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the method of argument, if argument it can be called, which the Professor pursues, and in order to show that he merely begs the question, we proceed to the direct consideration of his list of charges. We, of course, within our limited space, cannot consider them at so great a length as might be desirable, and must content ourselves with brief replies; but we will endeavour to make them, if brief, conclusive.

I. Catholicity is injurious to the mind, because it "discountenances the investigation of first principles."-p. 453. If this means, that Catholicity discountenances the investigation of first principles of science, in so far as they come within the legitimate province of science, we deny the assertion; for whoever knows any thing of the principles or history of the Church knows that it is not true. If it mean, that Catholicity discountenances the investigation of first principles, as principles or articles of faith, so far as to ascertain what they are, and the extrinsic motives of receiving them as principles or articles of faith, we also deny the assertion. If it be meant, simply, that the Church discountenances the investigation of the principles or articles of faith, for the purpose of ascertaining their intrinsic truth, we admit the charge, but deny that it is injurious; and furthermore allege, that, if it be an injury to the mind, it is an injury which must be objected not to Catholicity alone, but to all divine revelation, to be received as authority; and therefore an objection to which the Professor, unless he is an infidel, is himself as obnoxious as the Catholic.

The articles of faith are received on the authority of God revealing them, and are to be taken as first principles; this we admit and contend. But the question, whether God has revealed them or not, is open to investigation. Here Catholicity discountenances no investigation of first principles. The question, whether they are intrinsically true or not, is not an open question; because, 1. The articles of faith are mysteries, and their intrinsic truth lies out of the range of investigation; and because, 2. If they are revealed by God himself, there can be no question of their intrinsic truth; for God cannot reveal what is not intrinsically true, since he is prima veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, et in dicendo. Once ascertained to be articles of faith, that is, God's word, and if not God's word, they are not articles of faith, - they of course cease to be subjects of investigation, and are to be taken as first principles, as primitive data from which we are to reason, and to which we are to conform in our reasonings, as the geometrician must

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reason from, and conform to, the axioms and definitions of his science. But this we deny to be an injury to the mind.

1. Nothing can be an injury to the mind that does not deprive it of some one or more of its natural rights. But over the articles of faith reason has no natural rights, never had any, never can have any; because they lie out of her province, and belong to the supernatural, where her authority does not extend. In denying her the right to investigate the truth of these, we do not restrict her rights, nor in any sense abridge her domain or her authority. She is left in possession of all her territory and of all her original sovereignty.

2. The articles of faith are not taken from the dominions of reason, but they are certain grants made gratuitously to her, extending, instead of abridging, her authority, and therefore serve, instead of injuring her. By their means, she can extend her authority over an immense region, where without them she could have no authority at all. They enlarge her power, and therefore cannot injure her. They furnish her with first principles for the science of theology, without which the science of theology could not exist. Is this an injury to the mind? Why not say it is an injury to the mind to have first principles at all? Are his axioms an injury to the geometrician? Is there any science that supplies its own first principles? Is it an injury to the mind to be able to cultivate the science of theology? But as the science cannot exist without these articles of faith as first principles, and as it cannot of itself furnish its first principles, since no science supplies its own first principles, how say it is an injury to the mind to have them furnished?

But admitting that it is an injury to the mind to be debarred from investigating first principles, that is, from investigating the intrinsic truth of God's word, and ascertaining whether God speaks the truth or not, it is an injury which is done, not by Catholicity alone, but by every system which admits divine revelation at all. If we admit divine revelation at all, we must admit it as ultimate on all matters which it covers. No matter in what symbol that revelation is to be found, in the decrees and canons of the Church, in the Apostles, the Nicene or the Athanasian Creed, in the Old and New Testaments, in the Thirty-nine Articles, the Augsburg, Helvetic, or Westminster Confession, the Five Points of the Synod of Dort, the Saybrook Platform, or the New England Primer, if admitted to be divine revelation, it is final, held to be infallible, and no

investigation into its truth can be permitted; for it is not permitted to go behind the word of God, and ask if the word be true, since that would be asking, Does God tell the truth? a question no one can ask without blasphemy. The Professor, if he admits divine revelation at all, condemns himself if he brings this as a charge against Catholicity, and must contend that not Catholicity only, but the very idea of divine revelation to be received in any case as ultimate authority, is injurious to the mind of man. If his objection, then, has any force, it is only in the mouth of an infidel that it has it. Is it on infidel ground that our theological Professor wishes to take his stand? If so, let him avow it, and perhaps he will find he has a question to settle nearer home, unless Andover Theoogical Seminary is prepared to put down Catholicity at the expense of Christianity itself.

