ing through the enemy's advanced line you will find | comparatively little damage, and on the 4th no force in the direction of Richmond-that city itself being without a sufficient force to keep out your own command should you advance on it. This, however, is not expected.' What I wanted was Lee's army, with that, Richmond would have been ours, and, indeed, all of Virginia; and it was with this view that instructions were given General Stoneman." The plan of operations, as detailed by Hooker was to divide the cavalry corps into two columns, each of which would out number the entire force of the enemy's horse between the Rappahannock and the James rivers. These columns were to cross at Kelly's Ford on the 29th--one, under Buford, to proceed to its destination on the Acquia and Richmond railroad, while the other, under Averell, threatened Culpepper and Gordonsville. As soon as the former had passed on down the road, on its work of destruction, the second was to join it, at or near the Pamunkey. Cavalry Operation of Stoneman. Stoneman, it appears, either gave a remarkably liberal construction to his orders, or preferred a plan of operations of his own, since, not until May 3d did he conceive that the moment for action had come. Then, with Buford's column, three thousand five hundred strong, at Thompson's Cross roads, between the James and South Anna rivers, he issued orders breaking up that command into six sections-each one of which was detailed to its specific work. The labor designated was only feasible to larger parties; destruction enough was indicated to employ ten thousand men several days. Where were the other six thou-and five hundred, under Averill? Not feigning on Gordonsville and ready to join Buford at the proper moment, as Hooker's orders required; but, strangely enough, at Rapidan Station, May 1st and 2d, keeping Fitzhugh Lee's two brigades employed, and on May 3d at Ely's Ford. He was there by Stoneman's order of April 30th, which thus contravened Hooker's instructions in the most important particular. Buford's men did but Where the road from Spottsylvania to Goochland Court-house intersects the main Richmond road. started for the Rappahannock again—Kilpatrick's and Davis' commands alone pushing on to the South and East. The first named, with the Second New York, "Harris Light Guard," crossing the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, rode toward the Confederate capital, firing Aylett's Station, and injuring, but not destroying, the bridge over the Chickahominy. Pressed by the alarmed and rapidly rising enemy, from whose capital the smoke of the burning bridges could be seen, he made his way to Hanover town, where he crossed the Pamunkey on flat-boats, and spent a few reached Gloucester Point, May 5th, at which hours in destroying property. The command place Davis' Twelfth Illinois cavalry had already arrived, in safety. Marching to Urbanna, on the Rappahannock, the two regiments crossed in transports and joined Hooker, at Falmouth, on the 8th. Cavalry Operations of Stoneman. The destruction committed was more severe on stores and stations than on bridges, tracks and trains. The enemy used the railway line on the 5th, showing the damage, even to the Chickahominy bridge, to have been slight. The alarm in the Confederate capital was ludicrously great. Church bells were rung; households were r ady to fly; troops were under arms; public officers packed their papers and funds for a hasty exit, and the Confederate Executive had his carriage at hand for a race to Petersburg. Had Stoneman followed instructions, he must have verified, to the letter, Hooker's statement of the helpless accomplished to show what might and ought condition of the rebel capital. Enough was to have been done by the cavalry. WHY ΕΠΕ MOVEMENT FALLED. 33 captures named 17 standards, 19,500 stand of permitted Sedgwick to be arms, &c. Why the Movement Why the Movement driven back over the river, The initial idea of the movement over the Rappahannock, as planned by Hooker, was admirable. It was equally so in its execution up to the advance upon Chancellor's. The disasters which followed were incidents to the defensive policy adopt-ity in Sedgwick—the failure of the cavalry to ed-the Commanding General making combinations which he conceived justified such a policy. His declarations, on this point, made to the Investigating Committee, must be considered, in forming a correct judgment upon the affair. We therefore quote: Question. In your judgment as a military man, what would have been the result at Chancellorsville had the 11th Corps not broken, but stood its ground reasonably well? Answer. I never entertained a doubt on that subject. I not only expected a victory but I expected to get that whole army. I had reason to expect it, and I struck for that object. Question. Do I understand you to say that you now know of nothing that then prevented General Sedgwick from complying with your order? Answer. Nothing. Question. Had he carried out your orders vigorously, what do you think would have been the result? Answer. My impression was that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the same road that do its assigned work-that any one or all together entailed the disaster, because each one and all must have