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THOMAS' DEFEAT OF HOOD.

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after nightfall, and the place was found evacuated

ham's corps, capturing 207 prisoners and two | look after a battery of the enemy's on the Cumberguns. Hood finally attempted to get around land river at Bell's landing, eight miles below NashThomas' flanks to operate in his rear, on the ville. General Johnson did not get into position until late in the afternoon, when, in conjunction Louisville railway, by which all supplies with the gunboats under Lieutenant-Commander Le came. The "siege" of Nashville may then be said to have commenced, but it was not even annoying, for the way was preserved open to the rear, and the efficient river patrol by the gunboats of Commander Fitch kept the enemy from passing the river below. A cavalry force of about 800 men, under Lyon, was sent out on a raid to sever the roads, burn depots, etc., but it fared badly, being routed near Greensburg, Kentucky, by Lagrange's brigade, when the rebels made a hasty retreat from the State.

Thomas' Report.

Roy Fitch, the enemy's battery was engaged until in the morning. The remainder of General Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading and Knipe in reserve, moving on the right of General A. J. Smith's troops, first struck the enemy along Richland creek. near Harding's house, and drove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prisoners, wagons, &c., and continuing to advance, while slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt

containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault at one P. M., by a portion of Hatch's division, dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than

the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the first position, taking four more guns and about three hundred prisoners. The infantry, McArthur's division of General A. J. Smith's command, on the left of the cavalry, participated in both the above assaults, and indeed the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works; as they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured.

"Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would have

command (the 23d Corps) from the position in reserve, to which it had been assigned, over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to operate more freely in the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing operations of the day.

Thomas' delay to attack Hood created uneasiness in military circles. Grant's anxiety became so great that he started for the West "to superintend matters there in person," but, reaching Washington City, he was reeted with a dispatch announcing the attack on Hood, and the Lieutenant-General went no further. This attack-long delayed by Thomas in order to make his blow a crushing one-was thus reported by the commanding general: "On the morning of the 15th December, the weather being favorable, the army was formed and ready at an early hour to carry out the plan of bat-done, I directed General Schofield to move his tle promulgated in the Special Field Order of the 14th. The formation of the troops was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as also by a dense fog, which only lifted toward noon. The enemy was apparently totally unaware of any intention on our part to attack his position, and more especially did he seem not to expect any movement against his left flank. To divert his attention still further from our real intentions, Major-General Steedman had, on the evening of the 14th, received orders to make a heavy demonstration with his command against the enemy's right, east of the Nolansville pike, which he accomplished with great success, and some loss, succeeding, however, in attracting the enemy's attention to that part of his line and inducing him to draw reenforcements from toward his centre and left. As soon as General Steedman had completed his movement, the commands of Generals Smith and Wilson moved out along the Harding pike, and commenced the grand movement of the day by wheeling to the left and advancing against the enemy's position across the Harding and Hillsboro' pikes. A division of cavalry (Johnson's) was sent at the same time to

"The 4th Corps, Brigadier-General T. J. Wood commanding, formed on the left of General A. J. Smith's command, and as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, assaulted the Montgomery Hill, Hood's most advanced position, at one P. M., which was most gallantly executed by the third brigade, second division, Colonel P. Sidney Post, Fifty-ninth Illinois, commanding, capturing a considerable number of prisoners. Connecting with the left of Smith's troops (Brigadier-General Garrard's division), the 4th Corps continued to advance, and carried the enemy's entire line in its front by assault, and captured several pieces of artillery, about five hundred prisoners, some stands of colors and other material. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works and was forced back to a new position along the base of Harpeth Hills, still

Thomas' Report.

holding his line of retreat to Franklin by the main pike through Brentwood and by the Granny White pike. Our line at nightfall was readjusted, running parallel to and east of Hillsboro' pike-Schofield's command on the right, Smith's in the centre, and Wood's on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield; Steedman holding the position he had gained early in the morning.

The total result of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen pieces of artillery and twelve hundred prisoners, besides several hundred stands of small arms and about forty wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all points with heavy loss, and our casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, strictly adhered to.

"The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, while preparations were made to resume the battle at an early hour on the morrow.

compared with either his right, at Overton's Hill, or his left, on the hills bordering the Granny White pike; still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin.

About three P. M. Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade of the same command, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton's Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops commanded by Colonel Morgan (14th United States colored troops) to co-operate in the movement. The ground on which the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he, readily perceiving our intention, drew re-enforcements from his left and centre to the threatened point. This movement of troops on the part of the enemy was communicated along the line from left to right.

"The assault was made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of grape, canister and musketry, our men moving steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting columus a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and

gled-lying amid the abattis, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded. General Wood readily reformed his command in the position it had previously occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the

assault.

