than confused condition. Scarcely had he bebeld this chaotic state of things before he was ordered to fit out two expeditions, under officers who were to be largely, if not altogether, independent of him. Without a murmur he devoted, day and night, his energies to the organization, discipline, clothing, equipping, brigading, and forwarding these troops and transportation to the points designated.

Before he had entirely completed his task, it became apparent that these expeditions were impracticable, and were modified materially, so as to conform ro a plan presented by General Sigel, who was instructed to execute this new plan, the main feature of which was an expedition under General Crook, to destroy a portion of the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, the salt works, etc. Most of the best troops in the department were sent to General Crook, and, to deceive the enemy, another small expedition was fitted out at Beverly. The rest of the troops were concentrated at Martinsburg, to make a demonstration up the Shenandoah Valley, so as to divide the enemy, and thus secure beyond contingency the success of Crook (including Ave. rill's cavalry).

General Sigel had repeatedly applied for staff officers, but his applications were refused, although the officers asked for were unemployed. He was therefore obliged to take such officers as were in the department, officers without experience, on his staff, and with these he decided to share the deprivations and dangers of the column up the Valley.

He had scarcely started with this column before General Kelly was appointed to the command of the troops of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, making him in fact independent in his command, so

and then have gone to the aid of Lee; but the advance up the Valley divided the enemy, secured the success of Crook (the end aimed at), and prevented the re-enforcements to Lee.

The battle of Newmarket was fought by General Sigel with less than six thousand men, against at least nine thousand of the enemy. Of this six thousand more than two thousand were cavalry, posted on the extreme left, and not in the centre, as has been asserted, which were untrustworthy, and indeed worse than nothing. They might have routed the enemy, had they charged on one or two occasions, but, instead of this, they gave way before the infantry of the enemy, and obliged General Sigel to fall back to another position. It was, how. ever, only at the first position where there was any serious fighting. The enemy was too badly crippled to follow up to the second position. Beside this there were two regiments of infantry in our rear that were not brought up, although General Sigel had sent three of his staff officers successively to have them brought up. They were under General Sullivan (son-in-law of Kelly), and had they come up in time, or at all, would have defeated and driven the enemy.

In order to guard his trains and protect his wounded, it was necessary for General Sigel either to divide his forces, which would leave him too weak to stand against the enemy, or to withdraw all his troops. He decided to withdraw all, and did so in perfect order and unmolested. As soon as his trains were secure (having lost nothing whatever),

he commenced to advance again, but had scarcely commenced when he was superseded by General Hunter.

Thus, after all his toils and dangers, undefeated,

with a good prospect of success, and while the country was rejoiced at the triumph of his column under General Crook, which was the only object of his expedition, he was disgraced, as if he had met with disaster or been defeated.

that General Sigel was in a measure dependent upon his good will for re-enforcements, etc. This, too, was submitted to without a murmur. About this time he notified General Grant that, in order to take and occupy Staunton, 5,000 additional infantry was necessary, but was told that he was not exAs matters now stand, Hunter will reap the benpected to proceed further than Cedar Creek. While efit of General Sigel's labors and successes. Ee other Generals and department commanders were has already received the re-enforcements the Genkept informed of the movements of the army, General had ordered, and he has advanced to occupy eral Sigel was left in ignorance in regard to Grant's movements, Lee's movements, his own and all other movements. He did not know what had become of Crook, nor whether Grant was successful or defeated. He was obliged to find out everything for himself. He became very solicitous about Crook, and, in order to learn definitely, and aid him if possible, he continued to advance up the Valley. Had | be not done this, Breckenridge's forces, united, would have fallen on Crook and crushed him, and could then have turned on Sigel and defeated him,

the position and form the junction with Crook which Sigel would have done. He will have one of the best equipped and organised corps in the army, with which Sigel would have done much.

