where success might be doubtful, and especially all attempts to defend open towns, should have been avoided.

We have quite recently learnt by accounts from Tours that several camps of instruction have been formed in France, two of them at Bordeaux and Rochelle, although it was not stated if they were to be entrenched. St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, if local circumstances are favourable, would have been a better strategical choice than Rochelle. Havre, we also learn, has been fortified. The fear is that these measures may have been determined on too late.

The only organized army remaining to France after Sedan was shut in at Metz under Bazaine, and consisted, as we now know, of 150,000 men, not including the regular garrison of the fortress. This force was now hemmed in by strong lines of circumvallation, and invested by the 1st and 2nd German armies under General Manteuffel and Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of seven corps and three divisions of cavalry, reinforced later by one infantry division. Thus a German force, never probably exceeding 210,000 men, disseminated over a circumference of 27 miles, which was separated in two parts by the Moselle, was found sufficient to hold fast 150,000 French troops, occupying the centre of the circle, and with every strategical advantage in their favour.

At Strasburg a French garrison of 19,000 was besieged by 70,000 Germans. Toul, garrisoned by 2000 Mobiles, was besieged by one. Prussian division under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. The cannon of Toul, commanding the railroad from Nancy by Chalons and Epernay to Paris, compelled the Germans to unload their trains some distance east of the town, to transport their supplies on wheels by a long detour, and to load them again on trains to the west of the fortress. Thus the persistent defence of the garrison, which only surrendered in the last days of September, had a large share in delaying the operations of the besiegers of Paris. Verdun, on the Meuse, similarly commanded the direct railroad from Metz, passing by Rheims and Soissons to Paris. It was besieged by detachments from the 1st Army at Metz, and was defended by Mobiles and National Guards. Thionville, Longwy, Montmedy, and Mezières, all held French garrisons, and prevented the Germans from using the railroad passing by these places to Rheims and Paris. Thionville and Montmedy were blockaded, and the blockades of Bitsche and Phalsburg were continued; they were defended chiefly by Mobiles, and occupied about 18,000 German troops.

Somewhat in mitigation of their fatal inferiority in the field, the French possessed an advantage which is inherent in the case of a people defending their soil. Instead of being limited in the event of a defeat, as their enemies would be, to one general line of retreat, the French forces might retire cither in manoeuvring or from a disastrous field, in any direction save one that might be barred by the enemy. With such an extent of seaboard and a powerful fleet, a defeated French army might be secure of finding safety and support on reaching any point on the coast where local conditions might be favourable; and this circumstance would evidently give the French a real tactical advantage in battle.

Turning, now, to the Germans-the capture of Paris was the one great object they proposed to themselves in continuing the war, because it was considered that its attainment would lead to the immediate submission of France. The siege of Paris, therefore, was the one great central operation to which the other military movements were only accessory. Had they foreseen the resistance they were to encounter from the capital, it is more than doubtful if they would not have offered, after Sedan, terms of peace which would have been accepted by the French; but they were under the impression that Paris would yield on the mere appearance of their forces before it; and thus they were committed to a tedious and difficult enterprise, the duration of which would afford to France all the chances which might arise from the mutability of human affairs in general, and from the changes which time might work in the opinions and actions of the other European powers.

Destitute as France was, at this period, of any organised military force in the field, the most obvious manner of reducing the country to subjection was to prevent the assembly and training of any such force, by sending strong moveable columns of the three arms into every district. But France was too large for such a treatment, even with the overwhelming numbers at the disposal of the Prussian monarch. It was impossible to coerce in that manner more than a small portion of the area of France. The German columns would command only the ground on which they encamped, with a certain zone surrounding it; and the fire of hatred. and resistance smouldering over the whole surface of the country would thus be stamped out in one quarter only to burst forth with increased violence in another. To this fact it was owing that the so-called French Government was left so long unmolested at Tours; it would have been hazardous, in

up their respective investing positions from Lagny on the Marne towards Versailles.

The lines of communication for the army engaged in the primary operation of the siege of Paris took their departure from the northern half of this base; and on these lines were situated all the strong places excepting Strasburg, such as Metz, Toul, Verdun, Thionville, &c., which the Germans were besieging at the period of the fall of Sedan,

The southern half of the same line formed the base of operations for the troops engaged in the siege of Strasburg, and for those subsequently employed in reducing Schelestadt, Neuf Brisach, Belfort, &c.; as well as for the armies operating by Dijon towards Lyons, and to the south of Belfort towards Besançon.

The position of the investing army at Paris formed a secondary base, from which radiated the different columns acting towards Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Evreux, Amiens, St. Quentin, &c., for all of which Paris forms the centre of the wheel, of which these co lumns represent the spokes; and the object of the employment of these columns has been at once to collect supplies, and to prevent the siege from interruption by the different bodies of French troops which were organizing all over the country.

The above explanation being clearly apprehended, the movements of the German forces, which otherwise would appear confused, will assume in the mind of the reader a methodical and symmetrical arrangement. On the evening of the 2d September, the very same day on which the surrender of Sedan was consummated, the German armies received their marching orders, and next morning broke up in different directions.

