Puslapio vaizdai
PDF
„ePub“

consented to the entry of the judgment, and a formal judgment was entered.

2. If the corporation was in existence so that it could appear in a suit, it was concluded by the appearance of its attorney.

yoke. It is true a clothes-wringer might be attached to them by the aid of additional devices, but no such devices are disclosed in the drawings or in the specification, and had they been added the frame would have been substantially resenting the corporation and its creditors were 3. If it was not in existence, the receivers repdifferent from the one patented. It would have bound by the appearance of their attorneys. been capable of a new use. Equally well could 4. The appearance by authorized attorneys was additional devices have fitted the Sabin stand-equivalent to a personal service of process upon those parties.

ard for use in a manner different from that in which it was employed.

Discarding, then, the jaws and the wedge, or other clamping device, as neither patentable by themselves nor patentable in combination with a wringing-machine supporter or frame, in view of the state of the art when this patent was issued, unless the structure of the frame was such as to obtain a novel and useful result it be comes evident that the shape of the frame must 353*] be regarded as one of its most important elements. And if this be so, the novelty of the frame does not consist in its having two uprights standing apart from each other without regard to the figure of the intervening space; As we have seen, if the semi-circular shape of what in the specification is called the inner margin of the yoke, that is, of the space between the uprights, is not a necessary constituent, the yoke cannot accomplish the results claimed for it, and no manner of support for a wringer is exhibited. Surely a frame shaped like an inverted M (K), though it would have two up rights separated by a space and connected at the bottom, would be essentially different from that claimed in this patent, because incapable of the same use. It could not support a clotheswringer in the manner described in the drawings annexed to the patent. A space bounded by right lines is not substantially the same as one bounded by a curve, and unless we throw out of the specification and the claims all that is said respecting the configuration of the interval between the uprights, we must hold that the defendants, in the use of their device, have not been guilty of any infringement of the complainants' rights. They have used a portable support for a wringing mechanism which has some of the features of that of the complainants, but it has not the U formed yoke, which is essential to the patented combination.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

[No. 300.]

Argued Apr. 21, 1874. Decided May 4, 1874.

N ERROR to the Supreme Judicial Court of

the State of Massachusetts.

In April, 1869, Folger, the defendant in error, obtained a judgment in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, against the Columbia Insurance Company, a corporation of the State of New York, and against the plaintiffs in error and others, as trustee for divers sums due to him by that company. issued. The answer of the plaintiffs in error On these judgments, writs of scire facias were set up that the judgment was invalid, because, before it was recovered, the insurance company was dissolved by decree of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. A portion of the record of the judgment in New York was introduced, declaring that the company be dissolved. The Superior Court, however, rendered favor of the plaintiff, Folger. This decree was judgment upon the scire facias proceedings in affirmed in the Supreme Court of the State, and the case was brought to this court by writ of

error.

Mr. Dudley Field, for plaintiffs in error:

The only errors relied upon are, that the court erred in holding that the Columbian Insurance Company was not dissolved, and that, the company being dissolved, it had no right to enter judgment against it or the trustees. The courts of Massachusetts had not the right to question the validity of the judgment of dissolution rendered by the Supreme Court of New York.

That court had jurisdiction over the parties and the cause, and the record is, therefore, conclusive in Massachusetts.

Judkins v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 37 N. H., 470; Bissell v. Wheelock, 11 Cush. (65 Mass.), 279; Buffum v. Stimpson, 87 Mass., 591.

The Supreme Court of New York was authorized to declare the corporation dissolved. 2 N. Y. R. S., 464; Mann v. Pentz, 3 N. Y.,

1*] *EDWARD HABICH et al., Plffs. in Err.; 420; Howe v. Deuel, 43 Barb., 508; Slee v.

[blocks in formation]

Judgments of state courts, effect of in other States and how far conclusive in Federal Courtssee note to D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 13 L. ed. U. S. 648.

Bloom, 19 Johns., 456.

When a corporation is dissolved, no action can be maintained against it.

Greeley v. Smith, 3 Story, 657; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet., 281; Read v. Frankfort Bank, 23 Me., 318; Merrill v. Suffolk Bank, 31 Me., 57; Ang. & Ames, Corp., ch. 5, p. 128; Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H., 536.

