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brought for a trial de novo on all the evidence and pleadings in the case.

It is, therefore, too obvious to need comment, that this statute was designed to bring equity suits to this court from the State Courts by writ of error, as well as law cases, and that it was not intended that they should be re-examined in the same manner as if brought here from a court of the United States, in the sense of the proposition we are considering.

But passing from this consideration, what has been the manner in which this court re-exam623*] ines the judgments of *the circuit courts on writs of error, as touching the errors into which it will look for reversal? For it is this manner which is supposed to require an examination of all errors, whether of federal law or otherwise under this statute. It requires but slight examination of the reports of the decisions or familiarity with the practice of this court, to know that it does not examine into or decide all the errors, or matter assigned for error, of the most of the cases before them. Many of these are found to be immaterial, the case being reversed or affirmed on some import ant point which requires of itself a judgment without regard to other matters. There are errors also which may be sufficiently manifest of which the appellate court has no jurisdiction, as in regard to a motion for a new trial, or to quash an indictment, or for a continuance, or amendment of pleadings, or some other matter which, however important to the merits of the case, is within the exclusive discretion of the inferior court.

Nor does it seem to us that the phrase "in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect" is intended to furnish the rule by which the court shall be guided in the considerations which should enter into the judgment that it shall render. That the writ of error shall have the same effect as if directed to a circuit court can mean no more than that it shall transfer the case to the Supreme Court, and with it the record of the proceedings in the court below. This is the effect of the writ and its function and purpose. When the court comes to consider the case it may be limited by the nature of the writ, but what it shall review, and what it shall not, must depend upon the jurisdiction of the court in that class of cases as fixed by the law governing that jurisdiction.

short, the whole phrase is one eminently appropriate to the expression of the idea that these cases, though coming from state instead of federal tribunals, shall be conducted in their progress through the court, in the matter of the general course of procedure, by the same rules of practice that prevail in cases brought under writs of error to the courts of the United States.

This is a different thing, however, from laying down rules of decision, or enacting the fundamental principles on which the court must decide this class of cases. It differs widely from an attempt to say that the court in coming to a judgment must consider this matter and disregard that. It is by no means the language in which a legislative body would undertake to establish the principles on which a court of last resort must form its judgment.

There is an instance of the use of very similar language by Congress in reference to the removal of causes into this court for review which. has uniformly received the construction which we now place upon this.

By the Judiciary Act of 1789, there was no appeal in the judicial sense of that word, to this court in any case. Decrees in suits in equity and admiralty were brought up by writ of error only, until the Act of 1803; and as this writ could not bring up a case to be tried on its controverted questions of fact, the 19th section of the Act of 1789 required the inferior courts to make a finding of facts which should be accepted as true by the appellate court. But by the Act of March 3, 1803, 2 Stat. at L., 244, these cases were to be brought to this [*625 court by appeal, and to give this appeal full effect the 19th section of the Act of 1789 was repealed, and upon such appeal the court below was directed to send to this court all the pleadings, depositions, testimony and proceedings. In this manner the court obtained that full possession and control of the case which the nature of an appeal implies. And it is worthy of observation that Congress did not rely upon the mere legal operation of the word "appeal" to effect this, but provided in express terms the means necessary to insure this object.

But to avoid the necessity of many words as to the mode in which the case should be brought to this court and conducted when here, it was enacted "That such appeals shall be subject to the same rules, regulations and restrictions as are prescribed in law in case of writs of error." Here is language quite as strong as that we have had under consideration, and strikingly similar both in its purport and in the purpose to be served by it. Yet no one ever supposed that when the court came to consider the judg ment which it should render on such an appeal, it was to be governed by the principles applicable to writs of error at common law. It was never thought for a moment, notwithstanding the use of the word "restrictions," that the court was limited to questions of law apparent on the record; but the uniform course has been to consider it as a case to be tried de novo on all the considerations of law and of fact applic able to it. There are many decisions of this court showing that these words have been held to apply alone to the course of procedure, to matters of mere practice, and not at all affordIning a rule for decision of the case on its merits

So the regulations here spoken of are manifestly the rules under which the writ is issued. served and returned; the notice to be given to the adverse party, and time fixed for appearance, argument, etc. Another important effect of the writ and of the regulations governing it, is that when accompanied by a proper bond, given and approved within the prescribed time, it operates as a supersedeas to further pro624*] ceedings *in the inferior court. The word "manner" also much more appropriately expresses the general mode of proceeding with the case, after the writ has been allowed, the means by which the exigency of the writ is enforced, as by rule on the clerk, or mandamus to the court, and the progress of the case in the appellate court; as filing the record, dock eting the case, time of hearing, order of the argument, and such other matters as are merely incidental to final decision by the court.