been immaterial to a general result had the General used his troops and his first advantages with the quickness and skill which the situation absolutely demanded. His instructions of January 31stto "keep in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent construed as to keep his army between Lee and against them"-certainly were not so literally the Federal capital, for, in the questions and answers just cited, the General announced his pre-arrangements to run a race for Richmond with the enemy-actually leaving the entire rebel army between himself and Washington. Hence, we must judge of the affair by the results obtained; and, as these results were nothing, the movement upon Chancellor's Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. must be pronounced a great military failure. I should add, in my testimony, that before leaving Falmouth to make this move, I had a million and a half rations on board lighters, and gunboats in readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunkey river, in order to replenish my provisions, to enable me to reach Richmond before the enemy could, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that line of retreat. When I gave the order to General Sedgwick, I expected that Lee would be whipped by manœuvres. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off on the same line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpepper and Gordonsville road, placing me fifty or sixty miles nearer Richmond than himself. But, it is not to be denied that the Federal leader failed to seize the opportunities which offered for effective strokes against his adversary—failed to march out into the open country, where all his troops could have been employed, and every movement of the enemy detected that he was surprised, and his right crushed by non-preparation-that he The month which followed was, to Hooker, one of anxiety. His army, by reason of the expiration of the two years' men terms of service, was measurably reduced, and considerable changes were rendered imperative. On the 13th of May he wrote to Mr. Lincoln: "My movements have been a little delayed by the withdrawal of many of the two years' and nine months' regiments, and those whose time is not already up it will be expedient to leave on this side of the river. This reduction imposes upon me the necessity of a partial re-organization. My marching force is cut down to about eighty thousand, while I have artillery enough for an army more than double that number." This projected advance over the river, upon Lee's right, by Franklin's old crossing, Mr. Lincoln did not countermand. Yet, by writing as follows, on the 14th, he so evidently disapproved of it that Hooker, for the moment, suspended his preparations : "It does not now appear to me probable that Arrest of a Second Signs of a Move ment. By the latter end of the month, Hooker began to discover signs of a movement. The presence of a powerful body of rebel cavalry at Culpepper and Jefferson, sug you can gain anything by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock. I therefore shall not complain if you do no more for a time than to keep the enemy at bay, and out of other mischief, by menaces and occasional cavalrygested a raid in the direction of the Orange raids, if practicable, and to put your army in good condition again. Still, if in your own clear judg ment, you can renew the attack successfully, I do not mean to restrain you. Bearing upon this last point I must tell you I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous if true, and you should, therefore, first of all, ascertain the real facts, beyond all possibility of a doubt." and Alexandria railroad. To checkmate this Buford's cavalry was sent to the upper fords, while Stahel's cavalry of Heintzelman's command, at Washington,* was urged to "look into the Shenandoah Valley and see what was going on over there.” On the 6th, Sedgwick was directed to throw his corps over the river below Fredericksburg as speedily as possible, since the absence of the enemy on Couch's front indicated a removal. This order was promptly executed and Sedgwick reported the Confederates still on his front apparently in their usual strength. President commissioned both Major-Generals R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill as Lieutenant-Generals in the army of Northern Virginia. To each of these Generals a corps was assigned, consisting of three divisions, General Longstreet, for this purpose, part bring about an early peace. If, prior to the battles before and around Fredericksburg, Lee had not had the entire confidence of his Government and people, his admirable success in repelling both Burnside and Hooker, The several armies operating against Lee and had rendered him the idol of all; and every Richmond were a unit only in Halleck's hands. means were adopted to strengthen his hands. Hooker said, of the commands of Dix, at Fortress His army was augmented, and re-organised Monroe; Peck, at Suffolk; Heintzelman, at Washby the creation of three corps d'armce, to ington; Schenck, in the Shenandoah Valley; and whose command Longstreet, D. H. Hill and Foster, in North Carolina: “Each was in ignorance Ewell were assigned. The cavalry under of the position, force and movements