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sidered cases. But the matter decided by the court, and the burden of the opinion, is in strict accord with the settled conclusions of the English courts.

Without quoting from the decisions of the various state courts it is sufficient to refer to the case of California v. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233, 266, on the very will now in question. That case was founded on an information for an escheat of Broderick's estate, and a bill in equity at the suit of the State against the executors of the will, praying for an injunction to restrain them from selling the property of Broderick, and from intermeddling therewith. The principal frauds set up in the present case were set up in that, and a preliminary injunction, granted by the district court, was dissolved by the Supreme Court on appeal on the ground that the probate of the will belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court and, having been decided by that court, was res judicata, and could not be reviewed by the court of chancery. The opinion of the court delivered by Justice Norton, is quite elaborate, and arrives at the following conclusions: "Upon examining the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of the courts of the several States, it will be found that they have uniformly held that the principles established in England apply and govern cases arising under the probate laws of this country; and that in the United States, wherever the power to probate a 515*] will is given *to a probate or surrogate's court the decree of such court is final and conclusive, and not subject, except on appeal to a higher court, to be questioned in any other court, or be set aside or vacated by the court of chancery on any ground.'

The judge further stated what the statutes of California demonstrate, that in that State the jurisdiction of the Probate Court is the same in regard to wills of real estate as to wills of personal estate, both classes requiring probate, and the probate of each having the same validity and effect. This is the case in several, perhaps the greater number, of the United States. In some of the older States, as in England, the probate of a will has no effect upon devises of real estate therein, except, perhaps, to stand as prima facie proof of its execution. But in many States wills of real and personal estate are placed upon the same footing in respect to probate and authentication. It is true the estate in lands devised goes to the devisee and not to the executor, but that is the only difference in the effect of the will or probate as respects the two classes of property.

There is nothing in the jurisdiction of the Probate Courts of California which distinguishes them in respect of the questions under consideration from other probate courts. They are invested with the jurisdiction of probate of wills and letters of administration, and all cognate matters usually incident to that branch of judicature. The Constitution of the State as originally adopted in 1849, provided that the judicial power of the State should be vested in a supreme court, district courts, county courts and justices of the peace, and that the Legislature might establish such municipal and other inferior courts as might be deemed necessary. Art. v., sec. 1. It also ordained that there should be elected in each of the organized counties one judge, who

should hold his office for four years, and should hold the county court, and perform the duties of surrogate or probate judge. Art. VI., § 8.

These provisions were somewhat modified in September, *1862, but not in any manner [*516 material to this case. Moreover, the will in question was admitted to probate in October, 1860, before any modification took place. The Act of the Legislature in force at that time, on the subject of probate, was the Act of May 1, 1851, entitled, "An Act to Regulate the Settlement of the Estates of Deceased Persons." By this Act, as it stood in 1860, having been somewhat modified by sundry amendments, it was declared that the county courts, when siting for the transaction of probate business, should be known and called the "Probate Court," and the county judge should be ex officio probate judge. The mode of procedure for the probate of wills was pointed out. A petition was to be filed in the proper court by the executor or other person interested, and a day appointed for proving the will, not less than ten nor more than thirty days distant; and notice was to be published not less than twice a week in a newspaper published in the county, if there was one; if not, then by posting in three public places in the county. Hittell, L. of Cal., art. "Probate Act," ch. II., §§ 4–13.

Citations were also to be issued to the heirs, if they resided in the county, and to any executors named in the will and not joining in the application for probate. Subpoenas were to be issued to the witnesses if they resided in the county. Any person interested might appear and contest the will; and if it should appear that there were minors or non-residents of the county interested, the court was to appoint an attorney to represent them. If any person should appear and contest the will, he must file a statement in writing of the grounds of his opposition. Issues when formed were to be sent to the district court for trial by jury, unless the parties consented to a trial in the Probate Court. Hittell, L. of Cal., art. "Probate Act," ch. II., §§ 16-20. Incompetency, restraint, undue influence, fraudulent representations, and any other cause affecting the validity of the will, are specially mentioned as questions upon which issues might thus be formed. Various provisions were added, calculating to secure a thorough investigation on the merits. Hittell, L. of Cal., Art. "Probate Act," ch. II., § 20.