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But we have not yet considered the most im626*] portant part of the statute, namely: that which declares that it is only upon the existence of certain questions in the case that this court can entertain jurisdiction at all. Nor is the mere existence of such a question in the case sufficient to give jurisdiction-the question must have been decided in the State Court. Nor is it sufficient that such a question was raised and was decided. It must have been decided in a certain way, that is, against the right set up under the Constitution, laws, treaties or authority of the United States. The federal question may have been erroneously decided. It may be quite apparent to this court that a wrong construction has been given to the federal law, but, if the right claimed under it by plaintiff in error has been conceded to him, this court cannot entertain jurisdiction of the case, so very careful is the statute, both of 1789 and of 1867, to narrow, to limit and define the jurisdiction which this court exercises over the judgments of the State Courts. Is it consistent with this extreme caution to suppose that Congress intended, when those cases came here, that this court should not only examine those questions, but all others found in the recordquestions of common law, of state statutes, of controverted facts, and conflicting evidence? Or is it the more reasonable inference that Congress intended that the case should be brought here that those questions might be decided and finally decided by the court established by the

Constitution of the Union, and the court which has always been supposed to be not only the most appropriate but the only proper tribunal for their final decision? No such reason nor any necessity exists for the decision by this court of other questions in those cases. The jurisdiction has been exercised for nearly a century without serious inconvenience to the due administration of justice. The State Courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise. And it is not lightly to be presumed that Congress acted upon a principle which implies a distrust of their integrity or of their ability to construe those laws correctly. 627*] *Let us look for a moment into the effect of the proposition contended for upon the cases as they come up for consideration in the conference room. If it is found that no such question is raised or decided in the court below, then all will concede that it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. But if it is found that the federal question was raised and was decided against the plaintiff in error, then the first duty of the court obviously is to determine whether it was correctly decided by the State Court. Let us suppose that we find that the court below was right in its decision on that

question. What, then, are we to do? Was it the intention of Congress to say that "While. you can only bring the case here on account of this question, yet when it is here, though it may turn out that the plaintiff in error was wrong on that question, and the judgment of the court below was right, though he has wrongfully dragged the defendant into this court by the allegation of an error which did not exist, and without which the case could not rightfully be here, he can still insist on an inquiry into all the other matters which were litigated in the case?" This is neither reasonable nor just. In such case both the nature of the jurisdiction conferred and the nature and fitness of things demand that, no error being found in the matter which authorized the re-examination, the judgment of the State Court should be affirmed, and the case remitted to that court for its further enforcement.

The whole argument we are combating, however, goes upon the assumption that when it is found that the record shows that one of the questions mentioned has been decided against the claim of the plaintiff in error, this court has jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction extends to the whole case. If it extends to the whole case then the court must re-examine the whole case, and if it re-examines it must decide the whole case. It is difficult to escape the logic of the argument if the first premise be conceded. But it is here the error lies. We are of opinion that upon a fair construction of the whole language of the section the jurisdiction *conferred [*628 is limited to the decision of the questions mentioned in the statute and, as a necessary consequence of this, to the exercise of such powers as may be necessary to cause the judgment in that decision to be respected.

tions apart from the mere language of the statute, which seem to us to give additional force

We will now advert to one or two considera

to this conclusion.

on motions to dismiss this class of cases for want It has been many times decided by this court of jurisdiction, that if it appears from the record that the plaintiff in error raised and presented to the court by pleadings, prayer for instruction or other appropriate method, one of the questions specified in the statute, and the court ruled against him, the jurisdiction of this court attached, and we must hear the case on its merits. Rector v. Ashley, 6 Wall., 142, 18 L. ed., 733; Bridge Proprs. v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall., 116, 17 L. ed., 571; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall., 44, 19 L. ed., 370; Armstrong v. Treasurer, 16 Pet., 281; Crowell v. Randall, 10 Pet., 368. Heretofore these merits have been held to be to determine whether the propositions of law involved in the specific federal question were rightly decided, and if not, did the case of plaintiff in error, on the pleadings and evidence, come within the principle ruled by this court. This has always been held to be the exercise of the jurisdiction and re-examination of the case provided by the statute. But if when we once get jurisdiction, everything in the case is open to re-examination, it follows that every case tried in any State Court, from that of a justice of the peace to the highest court of the State, may be brought to this court for final decision on all the points involved in it.