The 11th Corps and 1st Bavarians, both belonging to the 3rd Army, were detailed to escort the prisoners to Pont à Mousson; whence, having handed over their charge to the 10th Corps employed before Metz, they were to make all speed to join the Crown Prince of Prussia at Paris.

The 3d and 4th Armies marched on Paris by two different routes; the 3d Army passing by Rethel, Rheims, and Epernay, to the south bank of the Marne; and continuing its march by Montmirail to Coulommiers;

The 4th Army passed by Vouziers, Rheims, and generally by the north bank of the Marne, to Claye; whence its several corps diverged to their respective positions for continuing the investing line from Lagny on the left, round by Gonesse to St. Denis and Argenteuil, north of the city.

It is to be remarked that, in order to take up the positions relatively assigned to them. before Paris, and owing to the positions respectively occupied by them round Sedan, the 3rd and 4th Armies had to cross each other's line somewhere en route. This they did at Rheims; and that one army of 80,000 men, with all its trains and impediments, should have been able to cut across the march of another army, numbering 120,000, without serious inconvenience, is a proof of the excellence of the working staff.

It is to be understood that only the general direction of the march of the armies on Paris is above given. Every parallel road leading in the named direction was of course utilised. Each army thus marched. in parallel columns, the lateral communication between which, as well as between the two armies, was kept up by the cavalry; and in particular the outward flanks of both armies were protected by strong bodies of cavalry. The front of both armies was at the same time covered by a chain of advanced guards in communication with each other by means of cavalry patrols, thus forming a continuous circle, either for protection or information, enveloping the head of the line of march of both armies at a distance of from twenty to thirty miles in advance.

If General Trochu had possessed at this time 120,000 good troops, and an adequate field artillery, it would have been impossible for the Germans to take up their investing line on such an enormous circumference. The French, holding the centre, might have struck vigorously at different portions of the serpent form then winding its way round the devoted city, and might easily have cut it into fragments before it could have found time, by the construction of entrenchments and batteries, to tighten its folds and choke its victim.

Even as it was, the operation was hazardous. The 4th Army, under the Crown Prince of Saxony, easily repulsed an attempt made by Vinoy's corps to stop its progress on the 18th September in the valley of the Marne, and on the 19th the French made a skirmishing attack on his leading columns

between St. Denis and Gonesse. But the 3rd Army had to encounter more serious opposition.

On the 17th September, the 5th, being the leading corps of the Crown Prince of Prussia's (3rd) army, threw pontoon bridges over the Seine at Villeneuve St. George; and over these bridges the 5th, 6th, and 2nd Bavarian corps must pass to take their positions in the investing line from the Seine westward by Sevres to Bougival, likewise on the Seine, north-west of the city. They must, perforce, also move in a long trailing column, dangerously weak at any given point in comparison with the masses which the enemy could direct against it. The formation of the bridges, and the operation of defiling over them, were covered towards Paris by posting on the heights of Limeil, extending from the Seine to Boissy St. Leger, one brigade of infantry, with two squadrons and two batteries. At 2 P. M. the French troops, to the number of eight battalions and two batteries, debouching from Charenton across the bridges over the Seine and Marne which there join, and advancing along the tongue of land comprised between the two rivers which afforded perfect protection to their flanks, attacked the Prussians, but were easily repulsed and driven back in confusion.

On the 18th, the 5th Corps, having crossed the Seine, continued its march on Versailles, by the two routes of Palaiseau and Bièvre; the Bièvre column, which was covered towards Paris by cavalry, had an unimportant skirmish in the afternoon: The same day the 2nd Bavarians, having crossed the bridges, occupied Longjumeau.

On the morning of the 19th, the 5th Corps marched from Palaiseau and Bièvre on Versailles; the 2nd Bavarians from Longjumeau through Palaiseau to its position in the investing line at Chatenay; the 6th Corps, which only crossed the Seine in the morning, moved by Orly to its destined position at Chevilly.

The head of the 9th Division 5th Corps, after leaving Bièvre, was attacked by the French 14th Corps under General Ducrot, occupying the intrenched position of Petit Bicêtre. Notwithstanding the bad behaviour of Ducrot's right wing, which left the field in great disorder early in the action, the Prussians were hard pressed for several hours; and to clear the road to Versailles they were obliged to bring up the remaining division of the 5th Corps from Jouy, which place it had reached on the southern road to Versailles, as well as two Bavarian brigades from Chatenay. The result was the withdrawal of the French to

the protection of the forts with the loss of eight gu

On the 20th, the 3rd Army was distributed from Bougival by Sèvres, Meudon, Clamart, Bourg, Chevilly, to Choisy on the Seine, south-east of Paris; the Würtemburg division belonging to the same army continuing the circle between Choisy and Bonneuil on the Marne; from which point the 4th Army prolonged and completed the circumference by La Landes, Sevran, Pierrefitte, and Argenteuil, to Chatou.

Having now placed the German armies in position round Paris, we shall proceed to examine their chances of success.