Messrs. John C. Dodge and G. F. McLellan, for defendant in error:

Even supposing the decree of the court in New York to intend the extinction of a corporation, and to be a valid decree, there is still no error in the judgment.

2 Kent, Com., 406; Booth v. Clark, 17 How., 336, 15 L. ed., 169; Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y., 577; Taylor v. Columbian Ins. Co., 96 Mass., 353; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet., 281; Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How., 485, 15 L. ed., 502.

6*] *Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion | afterwards, in October, 1867, an agreed stateof the court:

The record of the scire facias proceedings upon which the case was argued presents some questions requiring careful examination.

ment of facts was presented to the court.

Here were before the court, the trustees (the plaintiffs in error here), the present defendant in error, the Columbian Insurance Company, At the close of the argument a certified copy by its attorney, Edward Bangs; the receivers, of the record in the suit in which judgment by their attorney, Joseph Nickerson; compriswas rendered was handed up with the consenting all who were in any manner interested in of both sides, that the same should be considered by the court.

If we correctly apprehend the position of the case as there stated, there can be no difficulty in reaching a correct conclusion.

In his first point the plaintiff in error says: "The only errors relied on are, that the court erred in holding that the Columbian Insurance Company was not dissolved, and the company being dissolved, it had no right to enter judgment against it or the trustees."

The indebtedness of the plaintiffs in error and their liability to pay the amount of their notes to the defendant in error, as adjudged by the Massachusetts court, are thus admitted. But it is insisted that in reaching its conclusion, and as a part of the process of reasoning by which it was reached, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts erroneously held that the judg ment of the New York court, that the insurance company was dissolved, was without authority and was void.

If this be conceded, of what importance is it to the plaintiffs? How does it concern them whether the judgment dissolving the insurance company was erroneous or whether it was correct? All they have to do is to pay the amount of their notes. This it is conceded that they are bound to do, and this the certified copy of the record before us shows that the insurance company and its receivers consented that it be adjudged they should and must do. Payment under such circumstances is a complete protection to them against a claim for repayment by the receivers upon a suit brought in the New York courts equally as in the courts of Massa

chusetts.

The record shows the following facts, viz.: that the summons by which the suit was commenced was served on the insurance company in Massachusetts by levying on a ship as its property on the 18th of June, 1866; that on the first Tuesday of July the corporation entered its appearance, by its attorneys, and filed an affidavit of merits; that on the 30th of July it filed an answer denying that it was a corporation, and denying all the material allegations of the complaint, which answer was signed by Joseph Nickerson as its attorney; that on the 3d of October, 1866, George A. Osgood and Cyrus Curtis made an adverse claim, and filed a pétition alleging that they were the receivers of the said insurance company, praying to be admitted as parties to the action, setting forth the manner of their appointment, alleging that all the credits, effects and assets of said company were vested in them, and claiming the effects and credits in the hands of the said supposed trustees, which answer was signed by Edward Bangs, as attorney; that on the 19th of October this prayer was granted, and that

the transaction, or entitled to appear in the action.

At the January Term, 1869, the court ordered the following entry to be made, viz.: "Trustee charged. Judgment for the plaintiff. By the Court. Geo. C. Wild, Clerk."

At the following April Term a consent was filed by Mr. Bangs, defendant's attorney, that the judgment be entered for the plaintiff for the sum of $3,753.79, damages and costs, dated June 10th, 1869. On the 12th of June is made the following entry. "Claimants withdraw, E. Bangs, Attorney. John C. Dodge, Attorney for Plaintiff. Filed June 12th, 1869."

On the 14th of June a formal judgment for the amount is rendered for the plaintiff, reciting that the trustees are charged upon their answer, and that the claimants withdrew.

It is impossible to present the case of a judgment which would be more conclusive upon the corporation, and upon the receivers, than the case presented. They were parties in form and in fact. They contested the claim as far as contest was available, and when further contest was unavailing the attorney for the receivers consented to the entry of the judgment, in terms withdrew their opposition, and a formal judgment was entered.