That this is no exaggeration, let us look a

moment.

of 1867, yet an examination of the cases will show that it rested quite as much on the conviction of this court that without that clause and on general principles the jurisdiction extended no further. It requires a very bold reach of thought, and a readiness to impute to Congress a radical and hazardous change of a policy vital in its essential nature to the independence of the State Courts, to believe that that body contemplated, or intended, what is claimed, by the mere omission of a clause in the substituted statute which may well be held to have been superfluous, or nearly so, in the old

one.

Another consideration, not without weight in seeking after the intention of Congress, is found in the fact that where that body has clearly shown an intention to bring the whole of a case which arises under the constitutional provision as to its subject-matter under the jurisdiction of a Federal Court, it has conferred its cognizance on Federal Courts of original jurisdiction and not on the Supreme Court.

Suppose a party is sued before a justice of the peace for assault and battery. He pleads that he was a Deputy-Marshal of the United States, and in serving a warrant of arrest on plaintiff he gently laid his hands on him and used no more force than was necessary. He also pleads the general issue. We will suppose that to the special plea some response is made which finally leads to a decision against the defendant on that plea. And judgment is rendered 629*] against him on the general issue also. He never was a deputy-marshal. He never had a writ from a United States court; but he insists on that plea through all the courts up to this, and when he gets here the record shows a federal question decided against him, and this court must re-examine the whole case, though there was not a particle of truth in his plea, and it was a mere device to get the case into this court. Very many cases are brought here now of that character. Also, cases where the moment the federal question is stated It is the same clause and the same language by counsel we all know that there is nothing in which declares in the Constitution that the judiit. This has become such a burden and abuse cial power shall extend to cases arising under that we either refuse to hear, or hear only one the Constitution, laws and treaties of the Unitside of many such, and stop the argument, and ed States and to cases of admiralty and marihave been compelled to adopt a rule that when time jurisdiction. In this same Act of 1789 the a motion is made to dismiss it shall only be jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases is heard on printed argument. If the temptation conferred on the District Courts of the United to do this is so strong, under the rule of this States, and is made exclusive. Congress has in court for over eighty years to hear only the fed-like manner conferred upon the same court exeral question, what are we to expect when, by clusive original jurisdiction in all cases of merely raising one of those questions in any bankruptcy. case, the party who does it can bring it here for decision on all the matters of law and fact involved in it. It is to be remembered that there is not even a limitation as to the value in controversy in writs to the State Courts as there is to the circuit courts; and it follows that there is no conceivable case so insignificant in amount or unimportant in principle that a perverse and obstinate man may not bring it to this court by the aid of a sagacious lawyer raising a federal question in the record-a point which he may be wholly unable to support by the facts, or which he may well know will be decided against him the moment it is stated. But he obtains his object, if this court, when the case is once open to re-examination on account of that question, must decide all the others that are to be found in the record.

It is impossible to believe that Congress intended this result, and equally impossible that they did not see that it would follow if they intended to open the cases that are brought here under this section to re-examination on all the points involved in them and necessary to a final judgment on the merits.

630* *The 25th section of the Act of 1789 has been the subject of innumerable decisions, some of which are to be found in almost every volume of the reports from that year down to the present. These form a system of appellate juris prudence relating to the exercise of the appelfate power of this court over the courts of the States. That system has been based upon the fundamental principle that this jurisdiction was limited to the correction of errors relating sclely to federal law. And though it may be argued with some plausibility that the reason of this is to be found in the restrictive clause of the Act of 1789, which is omitted in the Act

In

*Upon the circuit court it has con- [*631 ferred jurisdiction with exclusive reference to matters of federal law, without reard to citizenship, either originally or by removal from the State Courts in cases of conflicting titles to land under grants from different States. 1 Stat. at L., 89. In cases arising under the patent laws. 16 Stat. at L., 206, 215. In suits against banking associations organized under the laws of the United States. 13 Stat. at L., 116. suits against individuals on account of acts done under the revenue laws of the United States. Act of March 2, 1833, 4 Stat. at L., 632; July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at L., 172. In suits for damages for depriving, under color of state laws, any person of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 141; April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. at L., 13. See, also, for removal of cases of similar character from State Courts, Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. at L.. 756; April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L., 27; May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 142.

The Acts referred to, and perhaps others not enumerated, show very clearly that when Congress desired a case to be tried on all the issues involved in it because one of those issues was to be controlled by the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, it was their policy to vest its cognizance in a court of original jurisdiction, and not in an appellate tribunal.

And we think it equally clear that it has been the counterpart of the same policy to vest in the Supreme Court, as a court of appeal from the State Courts, a jurisdiction limited to the questions of a federal character which might be involved in such cases.