It should be understood that at the time General Sigel fell back he had a large train, since he had with him all that was essential to a completely equipped corps, and much more in proportion than would belong to the little column he had with him in the Valley; so that it was important to guard it properly and secure its safety. This complete

equipment was designed for the two columns (un- | affairs offered additional reasons for the course der Crook and Stahl) when they were united, and recommended. were handed over in safety to Hunter.

THE

COTTON TRADE

ON THE RED

RIVER.

541

battles of the 8th and 9th, against an enemy superior in numbers to our own, rendered it probable that we could not occupy Shreveport within the time specified, and certain that, without a rise in the river, the troops necessary to hold it against the enemy would be compelled to evacuate it for want of supplies; and impossible that the expedition should return, in any event, to New Orleans in time to co-operate in the general movements of the army contemplated for the spring campaign.

THE COTTON TRADE FEATURES OF THE

SECOND RED RIVER EXPEDITION.

We should add to what is given in the text of this work [see pages 340-41] concerning the objects of the second Red river expedition, the following, from the testimony before the Conduct of the War Committee:

General Wm. Dwight on witness stand: Question. Do you understand that it was the object of the army to extend its lines around this cotton so as to embrace it within our lines?

Answer. Yes, sir; and to allow the cotton to come in.

Question. That is, it would come in as captured in this way, or by such arrangements as should subsequently be made?

Answer. Whatever policy would be deemed wise to adopt for letting it in-whether it should be paid for in whole or in part, or paid for in greenbacks in full, or whether a certain amount only should be paid on it—it was necessary, in order to get any cotton out of that country, that the people should derive some benefit from it, otherwise the rebel military authorities were determined to do exactly what they did do, destroy it; they would not have destroyed it were the cotton not being seized as prize of war by the navy.

Question. Do you understand that there was any agreement, understanding or expectation that the rebel authorities would permit our lines to be extended around that cotton, so that we could get possession of it, provided there was no attempt |

made to seize it?

Answer. I believe there was a tacit understand ing to that effect. At all events, it was so publicly known as to be no secret whatever, and it is notorious now that no cotton was destroyed until the navy had seized a large quantity as a prize of war, and it was given out that such was the policy of the navy and its right.

Question. Do you believe that the enemy would not have attacked our forces if the navy had not commenced the seizure of the cotton?

But

Answer. Not at all. The military part of the expedition was entirely independent of the cotton business. The enemy would have acted against us whenever they found us in such a condition that they could do so with a prospect of success. the military authorities of the enemy would not have destroyed the cotton, provided it had not been seized as a prize by the navy, or provided the people of the country could have derived a benefit from its being taken. The reason of that is obvious. The rebel army there had been quartered on the people, who had been obliged to furnish supplies to them. The authorities had their regular tithes of corn, bacon, and other products, and each person was obliged to bring into the tithe house a given portion of his products. These tithe-houses were built all along for some distance below Alexandria, and to the right of it over to the Sabine river, or to Shreveport, and again from between Shreveport and Houston. They were hidden and concealed as much as possible. It was from them that the enemy derived its chief source of supply, and it was from them that his army was entirely supplied during the time it was idle, and he derived his chief supply from them even in his active campaigns. That had been a great burden to the people. The rebel military authorities were willing that the people should dispose of their cotton.

Question. Then, do you understand that our lines were to be extended over that territory merely for the purpose of taking out this cotton, and to be withdrawn when that object was accomplished?

Answer. I do not consider that that was the only the expedition, as indicated in the correspondence, object of the expedition. The original object of was to move into Texas. After the whole army arrived at Alexandria the objects of the expedition were changed, and it was then decided that the army was simply to go to Shreveport, destroy the military power of the enemy there, let out as much cotton as possible, and then to retire from the country.

Question. Why were those objects changed?

Answer. They were changed by the order of General Grant, which reached General Banks just before he arrived at Alexandria, and which required that the army should place itself before Mobile as soon after the 5th of May as possible. That would indicate that the objects of the expedition were changed, because General Grant believed that the fighting ought to be east of the Mississippi, and that all our efforts ought to be directed there.

