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evacuation. The great eastern capital of France was delivered as a prize to those who had not earned it. Had Suchet been substituted for Augereau some weeks earlier the course of history might have been diverted. But although Napoleon had contemplated such a change, he shrank from disgracing an old servant, and again, as before Leipsic, displayed a kindly spirit destructive to his cause. The night after his retreat from Arcis Napoleon sent out a reconnaissance to Vitry, and, finding it garrisoned by Prussians, he swerved toward St. Dizier, which, after a smart combat, he entered on the 23d. This placed him midway between the lines of his enemy's communication both from Strasburg and from Basel; which of the two, he asked himself, would Schwarzenberg return to defend? Thinking only how best to bait his foe, he set his army in motion northward; the anxious Austrian would certainly struggle to retain the line in greatest danger. This illusion continued, French cavalry scoured the country, some of the Chatillon diplomats were captured, and the Emperor of Austria had a narrow escape at Bar. It seemed strange that the country-side as far as Langres was deserted, but the fact was apparently explained when the news came that the enemy was in force at Vitry; probably they had abandoned Troyes and had disregarded Brienne for the purpose of diverting him from his purpose. Alas for the self-deception of a ruined man! The enemy at Vitry were a body of 8000 cavalry from the Silesian army, sent, under Winzengerode, to dog Napoleon's heels and deceive him, as they actually did. Thanks to Marmont's disobedience and bad judgment, Blücher had opened communications with Schwarzenberg, and both were marching as swiftly as possible direct to Paris. Of this Napoleon remained ignorant until the 28th. The Russian cavalry, having left Vitry, were on that day moving toward St. Dizier, when Napoleon, believing they formed the head of a powerful hostile column, fell upon them with needless fury, and all too easily put them to flight; 2000 were captured, and 500 killed. From his prisoners the Emperor first gained a hint of the appalling truth, and the same afternoon at Vitry the rumors were confirmed. Mounting his horse, the unhappy man spurred back to St. Dizier, and closeted himself in silent communing with his maps.

The allies had not at first divined Napoleon's purpose. Indeed, their movements in passing the Aube, and the day following, were little better than random efforts to fathom it. But on the morning of the 23d two important

messengers were captured, one a courier from Berthier to Macdonald with despatches stating exactly where Napoleon was, the other a rider with a short note from Napoleon to his Empress, containing a statement of its writer's plans. This famous paper was lost, for Blücher, after having read it, let the rider go. But the extant German translation is doubtless accurate. It runs: «My friend, I have been all day in the saddle. On the 20th I took Arcis on the Aube. The enemy attacked at eight in the evening. I beat him, killed four thousand men, and captured four cannon. On the 21st the enemy engaged in order to protect the march of his columns toward Brienne and Bar on the Aube. I have resolved to betake myself to the Marne in order to draw off the enemy from Paris and to approach my fortifications. I shall be this evening in St. Dizier. Adieu, my friend; kiss my boy.» Savary declares that there was a final phrase: «This movement makes or mars me.» The menace to their lines of communication at first produced consternation in the council of the allies, but a second calmer thought determined them to abandon both, and, opening a new one by way of Châlons into the Netherlands, to make the necessary detour and fall on Napoleon's rear. Francis, for the sake of keeping close touch with his own domains, was to join the Army of the South at Lyons. That night a package of letters to Napoleon from the imperial dignitaries at Paris fell into the hands of the invaders. Each and all the writers expressed a profound despondency, Savary in particular asserting that everything was to be feared should the enemy approach the capital. Next morning, the 24th, the junction between Blücher and Schwarzenberg was completed. Francis and Metternich having been removed from the military council, Schwarzenberg, listening to warlike advice, determined to start immediately in pursuit of Napoleon and seek a battle. The march was begun, and it seemed as if Napoleon's wild scheme was to be completely justified. He had certainly displayed a profound insight into the character of his foe.

But Alexander had been steadily hardening his purpose to annihilate Napoleon. For a week past Vitrolles, the well-known royalist agent, had been at his headquarters: the accounts of a steady growth in royalist strength, the efforts of Napoleon's lifelong foe, Pozzo di Borgo, and the budget of despondent letters from the Paris officials, combined to temper the Czar's mystical humor into a determination of steel. Accordingly, on the same day he summoned his personal mili

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ARRESTING DESERTERS.