It is not difficult to discover what the pur

pose of Congress in the passage of this law was. In a vast number of cases the rights of the peo-, ple of the Union, as they are administered in the courts of the States, must depend upon the construction which those courts gave to the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States. The highest courts of the States were sufficiently numerous, even in 1789, to cause it to be feared that, with the purest motives, this 632*] construction *given in different courts would be various and conflicting. It was desirable, however, that whatever conflict of opinion might exist in those courts on other subjects, the rights which depended on the federal laws should be the same everywhere, and that their construction should be uniform. This could only be done by conferring upon the supreme Court of the United States the appellate tribunal established by the Constitution-the right to decide these questions finally and in a manner which would be conclusive on all other courts, state or national. This was the first purpose of the statute, and it does not require that, in a case involving a variety of questions, any other should be decided than those described in the Act.

Second. It was no doubt the purpose of Congress to secure to every litigant whose rights depended on any question of federal law that that question should be decided for him by the highest federal tribunal if he desired it, when the decisions of the State Courts were against him on that question. That rights of this character, guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws of the Union, should not be left to the exclusive and final control of the State Courts. There may be some plausibility in the argument that these rights cannot be protected in all cases unless the Supreme Court has final control of the whole case. But the experience of eighty-five years of the administration of the law under the, opposite theory would seem to be a satisfactory answer to the argument. It is not to be presumed that the State Courts, where the rule is clearly laid down to them on tne federal question, and its influence on the case fully seen, will disregard or overlook it, and this is all that the rights of the party claiming under it require. Besides, by the very terms of this statute, when the Supreme Court is of opinion that the question of federal laws is of such relative importance to the whole case that it should control the final judgment, that court is authorized to render such judgment, and enforce it by its own process. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that it is in any case necessary for the security of the rights claimed under 633*] the Constitution, laws or treaties of *the United States that the Supreme Court should examine and decide other questions not of a federal character.

And we are of opinion that the Act of 1867 does not confer such a jurisdiction.

This renders unnecessary a decision of the question whether, if Congress had conferred such authority, the Act would have been constitutional. It will be time enough for this court to inquire into the existence of such a power when that body has attempted to exercise it in language which makes such an intention so clear as to require it.

The omitted clause of the Act of 1789 declared that no other error should be regarded as

a ground of reversal than such as appears on the face of the record and immediately respects the before-mentioned questions.

It is probable that, in determining whether one of those questions was actually raised and decided in the State Court, this court has been inclined to restrict its inquiries too much by this express limitation of the inquiry "to the face of the record." Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat., 117; Rector v. Aschley, supra. What was the record of a case was pretty well understood as a common law phrase at the time that statute was enacted. But the statutes of the States and new modes of proceedings in those courts have changed and confused the matter very much since that time.

It is in reference to one of the necessities thus brought about that this court long since determined to consider as part of the record the opinions delivered in such cases by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. R. Co. v. Marshall, 12 How., 165; Cousin v. Labatut, 19 How., 202, 15 L. ed., 601. And though we have repeatedly decided that the opinions of other State Courts cannot be looked into to ascertain what was decided, we see no reason why, since this restriction is removed, we should not so far examine those opinions, when properly authenticated, as may be useful in determining that question. We have been in the habit of receiving the certificate of the court signed by its Chief Justice or presiding officer on that point, though not as conclusive and these opinions are quite as satisfactory and may more properly [*634 be treated as part of the record than such certificates.

But after all, the record of the case, its pleadings, bills of exceptions, judgment, evidence, in short, its record, whether it be a case in law or equity, must be the chief foundation of the inquiry; and while we are not prepared to fix any absolute limit to the sources of the inquiry under the new Act, we feel quite sure it was not intended to open the scope of it to any loose range of investigation.

It is proper, in this first attempt to construe this important statute as amended, to say a few words on another point. What shall be done by this court when the question has been found to exist in the record, and to have been decided against the plaintiff in error, and rightfully decided, we have already seen, and it presents no difficulties.

But when it appears that the federal question was decided erroneously against the plaintiff in error, we must then reverse the case undoubtedly, if there are no other issues decided in it than that. It often has occurred, however, and will occur again, that there are other points in the case than those of federal cognizance, on which the judgment of the court below may stand; those points being of themselves sufficient to control the case.

Or it may be that there are other issues in the case, but they are not of such controlling influence on the whole case that they are alone sufficient to support the judgment.

It may also be found that, notwithstanding there are many other questions in the record of the case, the issue raised by the federal question is such that its decision must dispose of the whole case.