"Immediately following the effort of the 4th Corps, Generals Smith and Schofield's commands moved

"At six A. M. on the 16th, Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin pike, to the eastward of it, and then swinging slight-wounded-black and white indiscriminately minly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him until he came upon his new main line of works, constructed during the right, on what is called Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin pike. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolansville pike, and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to co-operate in the operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved on the right of the 4th Corps, (Wood's,) and establishing connection with General Wood's right, completed the new line of battle. Generel Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and toward the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to General Smith's troops. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for the night at the six-mile post on the Hillsboro' pike, was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16th had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the Granny White pike, one of his two outlets toward Franklin.

"As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within six hundred yards of the enemy's at all points. His centre was weak as

against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in a dozen places, and capturing all his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four general officers. Our loss was remarkably small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the tops of the Brentwood and Harpeth Hills.

"General Wilson's cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and gaining firm possession of the Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route.

"Wood's and Steedman's troops hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed im petuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire the onset was irresistible, artillery and innumerable prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hope lessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood pass, the 4th Corps in a close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene and the troops rested from their labors.

THOMAS' ROUT

OF HOOD.

451

"As the 4th Corps pursued the enemy on the Franklin pike, General Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's division of his command, and directed them to pursue along the Granny White pike and endeavor to reach Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon the enemy's cavalry under Chalmers,

posted across the road and behind barricades. The

position was charged by the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, Colonel Spalding commanding, and the enemy's lines broken, scattering him in all directions, and capturing quite a number of prisoners,

among them Brigadier-General E. W. Rucker.

"During the two days' operations there were 4462 prisoners captured, including 287 officers of all grades, from that of major-general, 53 pieces of artillery, and thousands of small arms. The enemy abandoned on the field all of his dead and wounded. "Leaving directions for the collection of the scat tered property, and for the care of the wounded left on the battle-field, the pursuit was continued at daylight on the 17th. The 4th Corps pushed on toward Franklin by the direct pike, while the cavalry moved by the Granny White pike, to its intersection with the Franklin pike, and then took the advance. "Johnson's division of cavalry was sent by Gen

eral Wilson direct to Harpeth river, on the Hillsboro

pike, with directions to cross and move rapidly to

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The result well compensated for the delay in making ready, for the stroke when given was final. Beaten and broken, the enemy retreated with all possible haste to the Tennessce. Their losses at Franklin aggregated fully six thousand; the two days' battles before Nashville further stripped their ranks. of at least ten thousand more. Such disasters took from Hood's forces all spirit for further fight. In their commander the rank and file had lost confidence; the corps commanders succeeded in restoring order to the ranks only by the utmost personal exertions. The retreat was preserved from utter rout by the inability of the pursuit to pass the swollen and half frozen streams, over which the enemy, as they retired, destroyed all bridges, or removed their pontoons. Sherman, having taken Thomas' best pontoon and all his experienced pontoniers, some difficulty was experienced in constructing and laying the proper floats over Rutherford's creek, three miles from Columbia, and over Duck river, at Columbia; but the passage was made on the 21st and 22d. Time enough had been gained by the delay to enable Hood to get the start of his pursuers, and to save the remnants of his commands. Forrest joined the retreating column at Columbia, and thereafter became its rear guard, together with about four thousand infantry under General Walthall. "With the exception of this rear guard," said Thomas, “his (Hood's) army had become a disheartened and disor"The pursuit was immediately continued by Wil-ganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted son toward Columbia, the enemy's rear guard slow-men, who sought every opportunity to fall ly retiring before him to a distance of about five out by the wayside and desert their cause to miles south of Franklin, where the enemy made a put an end to their sufferings. The rear stand in some open fields, just northwest of Harpeth guard, however, was undaunted and firm, river, and seemed to await our coming. Deploying and did its work bravely to the last." The Knipe's division as skirmishers, with Hatch's in several fights with this rear guard all resultclose support, General Wilson o▲dered his body-ed in its defeat. Wood's corps kept well guard, the Fourth U. S. cavalry, Lieutenant Hedges commanding, to charge the enemy. Forming on the pike in column of fours, the gallant little command charged with sabres drawn, breaking the enemy's centre, while Knipe's and Hatch's men pressed back his flanks, scattering the whole com

ward Franklin. The main cavalry column, with Knipe's division in advance, came up with the enemy's rear guard strongly posted at Hollow Tree gap, four miles north of Franklin; the position was charged in front and in flank simultaneously, and handsomely carried, capturing 413 prisoners, and 3 colors. The enemy then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeavored to defend the crossing of Harpeth river at that place; but Johnson's division coming up from below on the south side of the stream, forced him to retire from the river bank, and our cavalry took possession of the town, cap

turing the enemy's hospitals, containing over 2000 wounded, of whom 200 were our own men.

closed up with Wilson's cavalry, which had the advance. Hood made for Bainbridge, Tennessee, where he effected a crossing of the river, and the pursuit then ceased, although Colonel Palmer's cavalry brigade of Steed

man's command advanced into Mississippi, | berland Gap. The concentration was not

doing much mischief on the rebel line of retreat toward Columbus.

