Puslapio vaizdai
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pire; worked by a vain, flabby, and perhaps disloyal nature, it had, with all its display and checks, but little value as a safeguard against the complots of the Talleyrand set, who desired the crash of the Empire that, amid the ruins, they might further pillage on their own account.

Napoleon returned from Russia sincerely protesting that what he most desired was peace. Yes, peace; but of what kind? The answer was inclusive of the whole European question. It was easy to believe that Spain was nearly exhausted, that if the process of devastation could be continued three years longer, a shattered society would finally accept the gentle Joseph as its regenerator. It was not unnatural for the Emperor to regard his Confederation of the Rhine as safe and loyal; yet, just as in the Moscow campaign his superlative strategy far outran the remainder of his system, so he had failed, embodiment of the new social order as he believed himself to be, in fully estimating the creative force of the revolution in middle and south Germany. Some inkling of the national movement he must have had, for Schwarzenberg's lukewarmness had awakened suspicions of Austria, and Prussia's new strength could not be entirely concealed. Soon after reaching Paris he learned with dismay that his Prussian auxiliaries had made terms with the Czar. This was done in defiance of their king; but it indicated the national temper, which, seeing the hand of God in the disasters of the grand army, made it impossible for Prussian troops to serve again in the ranks of a French army.

In his interview at Warsaw with De Pradt Napoleon had predicted that he would speedily have another army of 300,000 men afoot. In this rough calculation he had included both Prussians and Austrians. With a spirit of bravado, he had referred to the narrow escapes of his life: defeated at Marengo until six, next morning he had been master of Italy; at Essling the rise of the Danube by sixteen feet in one night had alone prevented the annihilation of Austria; having defeated the Russians in every battle, he had expected peace; could he have foreseen the Russian character, or have foretold their heroic sacrifice of Moscow, for which doubtless he himself would catch the blame? So now, if his allies stood firm, he would have another great army, and still conquer. This was not pure bluster, for his figures were in the main correct. Moreover, Russia's strength was steadily diminishing, a fact of which he was dimly aware. Of Kutusoff's 200,000 men only 40,

000 remained when he entered Vilna after the Napoleonic forces had left it; Wittgenstein's army had suffered proportionately, and the troops from the Danube still worse. Kutusoff wished peace quite as badly as Napoleon, and the ineffective Russian pursuit was intrusted to Yermoloff, an untried officer, to Wittgenstein, and to the incapable Tchitchagoff. The bickerings and insubordination of the French marshals had now become notorious, but they were fully offset by the discord and inefficiency of the Russian generals.

The Czar, however, was not for peace. Out of the rude experiences he had undergone there had been formed two fixed ideas: that Napoleon could not, even if he would, surrender his preponderance in Europe, and that he, the Czar, might himself hope to appear as the liberator of European nationality. For a moment Alexander thought it still possible to establish himself as king of Poland by the aid of the Jesuits and of Czartorysky's friends. But the Jesuit leader knew Napoleon's strength, and fled to Spain, while Czartorysky had formed the idea that in case of Napoleon's overthrow he might unite Polan and demand a liberal constitution, which could not be worked by a Russian autocrat with 300,000 Russians at his back. The only available constitutional ruler would be a member of his own family. The autocrat did not clearly understand the drift of his boyhood friend, but he saw enough to render the notion of reconstructing Poland in any form distasteful, and finally abandoned it. He then took the sensible resolution to recruit his strength, not by emptying his own lean purse, but by securing the coöperation with his forces of the strong armies built up by Prussia and Austria. It was therefore with a fairly definite purpose that, on December 18, he left St. Petersburg for Vilna.