In the two latter instances there can be no

doubt that the judgment of the State Court must be reversed, and under the new Act this | court can either render the final judgment or decree here, or remand the case to the State Court for that purpose.

But in the other cases supposed, why should a judgment be reversed for an error in deciding the federal question, if the same judgment 635*] must be rendered on the other points *in the case? And why should this court reverse a judgment which is right on the whole record presented to us; or where the same judgment will be rendered by the court below, after they have corrected the error in the federal question?

We have already laid down the rule that we are not authorized to examine these other questions for the purpose of deciding whether the State Court ruled correctly on them or not. We are of opinion that on these subjects not embraced in the class of questions stated in the statute, we must receive the decision of the State Courts as conclusive.

But when we find that the State Court has decided the federal question erroneously, then to prevent a useless and profitless reversal, which can do the plaintiff in error no good, and can only embarrass and delay the defendant, we must so far look into the remainder of the record as to see whether the decision of the

federal question alone is sufficient to dispose of the case, or to require its reversal; or on the other hand, whether there exist other matters in the record actually decided by the State Court which are sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court, notwithstanding the error in deciding the federal question. In the latter case the court would not be justified in revers. ing the judgment of the State Court.

But this examination into the points in the record other than the federal question is not for the purpose of determining whether they were correctly or erroneously decided, but to ascertain if any such have been decided, and their sufficiency to maintain the final judgment, as decided by the State Court.

Beyond this we are not at liberty to go, and we can only go this far to prevent the injustice of reversing a judgment which must in the end be re-affirmed, even in this court, if brought here again from the State Court after it has corrected its error in the matter of federal law. Finally, we hold the following propositions on this subject as flowing from the statute as it now stands:

1. That it is essential to the jurisdiction of 636*] this court over the judgment of a State Court, that it shall appear that one of the questions mentioned in the Act must have been raised, and presented to the State Court.

2. That it must have been decided by the State Court, or that its decision was necessary to the judgment or decree, rendered in the case. 3. That the decision must have been against the right claimed or asserted by plaintiff in error under the Constitution, treaties, laws or authority of the United States.

4. These things appearing, this court has jurisdiction and must examine the judgment so far as to enable it to decide whether this claim of right was correctly adjudicated by the State Court.

5. If it finds that it was rightly decided, the judgment must be affirmed.

6. If it was erroneously decided against plaintiff in error, then this court must further inquire, whether there is any other matter or issue adjudged by the State Court, which is sufficiently broad to maintain the judgment of that court, notwithstanding the error in deciding the issue raised by the federal question. If this is found to be the case, the judgment must be affirmed without inquiring into the soundness of the decision on such other matter or issue.

7. But if it be found that the issue raised by the question of federal law is of such controlling character that its correct decision is necessary to any final judgment in the case, or that there has been no decision by the State Court of any other matter or issue which is sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court without regard to the federal question, then this court will reverse the judgment of the State Court, and will either render such judgment here as the State Court should have rendered, or remand the case to that court, as the circumstances of the case may require.

Applying the principles here laid down to the case of Murdock v. Memphis, we are of opinion that this court has jurisdiction, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee must be affirmed.

Murdock and others against the City [*637 The suit was a bill in chancery brought by of Memphis to have a decree establishing their right in certain real estate near that City. The United States having determined to build a navy yard at Memphis, about the year 1844, or previous thereto, the City of Memphis, on the 14th day of September of that year, conveyed to the United States the land in controversy by an ordinary deed of general warranty, expressing on its face the consideration of $20,000 paid, and designating no purpose for which the land was conveyed. After retaining possession of the land for about ten years without building a navy yard, the United States abandoned that purpose, and by an Act approved August 5, 1854, ceded the property to the City of Memphis by its corporate name for the use and benefit of said City.

The plaintiffs in error, by their bill, allege that the title was originally conveyed to the City of Memphis, in trust, for certain purposes, including that of having a navy yard built on it by the United States; that when the title reverted to the City by reason of the abandonment of the place as a navy yard by the United States, and the Act of Congress aforesaid, the City received the title in trust for the original grantors, who are the plaintiffs, or who are represented by plaintiffs. A demurrer to the bill was filed. Also an answer denying the On the hearing the bill was dismissed, and this trust and pleading the Statute of Limitations. decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. The plaintiffs in their bill, and throughout the case, insisted that the effect of

the Act of 1854 was to vest the title in the Mayor and Aldermen of the City in trust for the plaintiffs.

It may be very true that it is not easy to see anything in the deed by which the United States received the title from the City, or the Act by which they ceded it back, which raises such a trust, but the plaintiffs claimed a right

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