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ARRIVAL OF NAPOLEON AMONG THE BAVARIANS AND SAXONS. trative reforms introduced by Maximilian had two divisions distributed in Hamburg, of Bavaria were in reality most salutary; Bremen, and Lübeck; Oudinot had one in his determined stand against priestly domi- Hanau; the soldiers of the Rhine Confedernation over the Tyrolese people proved in the ation were scattered in all its towns. Two end their salvation. But the evils of feudal- other divisions were just starting for Spain. ism were always least among mountaineers, In the beginning of March the faithful and relations of patriarchal tenderness ex- Berthier was again appointed chief of staff, isted between the aristocracy and the peas- and the Emperor's orders were issued. They antry. The devotion of both classes to their were as clear, concise, and adequate as any institutions, their habits, their clothes, their of his best; he was once more on familiar customs, their local names, was intense. They ground, under ordinary conditions, facing a had no mind to see the name of their country well-known foe, whose strength was greater disappear forever, to lose their pleasant, easy- than ever before, but whose identity was still fitting institutions, or to submit to the con- the same. Davout was to collect his troops scription and join in the great leveling move- at Bamberg, the Poles were to remain in Warment which compelled them to serve in the saw, the Saxons in Dresden. To the latter ranks as ordinary soldiers. With their local capital Bernadotte should lead his army and assemblies they meant to keep their mili- then assume command. Oudinot was ordered tary exclusiveness as scouts, skirmishers, to Augsburg, where he was to be reinforced. and sharp-shooters, in all of which lines they The departing divisions were brought to a excelled.

halt and sent back to Ulm for Masséna's The more enlightened citizens of the towns command, while two fresh ones were gathered were well pleased with Bavarian rule, but the in France and sent to Strasburg. The Rhine impulsive, ignorant, and superstitious peas- princes were to have their contingents ready antry were the glad instruments of Austrian and await orders. emissaries. When they learned that war was A glance at the map will show that, as Nainevitable and would soon be formally de- poleon said, he could then in an emergency clared, they at once rose, seized Innsbruck reach Munich like lightning. But he expected and held it against the Bavarian troops. no move from his enemy before the middle When an Austrian garrison marched in, their of April. By that time he hoped to have his reception was enthusiastic. This was in the German army gathered, equipped, and ready; middle of April; simultaneously the Arch- in the interval the forces already on the duke John defeated Prince Eugène in Italy ground could hold Charles in check; by the and drove him back upon the Adige, while end of March there would be 100,000 French Ferdinand overpowered all resistance in Po- in Bamberg, Ulm, and Augsburg, with 30,000 land, and on the 20th occupied Warsaw. Such Bavarians under Lefebvre about Munich; besuccesses were intoxicating; the great gen- fore the outbreak of hostilities he hoped to eral had, it seemed, been caught napping at have a total of 200,000 available fighting last, and the advantage of a successful open- troops. «Should the Austrians attack before ing appeared to be with his enemy.

April 10,» were the orders given on March

28, « the army shall be collected behind the THE FIFTH WAR WITH AUSTRIA-ECKMÜHL. Lech, the right occupying Augsburg, the

left resting on the right bank of the DanIt was Napoleon's pride that in his campaigns ube at Donauwörth.» Then followed the most no enemy should lay down the law to him. minute instructions to Berthier, explaining He did not ask, How will my foe behave? every move, and setting forth the reasons What must I do to thwart him?—that was why he had chosen Ratisbon as his headdefensive warfare. For his purposes he must quarters. This would give command of the ask, Whence can I best strike? This ques- Danube, assure a line of communication, and tion he now answered by selecting the valley enable him so to control space and time of the Danube as his line of approach, and that he could open the campaign much as Ratisbon as his headquarters. He had before he chose. him the most difficult task he had so far un- These dispositions had already compelled dertaken. The concentration and sustenance a second change of plan by the Austrians. of his troops must be made along the line of They had expected a repetition of Moreau's very least resistance. Davout had four divi- advance by Munich; instead, they were called sions-one each in Magdeburg, Hanover, on to defend their capital a second time. Two Stettin, and Bayreuth; he was also in com- divisions were left to watch the Bohemian mand of the Poles and Saxons. Bernadotte Forest; the rest of the army, with Charles

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at its head, set out, by the circuitous route human, had proved unequal to the execution through Linz, to join Hiller and assume the of his commander's orders. offensive in the Danube valley. In case of a It had been the object of Napoleon to battle the two divisions were to come up by gather his army on a certain definite, wellthe short, direct route through Ratisbon, and connected line, and thence use it as necessity add their strength to the main army. On the demanded. Instead of obeying the letter of declaration of hostilities the Austrians at his instructions, Berthier had struggled to once crossed the Inn and began their march; obey their spirit, and had failed. The comit was the 16th before they reached the line mand on the left bank had been assigned to of the Isar. Had the Archduke not been so Davout; that of all the troops on the other sparing of his troops, wearied as they were side had been given to Masséna; the latter by the circuit through Linz, he might have was to concentrate on the Lech, the former changed the course of history. Napoleon had at Ingolstadt. So far all was good; then Bernot yet arrived, and Berthier, who was but thier lost his head (the critics say he never