Murat had led the remnant of the grand army over the Niemen on December 14; on the 19th he entered Königsberg. The day previous Macdonald had learned by a despatch from Berthier of the final disasters to the Russian expedition, and on the 28th his van reached Tilsit. The Prussian auxiliaries were in the rear under York, who had been for nearly two months in regular communication with the Czar, and knew the details of Napoleon's rout, as Macdonald did not. Wittgenstein had been despatched to cut off Macdonald's retreat, but with the dilatoriness which characterized all the Russian movements, he came too late, a single detachment under Diebitsch falling in with the Prussians on their own territory. The Prus

sian general was in a quandary; he was quite strong enough to have beaten Diebitsch, but his soldiers were friendly to Russia and embittered against Napoleon. His own sympathies being the same, and considering that he might in extremity plead his isolation, he therefore, on December 30, concluded the convention of Tauroggen, in which he agreed to neutralize the district of Prussia which he occupied, and await orders from Berlin. Six days later an envoy arrived from Frederick William, nominally to degrade York, in reality to conclude an alliance with Russia. By the assistance of Stein, who had been called from Vienna to counsel the Czar, such a document was finally composed and signed at Kalish on February 28. Prussia and Germany were thus born again under the auspices of Russia. It was by the Czar's authorization that Stein began the reorganization of the provinces hell by the Prussian troops. These circumstances left Murat's positions at Dantzic and on the Vistula untenable. Throughout the campaign he had been vastly more concerned for his personal prestige than for Vapoleon's cause, and he was only too ready to leave a sinking ship. On January 15 he surrendered his command to Eugène at Posen and left for Naples. He was in haste, for on the 12th the Russians had entered the grand duchy of Warsaw on their way to its capital. Schwarzenberg, with his own and the remnants of two other corps, -those of Reynier and Poniatowski, - could easily have checked the foe; but instead the Austrian general entered into negotiations, promised a temporary neutrality, and, when a few Cossacks appeared before Warsaw, on February 6, evacuated the city as if yielding to superior force, and withdrew across the Vistula toward the Austrian frontier.

These blows seemed to fall lightly on the armor of Napoleon's intrepidity. France was by that time not merely enthusiastic; she was fascinated and adoring. The ordinary conscription of 1813 yielded 140,000 recruits; four regiments were formed for artillery service from the idle sailors, 3000 men were taken from the gendarmerie, some even from the national guard. On January 13 the senate decreed a further draft of 100,000 from the lists of 1813, and that the conscription for 1814 should be forestalled in order that the 150,000 boys thus collected might be hardened by a year's camp life, and rendered available for immediate use when their time arrived. In order to officer this mighty host, which included about a third of the ablebodied men of France between seventeen

and forty-five, such commanders as could be spared were called home from Spain, and the rabble of non-commissioned and commissioned officers which began to straggle in from Russia was drawn back into the service. These survivors were treated like conquerors, being praised and promoted until the nation became bewildered, and thought only of its recent victories. Napoleon fostered this sentiment by an exhibition of giant strength, animating the public powers, the military administration, and the popular movement, until he created a true national impulse. With this behind him, the senate in April called out another body of 180,000 men, partly from the national guard and partly from those not ordinarily taken as recruits. By this time the farmsteads of France and western Germany had yielded up all their available horses, a number sufficient to make a brave show of both cavalry and artillery. Excluding the Spanish contingent, not counting the levies of Bavaria, Saxony, and the Rhenish Confederation; allowing for sickness, desertion, and malingering, -and of all three there was much,-France and her wizard Emperor had ready on May 1 nearly half a million armed men. They lacked only one thing-two years of age and experience.

THE REVOLT OF THE NATIONS.

THIS magic was wrought, moreover, without any assistance from the precious army lists which Napoleon delighted to call his library; for those volumes had either been lost, destroyed, or left behind in distant headquarters: it was a supreme effort of memory by which the great captain brought order into his military estate. No wonder that under such a strain his financial policy was poor. To cover the enormous expense of this new army, contributions were «invited » from the rich corporations and financiers, and a new issue of paper money was ordered. The collateral security for this was found in lands belonging to several thousand communes, by the rentals of which they diminished their direct local taxes. Worth 370,000,000 francs, these domains yielded only 9,000,000, although their prospective returns were larger. With government five per cents. selling at 75, an investment of 135,000,000 would yield the same interest. This step was taken, the lands were seized, and the government cleared 235,000,000; 140,000,000 of the five per cents. were set aside to cover the income charges, and used simultaneously as collateral for notes to pay current expenses until

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the lands could be sold. These last were kept at a fair price by taking 71,000,000 of treasure from the Tuileries vaults for their purchase. Throughout the previous year the legislature had been left inert, and the Emperor told Metternich at Dresden that he contemplated its abolition; it was now galvanized, and made to stamp these puerile measures with the popular approval.