Question. Would the results of the campaign have been changed in any way, in your opinion, if the navy had refrained from seizing the cotton?

Answer. I do not think it would have changed the

military results at all. The military failure was entirely due to the bad organization and bad manage ment of the army. It was wholly independent of the subject of cotton, or of the operations of the navy.

Question. Do you know who directed the operations of the navy in relation to the seizure of cotton?

Answer. I do not. I have always understood that it was Admiral Porter. It was a matter of notoriety there that he directed it.

Quest on. You do not know under what instructions he acted?

Answer. I do not. I never saw them.

Question. And do you know what the policy would have been in relation to taking the cotton out, if we had succeeded in extending our lines so as to embrace it?

Answer. That policy can be found by the committee in the orders of General Banks on the subject of cotton.

Question. Orders issued to or by General Banks? Answer. By General Banks. It was, in general terms, that the cotton should be turned over to the quartermaster and shipped to New Orleans, where it should be subject to the claims of the owners.

Question. Was there any change in those orders, or in the policy, after the army left Alexandria ? Answer. That policy was adopted at Alexandria, and continued for a time.

one,

a liberal
for it was only by compensating those
people to a certain extent that you could obtain the
cotton. In fact, it was afterwards shown that none
but a very liberal policy would obtain any great
amount of cotton. The cotton could have been
bought for greenbacks at a very reasonable price,
and nothing but a compensation to those people in
greenbacks could have obtained any great quantity
of it.

Question. Was there any cotton seized by the army there?

Answer. There was cotton seized by the quartermaster's department and taken to New Orleans. But that cotton was made subject to the regulations adopted at Alexandria. The order issued at Alexandria was made to cover all the cotton that had been seized.

Question. Was there any cotton taken by the army for private purposes or on speculation? Answer. I believe not; not to my knowledge; every effort was made to guard against that.

Banks, in his official report, gives the following version of his orders and action regarding the cotton traffic and the disposition made of the captured property:

Under the general prize law, the naval authorities upon their arrival at Alexandria, commenced the capture of cotton on both sides of the river, exQuestion. Was it subsequently changed; and if so, tending their operations from six to ten miles into how and what caused the change?

the interior. Wagon trains were organized, cotton

Answer. I do not know. It was not changed in gins put in operation, and the business followed up my time.

Question. Then, so far as you know, the policy of Banks was to let that cotton all be takeu possession of by the quartermaster, sent to New Orleans, and there await the decision of the authorities?

Answer. In general terms, that was the policy to be adopted.

with great vigor while the fleet lay at Alexandria. Some difficulty occurred with the marines, who insisted upon their right to pass the lines of the army; who threatened at one time to turn their gans against the troops, which was terminated by the advance of the army and navy to Grand Ecore. I was informed by parties claiming property which

Question. The cotton was, of course, to be taken had been taken by the naval authorities, to whom I for the benefit of the Government?

referred them, that upon application for relief their property had been released to them by the commander of the fleet. The army did not enter into competition with the navy in the capture of this property.

Answer. It was to be subject to the charges which the Government should place upon it for transportation, and other taxes and dues. That was the policy adopted after the retirement of the army to Alexandria. A policy ought to have been adopted when the expedition started; and the more liberal that policy had been, the larger would have been the quantity of cotton derived from the expedition, and the more fully would the object of the expedition in that regard have been accomplished. Question. And the policy of the army and navy such property as should remain there after its deshould have been the same?

Answer. Yes, sir; and the policy followed in letting the cotton out of the country should have been

In order to remove all the products of the country which might under any circumstances be used to aid the rebellion against the Government, General Grover, in command of the post at Alexandria, and the quartermaster of that post, upon the departure of the army from Alexandria, were directed to collect

parture and transmit it to the quartermaster at New Orleans, who was instructed to turn it over to the officers of the treasury, to be disposed of according