*It was further provided, that when a [*517 will had been admitted to probate, any person interested might at any time within one year after such probate, contest the same or the validity of the will, by filing in the same court a petition containing his allegations against its validity or the sufficiency of the proof, and praying that the probate might be revoked. Hereupon new citations were to be issued and a new trial had. But it was declared that if no person should within one year appear to contest the will or probate, the latter should be conclusive, saving to infants, married women, and persons of unsound mind, a like period of one year after disability removed. Hittell, L. of Cal., art. "Probate Act," ch. II., §§ 30-36.

In view of these provisions, it is difficult to conceive of a more complete and effective probate jurisdiction, or one better calculated to attain the ends of justice and truth.

The question recurs: do the facts stated in the present bill lay a sufficient ground for equitable interference with the probate of David C. Broderick's will, or for establishing a trust as against the purchasers of his estate in favor of the complainants? It needs no argument to show, as it is perfectly apparent, that every objection to the will or the probate thereof could have been raised, if it was not raised, in the Probate Court during the proceedings instituted for proving the will, or at any time within a year after probate was granted; and that the relief sought by declaring the purchasers trustees for the benefit of the complainants would have been fully compassed by denying probate of the will. On the establishment or non-establishment of the will depended the entire right of the parties; and that was a question entirely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. In such a case a court of equity will not interfere, for it has no jurisdiction to do so. The Probate Court was fully competent to afford adequate relief.

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*charge him with laches or negligence in [*519 the vindication of his rights until after he has liscovered the facts constituting the fraud. And this is most just. But that principle cannot avail the complainants in this case. By their own showing their delay was due, not to ignorance of the fraud, nor any attempt to conceal it, but to ignorance of Broderick's death, and all the open and public facts of the case. They admit, and expressly charge, that it was a matter of public notoriety at San Francisco, as early as 1861, that the will in question was not Broderick's will, but was a forged and simulated paper. They do not pretend that the facts of the fraud were shrouded in concealment, but their plea is that they lived in a remote and secluded region, far from means of information, and never heard of Broderick's death, or of the sale of his property or of any events connected with the settlement of his estate, until many years after these events had transpired. Parties cannot thus, by their seclusion from the means of information, claim exemption from the laws that control human affairs, and set up a right to open up all the transactions of the past. The world must move on, and those who claim an interest in persons or things must be charged with knowledge of their status and condition, and of the vicissitudes to which they are subject. This is the foundation of all judicial proceed

But the complainants allege that, in consequence of circumstances beyond their control, and without their fault, they had no knowledge 518*] or information of Broderick's death *and, of course, no knowledge of the forgery of his will until within three years prior to the commencement of this suit, and after the period for contesting the will in the Probate Court had ex-ings in rem. pired, and when the power of said court to investigate the subject further had ceased. They therefore insist that as the Probate Court had no further jurisdiction over the subject, a court of equity was competent to give relief as against parties having possession of the estate or its proceeds mala fide or without consideration.

The fact that two of the complainants are married women does not take them out of the operation of the Statute of Limitations of California. They are only exempt when it is necessary that their husbands should join them in the suit. This is not necessary by the law of the State where they sue for their separate es tate, as in the present case. As to such prop

The Statute of 1862 has been referred to, which gives to the District Courts of California power to set aside a will obtained by fraud or undue influence, or a forged will, and any probate obtained by fraud, concealment or perjury. *Whilst it is true that alterations in the [*520 jurisdiction of the state courts cannot affect the equitable jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States, so long as the equitable rights themselves remain, yet an enlargement of equitable rights may be administered by the circuit courts, as well as by the courts of the State. And this is probably a case in which an enlargement of equitable rights is effected, although presented in the form of a remedial proceeding. Indeed, much of equitable jurisdiction consists of better and more effective remedies for attaining the rights of parties. But the statute referred to cannot affect this suit, inasmuch as the Statute of Limitations would still apply in full force, and would present a perfect bar to the suit.