Just as promises to pay, even when made by the greatest man, are not payment, so even the volition of a Napoleon is not popular spontaneity. To blend the old and the new aristocracy, the Emperor proposed a «spontaneous rising of those high-born youth who had somehow escaped the conscription. They were to be formed into four regiments, and designated «guards of honor.» The measure was abandoned promptly when it was found that the young men had no stomach even for fancy campaigning, and their relatives no mind to deliver them up as hostages. The guard, moreover, displayed a violent jealousy.

Pius VII had lost much of his obstinacy since his removal to Fontainebleau, for the Austrian alliance was now the sheet-anchor of France; the French ecclesiastics had threatened to depose him, but the loyal Roman Catholics of Bavaria, Italy, and Austria were important factors in Napoleon's problem. After an exchange of New Year's compliments, negotiations between the temporal and the spiritual powers were reopened. At first the Emperor was exacting, and the Pope unyielding. Finally, on January 18, Napoleon appeared in person at Fontainebleau, accompanied by Marie Louise, and unannounced they entered the prisoner's apartment. The Pope started up in pleased surprise. «My father,» cried his visitor. «My son,» came the response. The Emperor caught the old man to his arms and kissed him. Next morning began a series of personal conferences lasting five days. What happened or what was said was never divulged by either participant, but on January 23 the terms of a new concordat were settled. Pius VII was to reside at Avignon with his cardinals in the enjoyment of an ample revenue, and institute in due form the bishops selected by the council. There was to be amnesty for all prelates in disgrace, the sees of the Roman bishops were to be reëstablished, and the Pope was to have the nominations for ten bishoprics either in France or in Italy at his choice; his sequestered Roman domains were likewise to be restored. The document was not to be published without the consent of the

VOL. LII.-50.

cardinals, and Napoleon was actively to promote the innumerable interests of the Church. The Emperor and the Pope had scarcely separated before the former began to profess chagrin that he had gained so little, and the latter became a victim of real remorse. The cardinals instantly displayed bitter resentment, and Napoleon, foreseeing trouble, violated his promise, publishing the text of the Fontainebleau Concordat on February 14 as an imperial decree. On March 24 the Pope retracted even his qualified assent. The Emperor had gained a temporary advantage, and had asserted a sound position in antagonism to the temporal sovereignty of the Pope; but he had won no permanent support either from France or from the Roman see, with which he had dealt either too severely or too leniently.

In the previous July a treaty between the Czar and the Spanish nation, as represented by the Cortes, had been negotiated through the intermediation of Great Britain. The recent conduct of York was sufficient indication of how the Prussian people felt. Napoleon therefore knew that he was face to face with a virtual coalition, comprising Great Britain, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, Spain, and Prussia. Yet he stood undaunted, refusing to yield, proposing peace on his old terms and on them only; hinting that Prussia, which was still bound by her treaty, might hope for some territorial increase, and that Austria might expect Illyria. Such ideas, expressed in grandiloquent phrase, could not be regarded as indicating a pacific feeling. Every social class in France had a grievance; yet amid the din of arms, and in the dazzling splendors of military preparation, even the retraction of the Concordat attracted little attention, and a few riots in Dutch cities none at all. The report of Napoleon's conciliatory attitude had gone abroad, there was money in the treasury, a vast armament was prepared, the peace so ardently desired was evidently such as is made by the lion with his prey. On April 15 the still haughty Emperor of the West started for the seat of war.

Around the skeleton abandoned by Murat at Posen Eugène built up out of the stragglers an army of 14,000 men, which he hoped would enable him to make a stand; but with York deserting at one end of the line, and Schwarzenberg seeking shelter at the other, he was compelled to withdraw to Berlin. Finding his reception too chilly for endurance, and being again menaced by the Russian advance, he fell back thence beyond the Elbe, and early in March had established his head

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