If the corporation was in existence, so that it could appear in a suit, it was concluded by the appearance of its attorney. Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb., 140. If it was not in existence, the receivers representing the corporation and its creditors, were bound by the appearance of their attorneys. In either event the result is the same.

This judgment is binding upon the corpora tion and the receivers, and in the case of a suit brought by either of them against the trustees, would be an indisputable bar to their right of recovery, and this in any State in the Union. The appearance by authorized attorneys was equivalent to a personal service of process upon those parties.

Without intimating for a moment that an error was made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, it is too plain for discussion that it is immaterial to the plaintiff whether there was error or not.

It is a point in which they are not concerned. They have but to pay their debt, adjudged to be due in a proceeding which protects them against all the world. Magoon v. Scales, 9 Wall., 31, 32, 19 L. ed., 548; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall., 290, 18 L. ed., 475; Gruner v. U. S., 11 How., 163; U. S. v. Yates, 6 How., 605; Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How., 334; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet., 300; Chaffee v. Hayward, 20 How., 208, 15 L. ed., 804; McDonogh v. Millaudon, 3 How., 693; Field v. Gibbs, 1 Pet. C. C., 155; Bk. v. Slocomb, 41 Pet., 60; Eldred v. Bk., 17 Wall., 551, 21 L. ed. 686.

8*] *This being the only allegation of error, | said district court, the defendant appeared by the judgment must be affirmed.

JOHN L. PRIEST, Plff. in Err., v. JOHN B. FOLGER (No. 298), and SUPPLY C. THWING, Piff. in err., v. JOHN B. FOLGER (No. 299).

These cases involve the same questions as the case above decided, and in accordance with that decision are affirmed.

[Argued by same counsel and decided at same date.]

EDWARD CREIGHTON, Plff. in Err.,

v.

JOHN KERR et al.

(See S. C., 20 Wall., 8-14.) Appearance equivalent to personal service—effect of withdrawal of appearance.

1. A general appearance waives all question of the service of process. It is equivalent to a personal service. The question of jurisdiction only is saved. 2. A personal appearance by the defendant,

through his attorneys, converted into a personal

Suit, that which before was a proceeding in rem.

3. A withdrawal of appearance by defendant without prejudice to plaintiff in an attachment pro ceeding after a rule to plead had been served, leaves the plaintiff at liberty to enter a personal Judgment against defendant, as upon default after appearance.

[No. 288.]

Argued Apr. 14, 1874

I

Decided May 4, 1874. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the Ter ritory of Colorado.

On May 30, 1870, John Kerr, one of the defendants in error, filed an affidavit in attachment, pursuant to the laws of Colorado, in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the Territory of Colorado, sitting within and for the County of Arrapahoe, setting forth that the plaintiff in error was indebted to him and Alexander Lobb, the other defendant in error, in the sum of $5,563.50, for telegraph poles and labor and materials furnished by the defendants in error to the plaintiff in error, and that the said plaintiff in error was a non-resident of the Territory of Colorado.

Thereupon the necessary bond was filed, and a writ of attachment was issued, returnable to the June Term, 1870, of said district court.

June 4, 1870, the plaintiff filed his declaration in assumpsit, which consisted of the consolidated common counts for work and labor performed, for telegraph poles, wares and goods sold and delivered, for money laid out and expended, and for money in arrear upon an accounting, the damages being laid at $8,000. To this a copy of plaintiff's account was attached. June 10, 1870, the sheriff returned the writ executed, by attaching certain shares of bank stock, and the further return of non est inventus as to the defendant.

June 17, on motion of plaintiff's counsel, the

cause was continued to the next term.

Oct. 12, 1870, and at the October Term of

NOTE.-Appearance cures defects in service of process and its non-service, except want of jurisdic tion of subject-matter-see note to Knox v. Summers. 2 L. ed. U. S. 510.

Effect of appearance by counsel or attorney, in an action; unauthorized appearance; what is an appearance-see note to Shelton v. Tiffin, 12 L. ed.

387.

counsel, and upon motion the defendant was ruled to plead in ten days from that date.

Before the expiration of the rule to plead, and on Oct. 19, 1870, the defendant's counsel "withdrew their appearance as attorneys for the defendant, without prejudice to the plaintiffs."