Concede this to be true to a certain extent where injured parties have not lost their oppor-erty they act as femes sole. This suit, had it lain tunity of appearing in the Court of Probate or at all, could have been brought by the complainin the equity court by any laches of their own; ants, who are married women, though their husstill it cannot help the complainants. What ex- bands had refused to join them therein. cuse have they for not appearing in the Probate Court, for example? None. No allegation is made that the notices were fraudulently sup-, pressed, or that the death of Broderick was fraudulently concealed. The only excuse attempted to be offered is that they lived in a secluded region and did not hear of his death, or of the probate proceedings. If this excuse could prevail it would unsettle all proceedings in rem. But even admitting that, as to surplus proceeds, and property undisposed of, or acquired by those having actual knowledge of the fraud, the complainants might come into a court of equity on the ground of their own ignorance of the events when they transpired, they would still have to encounter the Statute of Limitations, which expressly declares that action for relief on the ground of fraud can only be commenced within three years; and the Statutes of Limitation in California apply to suits in equity as well as to actions at law. Boyd v. Blackman, 29 Cal., 19. It is true that it is added that the cause of action in such case is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the acts constituting the fraud. But that is only the application to cases at law of a principle which has always been acted upon in courts of equity. If fraud is kept concealed so as not to come to the knowledge of the party injured, those courts will not

We can perceive no ground on which the bill
in this case can be sustained.
The decree is affirmed.

Specially concurring, Mr. Justice Swayne.
Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion and judgment of

Treasury, by whom it was laid before Congress. By an Act passed March 3, 1807, this decision and all

the court in this case for the following reasons: (1) Because courts of equity may exercise juris- other decisions in favor of persons claiming lands in

Idiction to set aside and annul a decree of the Probate Court approving and allowing an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased person, in a case where it appears that the instrument is a forgery and that the decree approving and allowing the instrument was procured by perjury and fraud, provided it appears that the injured party has not been guilty of laches and that he has no other adequate remedy. (2) Because all the leading authorities cited to support the opposite rule admit that the jurisdiction does exist (3) in cases where there is no other remedy. Because the right of the complainants in this cause is not barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Mr. Justice Davis concurs in this dissent.

the district of Vincennes, contained in the transcript transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury were confirmed; held, that this confirmation was the fulfillment of the condition stipulated in the deed of cession, so far as the claimants were concerned, and was an authoritative recognition by record of the ancient possession and title of their ancestor, and gave to them full assurance of the validity of that possession and title; and that the subsequent clause of the Act providing for the issue of a patent to the claimants when their claim was located and surveyed, did not impair this effect of the confirmation.

3. In the legislation of Congress a patent has a double operation. It is a conveyance by the gov ernment when the government has any interest to convey; but where it is issued upon the confirmation of a claim of a previously existing title, it is documentary evidence, having the dignity of a record of the existence of that title or such equities respecting the claim as justify its recognition and confirmation.

521*] *LAWRENCE LANGDEAU, Plff. in the government. If the claim be to land with de

Err.,

v.

AMASA HANES.

4. A legislative confirmation of a claim to land is a recognition of the validity of such claim, and operates as effectually as a grant or quitclaim from fined boundaries or capable of identification, the legislative confirmation protects the title to the particular tract, and a subsequent patent is only documentary evidence of that title. If the claim be to quantity and not to a specific tract capable of identification, a segregation by survey will be required, and the confirmation will then immediately attach the title to the land segregated.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 521-531.) Northwest Territory, condition in transfer to United States-duty and manner of perform-confirmed by the Act of 1807, was not surveyed unance-land claim, heard by commissioners— confirmation of by Congress-effect of patent as evidence of title-effect of survey-adverse possession, title by.

*1. The Commonwealth of Virginia, in the Act of her Legislature, passed on the 20th of October, 1783, authorizing her delegates in Congress to execute a deed transferring to the United States her right, title and claim, as well of soil as of jurisdiction to the Territory northwest of the River Ohio, provided that the transfer should be subject to various conditions and, among others, to this one: "That the French and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers of the Kaskaskias, St. Vincents and the neighboring villages who have professed themselves citizens of Virginia, shall have their possessions and titles confirmed to them, and be protected in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties," and the deed executed by the delegates embodied the Act of Virginia: held, that the acceptance of the deed by the United States imposed upon them the duty of performing the condition and giving the protection stipulated and that to confirm the posessions and titles of the inhabitants was to give to them such further assurance as would enable them to enjoy, undisturbed, their possessions, and assert their right to their property in the courts of the country, as fully and completely as if their titles were derived directly from the United States.