The several crps were thus disposed for further work: Smith's corps took position at Eastport, Miss.; Wood's corps at Huntsville, and Athens, Ala.; Wilson's cavalry was distributed between the two corps; Schofield ere long was detached and sent east, to cooperate with Sherman's advance through the Carolinas. The "finishing up" of Hood rendered this detachment safe.

Breckenridge's Attempt on Knoxville.

Simultaneous with Hood's movements, Breckenridge, with the commands of Duke and Vaughn, moved into Northeast Tennessce, to menace Knoxville. Appearing, on the night of Nov. 13th before Morristown, where General Gillem's brigade was posted, the attack was a surprise, and the post fell into the enemy's hands with all its artillery and about five hundred prisoners. With the residue of his command Gillem made his way to Strawberry plains and Knoxville. Breckenridge followed on up to Knoxville, but Ammen's division was on hand, and, taking the offensive, that general pursued the enemy to Strawberry Plains.

finally effected until Dec. 12th, when Stoneman started from Bean's Station for Bristol the advance, under Gillem, finding Duke at Kingston. Gillem struck so quickly and hard that Duke was routed and his forces utterly scattered in an hour's time. Burbridge approached Bristol to confront Vaughn. Gillem soon came up on the flank, when a race for Saltville occurred. On the 16th the united commands "struck Vauglin, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners, and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead works near there. Returning to Marion he met a force under Breckenridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning, but morning found Breckenridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, be returned General Burbridge to Lexington, and General Gillem to Knoxville." These vigor ous operations freed East Tennessee, and somewhat restored Stoneman to the favor he had lost by his mismanagement of the raid intended upon Andersonville, hitherto no

To disperse Breckenridge's force and operate in South Western Virginia, General Stoneman, then in Louisville, was directed to Knoxville, to assume command. Burbridge's Kentucky brigades were pushed forward with directions to march through Cum-ticed.

CHAPTER V.

MINOR OPERATIONS, EAST AND WEST, FROM JULY FIRST, 1864, TO JANUARY FIRST, 1865.

gan, Gaines and Powell, with several outlying batteries. Obstructions and torpedoes were anchored at points best calculated to compel an approaching fleet to pass close under fire of the forts. Having for two years contemplated an attack, the forts and the harbor fleet were in the highest state of efliciency, rendering the task of their capture an enterprise of unusual magnitude and danger.

As the war progressed operations central- and 95 pounds weight. Three armed steamised. Small commands, both National anders acted as consorts to the Tennessee — all Confederate, were consolidated; petty col-being commanded by "Rear-Admiral" Franklisions, post attacks, small raids and detached lin Buchanan. The defenses were Forts Morexpeditions became less frequent. Experience taught that such warfare but slightly affected the general fortunes of either party; they were but a waste of life and strength which, if conserved and combined, would produce permanent results. These combinations, as we already have seen, were adopted, and the "minor" operations of the latter half of the year 1864-operations having no special reference to any campaign-assumed, in some instances, large proportions. Such were the capture of the forts in Mobile bay by Farragut's fleet and Gordon Granger's division from Canby's command; Price's invasion of Missouri; the assault on Fort Fisher, off Wilmington, N. C., etc.

An interview on the flag ship Hartford, July 8th, 1864, between Admiral Farragut and Generals Canby and Gordon Granger, resulted in arrangements for the expedition. Granger, with 5000 men, was to land on Dauphin Island, on the cast side of which The capture of Mobile, was Fort Gaines, fully commanding the main Mobile Bay. as the record of the war entrance to the bay. This fort, after severe shows, was often contemplated, and once or bombardment by the fleet and land batteries, twice arranged for; but, owing to want of Granger was to carry by storm, when its guns co-operation between the army and fleet, was could be turned upon the more powerful not definitively attempted until early in July, Fort Morgan, lying on the east side of the when it was determined to seal up that fa- main channel, about two miles away. But, vorite resort of blockade runners. The har- | preliminary to this, Farragut was to put his bor of Mobile is peculiarly adapted for defense. Mobile bay, thirty miles long and twelve wide, can float the fleets of the world. It is guarded at its entrance from the Gulf by Dauphin Island and the land locks of the bay, on all of which the enemy had very powerful works; while, within the bay, the only existing Confederate "fleet" was anchored. This fleet consisted of the iron and wooden clad ram Tennessee----a ve-sel of exceeding strength, propelled by two engines and mount

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fleet between the fire of the two forts, ga`n
the waters inside, destroy the rebel ram, and
then assist in the reduction of the fortifica-
tions. The minor Fort Powell, covering the
west entrance to the bay, through Grant's
Pass," would fall by the erection of a sand
battery on the north side of Dauphin Island.
These were the general arrangements. Far-
ragut's Fleet Orders were
published July 12th, viz:

The Fleet Orders.

"Strip your vessels and prepare for the conflict.

ing six rifled guns throwing projectiles of 110 | Send down all your superfluous spars and rigging.

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