reward is sufficient to induce us to will it. But, in the first place, it is not yet settled, that what I am required to will is for the good of others. It is called universal order, absolute good; but, at bottom, it is merely the satisfaction by each being of all its natural tendencies. Whether this is good or not can be determined only by determining what is good in itself, which M. Jouffroy has not done. In the second place, the simple willing of the good of others is not virtue. I must will their good, as my own, for the sake of absolute goodness, in order to be virtuous, according to our author himself.

2. Virtue consists in willing the supreme good; but the universal order we are required to will is not the supreme good, for it is merely the sum total of the separate goods of the several parts or beings which make up the universe. Supreme good is, as we have seen, the good in itself, that by participation of which this or that is good. How, then, in willing this universal order, am I virtuous? Suppose I do act in reference to it, what is my merit, since I am not acting in reference to the supreme good? Will it be said, that virtue, consisting entirely in the will, cannot be destroyed by a mistake of the understanding? We do not deny this. A man may, doubtless, be virtuous in acting from the motive here supposed, but only on condition of invincible ignorance; for a mistake of the understanding is no less culpable than perversity of will, if possible to be avoided. But the object of moral science is to enlighten the understanding. It will hardly do, then, for a

writer, who professes to give us ethical science, to give us a system which renders virtue possible only to the invincibly ignorant.

3. This doctrine of virtue makes virtue and its opposite practically the same. The acts to be performed are the same, whatever the motive from which we act. This M. Jouffroy is careful to inform us. What is done is the same in all cases, to wit, the satisfaction of our natural tendencies. This is what we are to do, whether we obey instinct, act from selfishness, benevolence, or a view of universal order. So far as actions and results are concerned, it matters not what is the motive from which we act. The sole difference is in the view we take of the reason for doing what we do. Practically, the supremely selfish man is as good as the supremely virtuous man, and receives and does as much good. What superiority, then, has virtue ? Why is it better to be virtuous than to be not virtuous? Why are we bound to be virtuous? Where is the obligation? I am to promote universal good by promoting my own; and I have a right to promote my own personal good, because it is a fragment of universal good. This is the doctrine. If I do it for the sake of myself, I am selfish; if for the sake of universal good, I am meritorious. Meritorious for what? What have I really done? Simply, found out a reason for being selfish; the method of being, with purely disinterested motives, supremely selfish. But what is the merit of disinterested motives themselves, especially if they have no tendency to lead to disinterested external acts? The practical rule, and the only practical rule of life, this sublime system, which makes a man live solely for himself, for the purpose of promoting universal good, is, Look out for number one; let each_take care of himself, and then all will be taken care of. I am revelling in every luxury, satisfying to the utmost all my natural tendencies, primitive passions, as Charles Fourier names them, while the poor beggar stands shivering and starving at my gate; but, for his consolation, I send him my servant to assure him that he may go in peace and be thankful, for I am doing all in my power to augment the good of all beings by augmenting my own! Admirable morality this, and worthy of being early instilled into the minds and the hearts of our New England youth!

But enough. M. Jouffroy talks largely and learnedly of man's destiny, of individual good, universal good, and absolute good; but he fails utterly to tell us what is our real destiny, what is good, and, a fortiori, what are the rules which should

govern us in the conduct of life. A puny Eclecticism runs through his whole work, and the vain attempt is everywhere made to accept and harmonize in one consistent whole the leading principles of contradictory schools. Much is said, but nothing is done. We rise from the study of his system as uninstructed in all that relates to the end for which God made us, or the means of attaining to that end, as we were before. No theoretical problem is solved, no practical difficulty removed, no wise practical suggestion offered. We are amused and misled by words. We seem at moments to have grasped somewhat; but we open our hand and find we have nothing. We might as well have attempted to catch a handful of smoke.

M. Jouffroy's first great mistake is in not perceiving clearly and steadily, that good, if good there be, must be independent, self-subsisting, set before us, and not contained in us. The first ethical problem is necessarily, What is good? It is the old question of the summum bonum; and till this is answered, we cannot proceed a single step in the construction of the science of ethics, whether speculative or practical. Now, this question M. Jouffroy does not answer, or, at least, not correctly. He, indeed, contends that order is the supreme good, but wrongly for order is but a mere state or condition, wholly dependent on the parts ordered, and good only as the means of enabling the beings ordered to gain good.

His next mistake is in confounding the end for which we were made with the mere fulfilment of our nature, or the realization of its most perfect type. According to him, our nature contains its destiny in itself; which is to say, that man is his own final cause. But man can no more be his own final cause than his own first cause. None but a self-existent and self-subsistent being can be its own final cause. Man is neither self-existent nor self-subsistent. This final cause, or end he is to gain, is therefore not in himself, but out of himself, something not possessed, but to be attained to.

The second great ethical problem is that of obligation. The first is the problem of good, and its solution reveals to us the end to be sought. The second establishes our duty to seek that end, not only stating the fact that we feel we ought to seek it, but disclosing the grounds of the obligation. This is the problem which M. Jouffroy has chiefly labored in the volumes before us. There can be no morals unless there is a moral law, and none if a law which does not bind. Now, after all his labor, M. Jouffroy fails entirely to establish the reality of such law. He recognizes no lawgiver but human nature. Man,

then, is under no law, but the law imposed by his own nature, which is to say, no law at all. Why am I bound to obey the law of my nature?

Failing to establish a real moral law, M. Jouffroy of course fails to establish the possibility of virtue, of merit; for virtue can be found only in obedience, actual or intentional, to the moral law. But if no moral law, then no virtue, then no merit, no praise, no blame. M. Jouffroy really comes to this conclusion; for he recognizes no distinction in actions but such as exists solely in the mind of the actor. We say, then, with truth, that his whole system, as a system, whatever the ingenuity, learning, and ability it indicates, is a complete failure, and leaves us no wiser than it found us.

This mournful result was the necessary consequence of M. Jouffroy's vicious method. From the study of man's nature it is impossible to conclude to man's destiny or end, or to deduce the rules for the conduct of his life; because man was not made to follow nature, but God. This is the grand fact which the author began by discarding, and hence all his mistakes and errors. Having begun wrong, started in the wrong direction, no speed he could make could bring him to the right termination. The faster he travelled, the farther he departed from the truth. Yet he errs only in common with all our great German, English, and Scotch moralists. All these, or nearly all, adopt the rule, that we must follow nature, and assume that the end to be sought is the perfection of our nature. M. Jouffroy tells us that we are predestinated by our organization to a certain end, which is our good. Follow nature, and you will gain it. Here the fulfilment of our nature, or the complete satisfaction of our natural tendencies, is assumed to be the good. Obtain this, and you obtain good. This is the case also with our Fourierists. M. Jouffroy and Charles Fourier adopt precisely the same ethical system, with this simple difference,that what the one calls tendencies the other calls passions, what the one terms order the other terms harmony. Absolute good with the former is universal order, with the latter it is universal harmony; the means of attaining to it is with the one the satisfaction of our natural tendencies, with the other the satisfaction of the primitive passions. And even this, not because by this satisfaction the individual is placed in relation with an order or harmony which exists independent of him; but because by establishing order or harmony in the individual, it contributes so much towards the general order or harmony of the universe. It is not good for the reason that it participates of absolute

[blocks in formation]
« AnkstesnisTęsti »