2. By an Act passed on the 26th of March, 1804, Congress required claims to lands within certain designated limits in the Territory north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi, by virtue of any legal grant made by the French Government prior to the Treaty of Paris of the 10th of February, 1763, or by the British Government subsequent to that period and prior to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain, on the 3d of September, 1783. to be presented, with a plat of the tract or tracts claimed, to commissioners designated by the Act, for examination, who were to hear all matters respecting such claims and decide thereon, "according to justice and equity," and transmit a transcript of their decisions made in favor of the claimants, to the Secretary of the Treasury, by whom they were to be laid before Congress. Among the claims presented under this Act, was one on behalf of the heirs of Jean Baptiste Tougas for two hundred four acres, situated in the neighborhood of Vincennes, a place which is designated in the cession from Virginia as St. Vincent, such claim being founded upon an ancient grant to their an The commissioners decided in favor of the heirs, and confirmed their claim and transmitted a transcript of their decision to the Secretary of the Headnotes by Mr. Justice FIELD.

cestor.

In this case the claims of the heirs of Tongas, til 1820, and the patent thereon was not issued until 1872; held, that if the ancient grant to Tongas was of a defined tract, the title of the heirs was perfected. assuming that previously they had only an equitable interest, upon the passage of the Confirmatory Act of 1807: if, however, the grant was of a certain quantity of land, then undefined and incapable of identification, the title became perfect when the quantity was segregated by the survey made in 1820, and that no title was conferred by the patent; and that an adverse possession of the premises by the defendant under claim and color of title made in good faith with payment of the taxes legally assessed thereon, after the title of the heirs was perfected as mentioned above, and before the patent issued continued within the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations of Illinois, was a bar to any recovery by the heirs upon the patent.

[No. 139.]

Submitted Jan. 13, 1875. Decided Feb. 15, 1875. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Southern District of Illinois. Suit in ejectment was brought in the court below by the plaintiff in error, claiming the title to lands in Vincennes, Indiana, under a patent from the United States, issued in 1872. The defendant claimed by right of possession under the Statute of Limitations. The land was a part of that belonging to French and Canadian inhabitants, who were to have their possessions and titles confirmed for them by the terms of the cession of the Northwest Territory by Virginia to the United States. After the said cession, the claim to this land by the original possessor was, pursuant to Act of Congress, presented to certain commissioners, who decided in favor of the claim. Their decision was confirmed by Act of Congress of March 3, 1807, which also provided as follows:

"That every person or the legal representative of every person whose claim to a tract of land is confirmed by this Act, and who had not previously obtained a patent from the Governor, either of the Territory northwest of the Ohio, or of the Indiana Territory shall, wher

ever his claim shall have been located or surveyed, be entitled to receive from the Register of the Land Office of Vincennes, a certificate, stating that the claimant is entitled to receive a patent for such tract of land by virtue of this Act; for which certificate the register shall receive $1, and which certificate shall entitle the party to a patent for said tract, which shall issue in like manner as is provided by law for the other lands of the United States.

The land was located and surveyed by the United States in 1820.

ers was for the purpose of segregating the private property of the settlers, as required in the Act of Cession, for the public domain, to determine what amount of land in the Territory ceded by Virginia was reserved to the settlers, who were the claimants; how much they claimed, and where the claims were located.

Reichart v. Felps, 33 Ill., 434; see S. C. in error, 18 L. ed., 849.

Whatever claim or interest there was in the United States, passed out by the confirmatory Act of March 3, 1807, sustaining and confirming the acts of the commissioners in all things, being a present grant, operative and effective, devesting the United States of any claim or in

Doe v. Hill, Breese, 236.

The said patent was not issued until 1872, and then was to the claimant's heirs. It was admitted that if the legal title was held by the United States until the issue of said patent,terest in the land aforesaid. then the Statute of Limitations could not avail the defendant; but that, on the other hand, if the legal title was or became vested in the claimant when the Act of March 3, 1870, took effect, then the Statute of Limitations would be a full defense. Judgment having been given for the defendant, the plaintiff sued out this writ of

error.