On the 27th day of the same month, and after the rule to plead had expired, the plaintiffs took judgment nil dicit, the circumstances under which judgment was taken being recited at length in the record.

Thereupon the damages were assessed by the jury to an amount exceeding the ad damnum of the declaration; but the plaintiff remitted all in excess of the sum of $8,000, and the amount of the ad damnum, for which amount, with costs of suit, judgment was given by the court and execution awarded.

Nov. 26, 1870, the plaintiff in error sued out his writ of error from the Supreme Court of Colorado Territory to the said district court, which was made to operate as a supersedeas by of the Supreme Court. a compliance with the order of one of the judges

Feb. 29, 1872, the judgment of the court below was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Colorado.

From the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado the defendant in the original suit, Mar. 9, 1872, sued out his writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to said Supreme Court of Colorado.

The errors assigned here are as follows: 1. The court erred in rendering judgment without publication notice of the proceedings, and without mailing the same to the defendant.

2. The court erred in rendering judgment for a larger amount than was claimed in the writ and other proceedings.

Mr. J. M. Woolworth, for plaintiff in error:

The defendants in error may claim that, Mr. Creighton having appeared generally in the action, they were not limited by the amount named in the writ, but could have the sum alleged as their damages in the declaration.

A

The account, by which the sum really claimed appeared, would control the nominal damages alleged in the declaration. The system of pleading which obtains in Colorado, as shown by the statute given above, sec. 8, p. 502, requires the account to be annexed to the declaration. defendant, duly served with process, might safely let judgment go by default, or appearing, might decline to plead, resting safely in the supposition that the amount adjudged against him would not exceed that shown by the account to be due. To render judgment for a much larger amount is the grossest error.

Had the withdrawal of the appearance been general, and unqualified by the words "with out prejudice to the plaintiff" the case would have stood as if no appearance had been en

tered.

Michew v. McCoy, 3 Watts & S., 501; Lodge v. State Bank, 6 Blackf., 557; Dana v. Adams, 13 Ill., 691.

Those words, "without prejudice," do not retain to the plaintiff the advantage of the appearance. To give them that effect would nullify the withdrawal. To say to a party: you may withdraw your appearance, but we will

proceed against you as being before the court, is a contradiction of terms. The utmost meaning that can be attributed to the words is, that the property, and all rights of the plaintiff not resting on the appearance, should remain unaffected by the withdrawal. To give greater force to those words, would be to unduly magnify a merely formal proceeding. The appearance on the 12th of the month did not delay the entry of the rule to plead, nor lengthen the time to plead. The rule, in the very form and words of it, was required in the case of a defendant failing to appear, as the statute above shows. The appearance was withdrawn on the 19th of the month, seven days after its entry and three days before the expiration of the rule. So that nothing was gained by the defendant nor lost to the plaintiff. To give it the effect of subjecting a party, not found and not resident in this jurisdiction, to a judgment for nearly $2,500 more than could have been taken against him, is shocking.

Messrs. R. T. Merrick and Alfred Sayre, for defendants in error:

As to the first assignment of error, the defendants in error rely upon the fact.

(a) That defendant did appear, by attorney, and thereby submitted himself fully to the jurisdiction of the court; and that the defendant's attorneys only withdrew their appearance "as attorneys for the defendant," thereby leaving the defendant still in court, i. e., they did not withdraw the appearance of the defendant (which could only be done by special leave of the court for good cause shown), but their own appearance, as attorneys for the defendant.

(b) That, whether the withdrawal of the appearance was that of the attorneys simply or was, in effect, the withdrawal of the defendant, it was, in either case, without prejudice to the plaintiff, i. e.; any advantage the plaintiff had obtained by reason of the voluntary submission of the defendant, to the jurisdiction of the court, he was to retain notwithstanding the act of the defendant's attorneys.

Dana v. Adams, 13 Ill., 691.

As to the second error assigned, it is asserted by the defendants in error that the judgment in this case is a personal judgment as contradis tinguished from a judgment in rem. This is an attachment case and, so far as attachment lien is concerned, it is not relinquished by the appearance of the defendant in the action. But the judgment rendered is a personal one, and upon which a general execution will lie.