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could have learned strategy if he had had one Bavarian division, was held ready to ten lives), and, swerving from the clear letter strengthen any weak spot in case of battle. of Napoleon's orders, he attempted a more Masséna next day was ordered to set out rapid combination-not that behind the Lech, from Augsburg for the same point, « to unite but one directly at Ratisbon. Davout was to with the army, catch the enemy at work, and march thither and remain there; the other destroy his columns. To this end he was divisions were successively to join him. The to march eastward by Pfaffenhofen. In a result was that three days elapsed before twinkling the scattered French army seemed any army was gathered at all; the two por- already concentrated, while scouts came one tions, one at Ratisbon, the other at Augsburg, after the other to announce that the Ausbeing widely separated, and each exposed to trians were separating. the separate attack of an enemy without the The Austrians had crossed the Isar in good possibility of coöperation by the other half. order, Charles himself at Landshut. If they

When the Archduke Charles learned the had kept directly onward they might have general situation of his enemy he determined still wedged themselves between Davout and to do exactly this thing-that is, to attack Lefebvre. But the Archduke grew timid at and overwhelm each portion of the French the prospect of swamps and wooded hills bearmy separately. For this purpose he crossed fore him; uncertain of his enemy's exact pothe Isar, and, turning to the right, marched sition, he threw forward three separate coldirectly on Ratisbon to attack Davout's com- umns by as many different roads, and thus mand with his superior force before Mas- lengthened his line enormously, the right wing séna's scattered divisions could reach the being at Essenbach, the center advanced bepositions assigned to them. But he was too fore Landshut to Hohen-Thann, the left at late. The semaphore telegraph then in use Morsbach. At four in the morning of the 18th had flashed from station to station its signals Lefebvre received orders to fall on the Ausof the declaration of war and of the enemy's trian left, while flying messengers followed advance over the Inn, until the news reached each other in quick succession to spur on Napoleon in Paris on the 12th. On the 16th, Masséna with urgent pleas of immediate neafter four days' almost unbroken travel, hecessity. It was hoped that he might come up to reached Donauwörth. The confusion into join an attack, which though intended mainly which Berthier's orders had thrown his care- to divert the Austrians from Davout, could by fully arranged plans infuriated him; but when his help be turned into an important victory. he heard, as he descended from his traveling- The Archduke during the day collected carriage, where the enemy was, he could not 66,000 men at Rohr for his onset, and 35,000 believe his ears. When assured of the truth men at Ludmannsdorf to cover his flank, leavhe seemed, as eye-witnesses declared, to ing 25,000 at Moosburg. That night Davout's grow taller, his eyes began to sparkle, and last corps (Friant's) came in, and he began his with every indication of delight he cried: march. Masséna, who had collected his army « Then I have him! That's a lost army! In and was coming from Augsburg, was ordered one month we are in Vienna!» The enemy's to turn, either left toward Abensberg, in order first decisive blunder was the march by Linz; to join Davout, or right toward Landshut, to the second was yet to be made.

attack Charles's rear, as circumstances should Napoleon's strategy during the following determine. Lefebvre was now commanded to days was, both in his own opinion and in that assume the defensive and await events at of his military commentators, the greatest of Abensberg. Throughout the morning of the his life. Such had been Berthier's indecision 19th Davout and Charles continued their when he saw his blunder that one general at march, drawing ever closer to each other. least (Pelet) charged him with being a traitor. At eleven the French van and the Austrian In twenty-four hours his puzzled humor and left collided. The latter made a firm stand, conflicting orders had more or less demoral- but were driven in with great slaughter. ized the whole army. But with Napoleon's A considerable force which had been sent presence new vigor was inspired into every to strike Davout on the flank at Abensberg one, from the division commanders to the was also defeated by Lefebvre. Before evenmen in the ranks. Promptly on the 17th the ing the entire French army was united and order went forth for Davout to leave Ratis- in hand. Davout was on the left toward the bon and challenge the enemy to battle by a river Laber, Lefebvre, with the Bavarians and flank march up the right bank of the Danube several French divisions, was in the center to Ingolstadt in his very face. Lefebvre was beyond the river Aben, while Masséna had to cover the movement, and Wrede, with reached a point beyond Moosburg. Within REAPPEARANCE OF NAPOLEON ON THE FIELD BEFORE RATISBON, AFTER BEING WOUNDED.

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