The case is further stated by the court. Messrs. W. B. Thompson, J. F. Darby, John Hallum and Pike & Johnson, for plaintiff in error:

Conditions precedent were, by the terms of the Act, to be performed by both the confirmee and the United States. The former was to enter his location with the Register of the Land Office at Vincennes, on any part of the tracts set aside for that purpose by Act of Congress. The land was then to be surveyed by the United States; after which the Register of Vincennes was to issue a certificate stating that the claimant is entitled to receive a patent for such tract of land by virtue of this Act, which certificate entitled the party to a patent for such tract of land.

A survey was necessary, but simply to sever the private lands from the public domain. It was a matter of public policy, not necessary to create or perfect the title, but to ascertain or determine what amount of land, in the territory ceded by Virginia, was reserved by the Act of Cession, and who claimed it, and how much was claimed. Reichart v. Felps, supra.

Hanes relies on an uninterrupted possession for nearly half a century. It is no argument against his right that no paper title is offered in evidence from the claimant Tongas. In those early times, the transfers of property, both personal and real, were made by the simple settlers of Vincennes by parol more frequently than by any writing or record.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

Although the territory lying north of the Ohio River and west of the Alleghanies, and extending to the Mississippi, was [*526 claimed by Virginia previous to 1776 to be within her chartered limits, it was not reduced to her possession until the war of the Revolution. Previous to that period numerous settlements had been formed within that portion which at present comprises the States of IndiBurgess v. Gray, 16 How., 48; West v. Coch-ana and Illinois, consisting principally of ran. 17 How., 408, 15 L. ed., 112; Fenn v. French inhabitants from Canada, who held the Holme, 21 How., 481, 16 L. ed., 198.

There are many analogous Acts of Congress which have been construed by this court, and the principle involved in this case has been long settled.

The recent case of Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92, 20 L. ed., 534, disposes, we think, of every point presented in this record.

In the celebrated case of Maguire v. Tyler, 8 Wall., 650, 19 L. ed., 320, this court held that, "When the documentary evidence of title produced by a claimant, of an incomplete title to land contains no sufficient boundary lines, marking a definite parcel of land so as to sever it from the public domain, the concession in such case creates no right of private property which can be asserted in a court of justice."

Mr. W. E. Niblack, for defendant in error: The fee of the land in controversy never was in the United States.

Aside from any stipulations in the Treaty of Cession, the recognized and fundamental law of nations has been and still is, that private property shall be respected, and all rights and titles shall not and cannot be interfered with, and this is the rule governing nations, even when the territory has been acquired by conquest. The Act of confirmation was not a grant by the United States, because the title was never in them. The appointment of the commission

lands they occupied under concessions from French and English authorities. The possessions and titles of these people were respected by Virginia, and in her cession of the territory to the United States she expressly stipulated for their confirmation. The Act of her Legislature, passed on the 20th of October, 1783, authorized her delegates in Congress to execute a deed transferring her right, title and claim, as well of soil as of jurisdiction to the territory, provided that the transfer should be subject to various conditions, and, among others, to this one: "That the French and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers of the Kaskaskias, St. Vincents and the neighboring villages, who have professed themselves citizens of Virginia, shall have their possessions and titles confirmed to them, and be protected in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties." The deed executed by the delegates embodied the Act of Virginia, and its acceptance by the United States imposed upon them the duty of performing the condition and giving the protection stipulated. That duty was to confirm the possessions and titles of the inhabitants, and to confirm was to give to them such further assurance as would enable them to

enjoy undisturbed their possessions, and assert | tion of Congress as grants by that officer. L. cf their right to their property in the courts of the U. S., Vol. I., p. 580; Doe v. Hill, Breese, 236, country as fully and completely as if their titles 244; Reichart v. Felps, 33 Ill., 434. But no were derived directly from the United States. system of measures was adopted for a general Such further assurance might have been given confirmation until the passage of the Act of by any Act of the new government recognizing Congress of March 26th, 1804. An Act entitled the existence of the original possession and de- An Act Making Provision for the Disposal of fining its limits, which the claimants could use the Public Lands in the Indiana Territory, and as evidence of their title under the cession. It for Other Purposes. 2 Stat. at L., 271. might have been by a certificate of survey, or by a patent of the government, or by direct legislation. The mode in which the obligation assumed by the United States should be discharged was a matter resting in the discretion of Congress.