See, Conn. v. Caldwell, 1 Gilm., 536; Lockridge v. Foster, 4 Scam., 569; Tunnison v. Field, 21 Ill., 108; Pierson v. Finney, 37 Ill., 29; Lawrence v. Yeatman, 2 Scam., 17; Rowley v. Berrian, 12 Ill., 198; Hobson v. Emporium Real Estate, etc., Co., 42 Ill., 306; Kerr v. Swallow, 33 Ill., 379; Hichins v. Lyon, 35 Ill., 150; opinion of Supreme Court of Colorado in this case, Creighton v. Kerr, 1 Col., 509.

that notice of the proceedings required by the laws of Colorado. *It may be assumed, [*11 also, that in making a claim of damages for $5,563.50, only in the writ of attachment, and in making a claim for $8,000 in the declaration, an error was committed. It is insisted that, in consequence of this claim in the writ, the party would have been justified in assuming that no judgment for a larger amount would be taken against him; and that great injustice might have been done to him. We do not find that the respectable counsel claims that any injustice has actually been done.

But we are of the opinion that there has been no opportunity for the commission of injustice. We find the facts in this respect to be as follows:

After the execution of the writ of attachment the plaintiff filed his declaration claiming damages to the amount of $8,000, giving the items of the claim. After this time, viz.: on the 12th day of October, the defendant appeared in the suit by his counsel, Messrs. Charles and Albert. The appearance was general, and, "thereupon,” as the record says, on motion of the plaintiff's attorney, the defendant was ruled to plead in ten days.

Within the ten days, in which an order to plead had been entered, upon, or upon the faith of, or in consequence of their appearance, the attorneys came into court and withdrew their appearance as attorneys for the defendant, without "prejudice to the plaintiff." Leave to withdraw was granted upon this condition. Assuming the rule to plead to have been effectual, as it manifestly would have been had there been no withdrawal, and assuming that a failure to comply therewith placed the defendant in default, and entitled the plaintiff to a judgment by nil dicit, as would manifestly have been the case had there been no withdrawal, the plaintiff and the court held the action to be undefended, and a judgment was entered for the plaintiff, with damages to be assessed by a jury to be impaneled. The jury received evidence upon this subject, and under instructions from the court rendered a verdict for $12,244.50. The evidence is not returned in the record, as there was no occasion that it should be, and there is no presumption of law, or *reason in fact, to [*12 suppose that the verdict was for a larger sum than was justly due to the plaintiff. For all in excess of $8,000 a remission was made, and judgment was entered for that sum.

The leave to withdraw the appearance of the defendant's attorneys was given upon the condition that it should be "without prejudice to the plaintiff." This meant that the position of the plaintiff was not to be unfavorably affected by the act of withdrawal. All his rights were to remain as they then stood.

A general appearance waives all question of the service of process. It is equivalent to a personal service. The question of jurisdiction only is saved. U. S. v. Yates, 6 How., 605. If there Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of was error in the commencement of this action the court:

In the view we take of this case it is not necessary to examine the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the suit or the alleged defects in its commencement. Without intending, in fact, to decide those points, it may be assumed, as is argued by the plaintiff, that there was not

by reason of a defective notice or otherwise, it was cured by the appearance.

This advantage, among others, was not to be impaired by the withdrawai of the appearance. A personal appearance by the defendant, through his attorneys, converted into a personal suit that which was before a proceeding in

rem. This result has been worked when the l appearance was entered, and stood in full effect when the withdrawal was made. Any judgment that he could then obtain against the defendant was binding upon the defendant, indisputable and valid against him and his property whereever he or it could be found. To reconstruct this judgment and by means of a withdrawal of the appearance make it a judgment to be enforced upon certain shares of bank stock only, and liable to be re-examined as to that upon the personal application of the defendant, would produce an extremely unfavorable effect upon the plaintiff's position. It would be a "prejudice" to him, and hence it cannot be permitted. A rule to plead had been served upon the attorneys. This remained in force. At the expiration of the time to plead, the action was undefended; and a right to an interlocutory judgment at once arose. To take away this right 13*] would be an injury to the plaintiff. Hence, under the condition of no prejudice, it remained good to him.