The science of war-whether in its application to the branches termed Strategy or Tactics, which are simply different names of the same art when applied to scales of different magnitude-may be defined as the art of bringing superior numbers against an enemy. In other words, success in war depends on superiority of concentration. The same idea was expressed forcibly, if rather irreverently, by the First Napoleon, when he said 'God always fought on the side of the gros bataillons."

The different rules and maxims which have been framed by military writers are all deduced from this one leading principle, by which, indeed, all military operations, whether great or small, must alike be regulated; whether these relate to the general strategy of a campaign, to the marshalling of an army on a field of battle, or even to the manoeuvring of a battalion on the paradeground. And the object of all military rules, of all drill, discipline, and military training, and of all the labours of the different military departments, is to enable the general in command of an army to apply that principle successfully. It will be found that every advantage obtained by either side during the present war may be traced directly to that superiority of concentration on which we have insisted as a necessary condition of success.

The art of fortification is simply an application of the same principle, by means of which a small force may be enabled successfully to resist a large one, and the real superiority may be converted practically to the side of the weaker numbers. Its origin dates as far back as, and was a consequence of, the use of missiles. And the primary idea was to neutralize superior numbers by creating a shelter, from behind which the weaker party, in comparative safety, might discharge their missiles at an enemy advancing to attack them. It is clear that if a man sheltered by a parapet could discharge three darts or arrows at an attacking body

between the moment of the latter coming within range and that of closing with the defenders, the interposition of the parapet would, speaking theoretically, place one of the latter on an equality with three assailants. Every improvement in the science of projectiles has been in favour of the lamb against the wolf; and it is evident that the advantages to the defenders must increase in the triple proportion of the range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire. Thus, the same man behind a parapet, who, when armed with stones or darts, might be equal to three assailants, would, when furnished with a weapon firing ten shots in a minute at an effective range of six hundred yards, be equal in theory to fifty assailants, or, if we suppose only every fifth shot to tell, to ten assailants advancing to the attack over open ground.

The present range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire impart to all irregulars, when acting on the defensive, a greater value than they formerly possessed in the threefold proportion of those elements; and the consideration is one of paramount interest to England, since her Volunteers, by reason of their proficiency in shooting, would, in this view, be little inferior to trained soldiers in defending an entrenched position.

As the art of fortification advanced, towns were completely surrounded by parapet walls, and various devices were adopted in their construction, with the purpose of increasing the superiority of defensive fire, of which the most important was the provision of flanking defence.

The reduction of an ancient fortress, too strong to be carried by sudden assault, was undertaken, as in modern times, in a methodical and scientific manner, the system of attack being regulated according to the nature of the defences. In the absence of any sufficient means of forcing a passage through a solid rampart too lofty for escalade, the assailants resorted to the erection of a huge mound of earth, pushing forward the mass gradually until it touched the walls, and raising it to the level of the summit, from whence the besiegers might pour their stormers over the defences. Many passages in the Old Testament refer to this method of capturing besieged cities, as (Deut. xx. 20), where the Israelites are commanded to 'build bulwarks against the city' until it should be subdued; and yet more expressly in the denunciation against Sennacherib (2 Kings, xix. 32), proclaiming that he should not shoot an arrow into Jerusalem, nor come before it with a shield, nor cast a bank against it.'

This, the most ancient mode of attack,

was superseded by the method of effecting an entrance into a besieged place by breaching the wall with battering-rams and engines hurling masses of rock and other missiles with great force. To effect this, however, these engines had to be brought close up to the wall; and the necessity of protecting the soldiers employed in running up these engines or rams, and in working them when in position, gave rise to the system of approaches, the rudest idea of which is expressed in the moveable towers or sheds on wheels, which were pushed up to the walls. This system has, in modern days, only been elaborated to suit the altered conditions introduced by science in military operations.

As the power of artillery increased, it became necessary to substitute for the parapet wall a rampart built of a thick mound of earth, the excavation of which formed the ditch. This mound was faced or scarped with brick or masonry to such a height as to render access to the interior impossible except by scaling-ladders; and to prevent this scarped wall, forming the inner side of the ditch, from being brought down in ruins by a distant fire, it was protected by raising on the outer edge of the ditch an earthen mound or parapet higher than, and sloping gradually towards, the surrounding country.

The increased range and accuracy of hollow projectiles have rendered the old system of closely surrounding a town with a continuous rampart or enceinte both useless and dangerous, unless supplemented by a system of detached forts sufficiently in advance to keep an enemy's artillery beyond that distance from which he might destroy the place by his shells. It was the absence of such advanced works at Sedan that enabled the Germans to place their artillery on the heights surrounding the fortress, and compelled the surrender of the French army enclosed within its walls.

A series of such forts disposed on a large circumference constitute a vast entrenched camp, the forts themselves armed with the heaviest known ordnance and requiring comparatively small garrisons, yet affording the most favourable battle positions for a large army, whose flanks would rest on two of the forts and whose front would be effectually protected by their fire.

In general terms, the advantages of such a system are:-1. They oblige an enemy to commence his approaches at a great distance from the place they are designed to protect, thereby preventing its being destroyed by distant bombardment, and rendering it necessary, before such a result can be achieved, that the besiegers should reduce two or more of the adjacent forts by regular approaches and assault. 2. The circumference