By that Act every person claiming lands within certain designated limits in the Territory north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi, by virtue of a legal grant made by the French Government prior to the Treaty of Paris of the 10th of February, 1763, or by the British Government subsequent to that period, and prior to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain, on the 3d of September, 1783, or by virtue of any resolution or Act of Congress subsequent to that Treaty, wa.3 required to deliver, on or before the first of January, 1805, to the register of the land office of the district within which the land was situated a notice stating the nature and extent of his claim, together with a plat of the tract or tracts claimed, and at the same time, for the purpose of being recorded, "every grant, order of survey, deed, conveyance, or other written evidence of his claim." And the register of the land office and the receiver of public moneys were constituted commissioners within their respective districts for the purpose of examintheir duty to hear in a summary manner all matters respecting such claims, to examine witnesses and such testimony as might be adduced *before them, and to decide thereon "ac- [*529 cording to justice and equity;" and to transmit to the Secretary of the Treasury a transcript of their decisions made in favor of the claimants, and a report of the claims rejected, with a substance of the evidence adduced in their support. This transcript of decisions and the report, the Secretary was required to lay before Congress at its next ensuing session.

527*] *It was for confirmation of existing possessions and titles that the deed of cession stipulated, not the transfer of any new title. Virginia had not repudiated the concessions made by the French and English authorities to the inhabitants in the territory who had declared themselves her citizens, but had recognized and sustained them. There was, therefore, no title in her in the lands covered by the possessions of these people to transfer, and she did not undertake to transfer any. Her language was, that she conveyed "All right, title and claim, as well of soil as of jurisdiction," which the Commonwealth had to the territory. In this respect she recognized the general rule of public law, that by the cession of territory from one State to another public property and sovereignty alone pass, and that private prop-ing the claims thus presented. It was made erty is not affected. Even in cases of conquest, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observes in U. S. v. Percheman, 7 Pet., 51, 87, it is unusual for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country, and the sense of justice and right, which is felt by the whole civilized world, would be outraged if private property should be generally confiscated and private rights annulled. "The people," continues the Chief Justice, "change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved, but their relations to each other and their rights of property remain undisturbed. If this be the modern rule, even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory? Had Florida changed its sovereign by an Act containing no stipulation respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who became subjects or citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by the change. It would have remained the same as under the ancient sovereign."

The United States took, therefore, the territory ceded by Virginia, bound by the established principles of public law to respect and protect all private rights of property of the inhabitants of the country, and bound by express stipulation 528*] *to confirm the possessions and titles of the French and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers mentioned in the deed of cession who had professed themselves citizens of Virginia.

By Resolutions passed by Congress under the Confederation, in June and August, 1788, measures were authorized for the confirmation of these possessions and titles, and in supposed compliance with the authority conferred upon the Governor of the Territory numerous confirmations were made by him, which have been sometimes designated in the subsequent legisla

Among the claims presented under this Act was one on behalf of the heirs of Jean Baptiste Tongas for 204 acres, situated in the neighborhood of Vincennes, a place which is designated in the cession from Virginia as St. Vincent, such claim being founded upon an ancient grant to their ancestor. The commissioners decided in favor of the heirs and confirmed their claim, and transmitted a transcript of their decision to the Secretary of the Treasury, by whom it was laid before Congress.

By the Act of March 3d, 1807, an Act Confirming Claims to Land in the District of Vincennes, and for Other Purposes, 2 Stat. at L., 446, this decision, and all other decisions in favor of persons claiming lands in the District of Vincennes, contained in the transcript transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury. were confirmed. This confirmation was the fulfillment of the condition stipulated in the deed of cession so far as the claimants were concerned. It was an authoritative recognition by record of the ancient possession and title of their ancestor, and gave to them such assurance of the validity of that possession and title as would be always respected by the courts of the country. The subsequent clause of the Act providing for the issue of a patent to the claimants, when

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