tary advisers, Barclay, Wolkonsky, Diebitsch, and Toll; then, pointing out on a map the various positions of the troops engaged in the campaign, he asked impressively whether it were best to pursue Napoleon or march on Paris. Barclay supported the former alternative; Diebitsch advised dividing the army and doing both; but Toll, with powerful emphasis, declared himself for the second course. The Czar listened enthusiastically to what was near his own heart, and expressed himself strongly as favoring it; the others yielded with the eagerness of courtiers, and Alexander, mounting his horse, spurred after Frederick William and Schwarzenberg. The new plan was unfolded, the Prussian king supported it, Schwarzenberg hesitated, but yielded. That night the orders were issued for an aboutface, a long explanatory despatch was sent to Blücher, and on the 25th the combined armies of Bohemia and Silesia were hurrying with measured tramp toward Paris. For the first time there was general enthusiasm in their ranks. Blücher, who from his unparalleled ardor had won the name of Marshal Forward, was transported with joy.

The two armies marched on parallel lines, and met with no resistance of any importance, except as the various skirmishes displayed the desperate courage of the irregular French soldiers, both the untried «Marie Louises» coming out from Paris, and various bodies of the national guard convoying provision trains. It was the 25th before Marmont and Mortier effected their junction, and then, although about 16,000 strong, they were steadily forced back through Fère Champenoise and Allement toward Charenton under the very walls of Paris. Marmont displayed neither energy nor common sense on the retreat, his outlying companies were cut off, and strategic points which might have been held were utterly neglected. The army with which he reached Paris on the 29th would have formed an invaluable nucleus for the formation and incorporation of the numerous volunteers and irregular companies which were available, but it was entirely demoralized. Ledru des Essarts, commander of Meaux, was obliged, on the 27th, to abandon his charge, essential as it seemed to the safety of Paris, because in his garrison of 6000 men he had not more than 800 veterans, hastily collected from Marmont's stragglers, while the new conscripts, ill-conditioned and badly commanded, were overwhelmed with terror at the sight of Blücher's army. They fought gallantly enough, however, on their retreat throughout the 28th, but to no avail; one position after an

other was lost, and they too bivouacked on the evening of the 29th before the gates of the capital. It is a weak curiosity, possibly, but we must wonder what might have been had Marmont, instead of retreating to Fismes on the 18th, withdrawn to Rheims, where he and Mortier could at least have checked Blücher's unauthorized advance, and perhaps have held the army of Silesia for a time, when the moral effect would probably have been to justify Schwarzenberg and confirm his project for the pursuit of Napoleon. In that case, moreover, the precious information of Napoleon's letter to his consort would not have fallen into his enemies' hands. Would destiny have paused in its career?

THE FALL OF PARIS.

THE pallid, silent Emperor at St. Dizier was closeted with considerations like these. He knew of the defeat which forced Marmont and Mortier back on Paris; the loss of the capital was imminent; parties were in a dangerous state; his marshals were growing more and more slack; he had failed in transferring the seat of war to Lorraine; the information he daily received was almost certainly colored by the medium of scheming followers through which it came. On the other hand, there was a single fact which might counterbalance all the rest: the peoples of northern and eastern France were at last aroused in behalf of his cause. For years all Europe had rung with outcries against the outrages of Napoleon's soldiery; the allied armies no sooner became invaders in their turn than they began to outstrip their foe in every deed of shame; in particular the savage bands from Russian Asia indulged their inhuman passions to the full, while the French peasantry, rigid with horror, looked on for the moment in paralysis. Now they had begun to rise in mass, and from the 25th to the 28th their volunteer companies brought in a thousand prisoners. Besides, all the chief cities of the district were now in the hands of more or less regular troops; Dunette was marching from Metz with 4000 men; Broussier, from Strasburg with 5000; Verdun could furnish 2000, and several other fortresses a like number. Souham was at Nogent with his division, Allix at Auxerre with his; the army at the Emperor's disposal could easily be reckoned at 70,000. Assisted by the partizan bands which now hung in a passion of hatred on the skirts of the invaders, and by the national uprising now fairly under way, could not the Emperor-general hope for another successful stand? He well

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FROM THE PAINTING BY JEAN-LOUIS-ANDRÉ-THÉODORE GÉRICAULT, IN THE LOUVRE.
OFFICER OF THE MOUNTED CHASSEURS OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD CHARGING.

knew that the fear of what had happened was the specter of his enemy's council-board; they would, he reckoned, be rendered overcautious, and give him at least a fortnight in which to manoeuver before the fall of Paris could be expected. Counting the men about Vitry and the garrison reinforcements at

only 60,000, the combined armies of Suchet, Soult, and Augereau at the same number, that of Marmont at 14,000, and the men in the various depots at 16,000, he would have a total of 150,000, from which he could easily spare 50,000 to cut off every line of retreat from his foe, and still have left 100,000

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