The appearance of the defendant may remain, although the attorneys, by whom it was entered,

THOMAS J. McQUIDDY, Appt.,

บ.

JOHN H. WARE, John H. Ware, Jr., Hanson
H. Ware, and Nodaway County.

(See S. C., 20 Wall., 14-20.)

Judgment against one who joined the rebellion, when will not be set aside-tender-laches.

cannot complain that his creditors proceeded to
1. A man who left his State to join the rebellion,
collect their debts by publication, and he is entitled
to no equitable relief on that account.
and void, the remedy at law is complete.

2. If the proceedings by his creditors are null 3. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he cannot set aside the proceedings for collection of a debt without tendering the amount due.

4. Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights. There is no artificial rule on such a subject, but each case as it arises must be determined by its own particular circumstances.

[No. 254.]

Submitted Apr. 10, 1874. Decided May 4, 1874.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Eastern District of Missouri.
The case is stated by the court.
Messrs. W. H. Letcher and Davis, Thor-
oughman & Warren, for appellant.
Mr. Geo. P. Strong, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court:

Mc

have withdrawn. Its effect cannot be annulled by such withdrawal. The appearance gives rights and benefits in the conduct of a suit, to destroy which by a withdrawal would work great injustice to the other party. Such was the case of Eldred v. Bk., 17 Wall., 551, 21 L. ed., 686, where the defendant withdrew his plea, claiming that the withdrawal left the case as though it had never been filed, and that, never This bill of complaint has no equity to rest having been served with process, he was not lia- upon. It makes substantially this case: ble to a personal judgment. The court say: souri, in 1861, voluntarily entered the service of Quiddy, a resident of Nodaway County, Mis"We do not agree to this proposition. The filing of the plea was both an appearance and a the Confederate States under General Sterling defense. The withdrawal of the plea could not Price, and followed the fortunes of that officer have the effect of withdrawing the appearance and his army when they left Missouri. At this of the defendant, and requiring the plaintiff to time there were two mortgages on his farm, or take steps to bring him again within the juris- which were due, and also an outstanding unseinstruments of writing claimed to be such, He was not by the withdrawal of the plea out of court." cured note. The mortgagees, in 1862 and 1863, None of the cases cited contain anything in procured a foreclosure of their mortgages by hostility to these views. As confirming them, constructive notice to McQuiddy, on the ground see Lawrence v. Yeatman, 2 Scam., 17; Row-that his place of residence was unknown, and ley v. Berrian, 12 Ill., 198; Thompson v. Turn the unsecured creditor, by process of attacher, 22 Ill., 389; see, also, the present case, re- ment, obtained judgment. There were three ported in 1 Col., 509. sales on these judgments. The first took place in 1863, and both the others occurred in 1864.

diction of the court.

[ocr errors]

Second. We do not intend by the argument

thus advanced to intimate that the result would have been different had the appearance been withdrawn unconditionally, as was the case in

Eldred v. Bk.

The authorities upon this subject of a voluntary appearance are cited in the case of Habich v. Folger, recently decided in this court, and it is not necessary to do more than to refer to them as there collected, ante, 307.

In the present case there was not a simple withdrawal, but it was allowed upon the condition that it should be without prejudice to the position of the plaintiff. We decide the case upon the facts as they are presented, and 14*] *nothing would be gained by attempting to go beyond them.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Bradley did not sit during the argument, and took no part in this decision.

The complaint is, that all these proceedings were null and void, and that the court which heard the cases was without jurisdiction, and various grounds are stated in support of these allegations, and others, which affect the regularity of the proceedings. The chief ground that attacks the jurisdiction and is applicable to all the cases alike is, that the orders of publication were based on false statements, and

that in one case jurisdiction could not be acquired on affidavit of unknown residence, as it was a proceeding to enforce a lien on lands instead of a suit to foreclose a mortgage, and required an affidavit of non-residence to authorize ant says that his departure from the State was the giving of constructive notice. The complainfor a temporary purpose, with an intention of soon returning; that he left his wife at his

chen necessary to validity of a judgment-see note NOTE.-Service of notice to appear and defend,

to Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 7 L ed. U. 8. 922.

« AnkstesnisTęsti »