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But the real gist of the Professor's objection we suppose to be, that such is the state of the question with regard to the evidences of religion, that no articles of faith can rightfully be imposed or received as first principles. "Our Maker," he says (p. 452), "intended to leave the evidences of religion such as ..... to sharpen the intellect. He designed to invigorate the reason ..... by allowing arguments of real weight to exist in favor of what may be proved, upon the whole, to be false, and in opposition to what may be proved, upon the whole, to be true. But the Romish idea of the infallibility of the Church is, in itself and in its results, at variance with the nature of moral reasoning, and incompatible with a due regard to the evidence which exists for and against the truth." This passage, if analyzed, will be found to contain four assumptions : 1. To sharpen the intellect, or, what is the same thing, invigorate the reason, is, in itself considered, a good. 2. That the mind is really invigorated, not by the possession of truth, but by the search after it and difficulty of finding it. 3. That arguments of real weight may exist in favor of falsehood and against truth. And, 4. That faith rests on moral reasoning, which does not, and cannot, exclude uncertainty as to its truth or falsehood. The first three are evidently false, and the last begs the question, and denies the possibility of faith.

1. The cultivation and improvement of the mind in the service and for the sake of God is a good, but not in or for the sake of itself, as the Professor assumes, when he makes sharpening the intellect or invigorating the reason an end which Almighty God himself contemplates in adjusting the evidences of

religion. God is good, and can contemplate, in what he does, no end, as an end, which is not good in and for the sake of itself. Such must be sharpening the intellect, if he contemplates it as an end. But it can be a good only on condition that the development and perfection of our faculties is in itself good, and this can be good only on condition that the development and perfection of our faculties is the end for which we were made; which is false. That this is a good cannot be sustained from the Sacred Scriptures, the only authority beside reason to which the Professor can appeal; for they nowhere assert it, but the contrary. They are not the acute in intellect, the vigorous in reason, but the pure in heart, who shall see God. The Sacred Scriptures never commend mere sharpness of intellect, mere vigor of reason; for, if they did, they would commend, by implication, Satan himself, who, probably, in acuteness of intellect and vigor of reason is an over match for even our able and learned professors of Andover Theological Seminary themselves. The Scriptures do not commend the merely intellectual, the subtle reasoners, men ever disputing, doubting, learning, never able to attain to the knowledge of the truth, but the simple, the docile, who with meekness and humility receive the ingrafted word, and obey it with all fidelity and alacrity. We recommend the Professor to read and meditate 1 Cor. i. 19-31. If he will do so, he will, perhaps, not be ambitious of repeating this first assumption.

2. So far as the mind is really improved, invigorated, in the sense in which to sharpen the intellect, or invigorate the reason, is not an evil, but a good, it is not done by the search after truth and the difficulty of finding it, but by the possession of truth. Truth is the appropriate food of the mind; and as well say the body is sustained and invigorated by the search after food and the difficulty of finding it, instead of eating and digesting it, as say that the mind is invigorated by the search after truth and the difficulty of finding it, and not by possessing it. The mind does not suffer in presence of truth, but in its absence, in the darkness of doubt, and the hell of falsehood. There it loses its vigor, its acuteness, becomes enslaved, bound hand and foot. It is the truth that liberates it, veritas liberabit vos, that restores it its strength, sanctifies it, and secures its free and healthy action.

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The Professor reasons on the supposition, that the mind, as soon as it comes into possession of truth, loses its motive to exertion, relaxes its energy, and sinks into inanity and death.

He concludes from what is unquestionably the effect of false doctrines on the mind, which it is compelled by authority to embrace, and forbidden to examine, to the effect of truth. But his conclusion is evidently false; for truth has a vivifying, strengthening, and sanctifying influence on the mind that receives it; or else how sad must be the condition of the saints in heaven, who are to see the truth as it is, in itself, and spend an eternity in its immediate possession and contemplation! The Professor probably forgot himself, when he undertook to show that doubt, uncertainty, and falsehood were more beneficial to the mind than truth; or rather, he chose to assume principles on which it would be easy to overthrow Catholicity and defend Protestantism. When a man has the making of his own first principles, he must be an unskilful workman indeed, not to make them to suit his purpose.

3. Arguments of real weight are solid arguments, founded in truth, therefore true; for what is not true is not real. The Professor's third assumption is, then, that truth may exist in favor of falsehood, and against truth; for he says arguments of real weight exist in favor of falsehood and against truth! This looks very much like contradicting the first principle of all philosophy, namely, the same thing cannot both be and not be,-called, by metaphysicians, the principle of contradiction. Did our Professor make his theology before his philosophy? He must be on his guard, lest he raise a suspicion that even Protestantism does not exert a remarkably wholesome influence in sharpening the intellect and invigorating the reason.

4. The fourth assumption of the Professor is, 1. A petitio principii; for it asserts that the evidence for and against the truth is such that the articles of faith cannot be affirmed with infallible certainty, that is, so as to preclude all room for doubt whether they are the word of God or not. But this the Church denies; for she alleges they can be so affirmed, and that she so affirms them. We have here merely the Professor against the Church, and the Church against the Professor; and our old question comes up, Which am I to believe?

But, 2. There is an assumption here that the articles of faith are exposed to uncertainty. But, if so, they cannot be articles of faith; for faith is not compatible with uncertainty, since the property of faith is to exclude all uncertainty. Admit the Professor's assumption, then, and it excludes faith. His objection to the Church, then, is that she asserts the possibility of faith. Is this the objection of a believer in divine

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