of the other. Stuart was recruited up to about eleven thou- Sometimes they acted in concert, and as often in sand strong. The morale of the troops never opposition to each other." So keenly did the Genhad been so fine. "The South, early indulg-eral feel the necessity of a consolidation of coming the prospect of the defeat of Hooker's mands that he wrote to the President, June 5th, in view of Lee's probable assumption of the offensive : forces, was elated with renewed anticipations "In view of these contemplated movements of the of an early peace," said Pollard. At the close enciny, I cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of May the Confederate marching infantry strength was about eighty thousand muskets a force competent, it was thought, to invade the North, and, by retaining its hold there, to secure terms of settlement on the basis of Southern independence. of His Excellency, the President, the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army. I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire." HOOKER'S PLANS FRUSTRATED. 35 Halleck was, appa rently, only anxious about the Potomac river, and looked to it for the enemy rather than to the Rappahannock; while Mr. Lincoln proposed (and his proposal was equivalent to a command) as follows: "I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee ing with one of his divisions (Anderson's), and A. P. | at its very initiation. Hill's old division being reduced by two brigades, was assigned to Major-General W. D. Pender. The two brigades thus taken from A. P. Hill's division, were united with Pettigrew's and another North Carolina brigade, and assigned to Major-General Heth, who, with Major-General Pender, was promoted from the rank of Brigadier-Generals. GeneA. P. Hill was assigned to the command of this corps, while General Ewell retained General Jack-coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would son's old corps, consisting of Early's division; Early having been made a Major-General in February, and receiving command of Ewell's old division; Rode's division and Trimble's division, to which General Edward Johnson, then just promoted to a Major-Generalship, was assigned. Five of the six Major Generals in the infantry department of this army, and the two Corps-Generals, received their promotion within the twelve months past. by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, would fight in entrenchments and fight you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled up on the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other. "If Lee would come to my side of the river I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defensive, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck." On the 3d of June McLaw's division of Longstreet's corps left Fredericksburg for Culpepper Court-house, and Hood's division, which was occupied on the Rapidan, marched to the same place. General Ewell's corps took up the line of march from its camps near Fredericksburg on the morning of June 4th, moving in the direction of Culpepper Court-house. On the same evening Longstreet's corps moved in the same direction. On Friday,. June 5th, the enemy crossed a force below Frede-march to the North, we find both the Excricksburg, near the Bernard house, as if they intend ed to move once more upon our lines, stretching from Hamilton's crossing up to Fredericksburg Ewell and Longstreet were halted at or near Locust Grove, in Orange county, to await the issue of the movement. Hooker's Plans Hooker, forecasting the nature and objects of Lee's movement, with an admirable sagacity, quickly determined his course of action. As early as the 5th he wrote to Mr. Lincoln for authority to initiate bis of fensive action, saying: "In the event that the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will be headed toward the Potomac via Gordonsville or Culpepper, while the rear will rest on Fredericksburg. After giving this subject my best reflection, I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return. Will it be within the the spirit of my instructions to do so?" Both Mr. Lincoln and General Halleck replied, in effect countermanding this well matured plan for arresting the rebel march Thus, at the incipiency of the second rebel cutive and the General-in-Chief discounte- Restrained from this active opening of the Battle of Brandy Station. Battle of Brandy Station. The information obtained, it was said, determined the rebel cavalry to be about twelve thousand strong, with twenty-five pieces of artillery, and from papers captured in Stuart's quarters, at the Station, it was learned that, on the 10th, their cavalry was to have started north, for a raid into Maryland. The enemy's loss never was reported. About two hundred prisoners were secured, and one battle flag. The Federal loss was nearly five hundred men, in killed, wounded and missing. For their conduct on t is occasion Pleasanton was brevetted a Major-General, and Kilpatrick a Brigadier. as to cripple it for further | it was stayed by Stuart's immediate action. If, on advance, and Gregg found the other hand, more than his position one of peril, in a raid was designed, the offensive movement consequence of the non-junction of the two over the river probably would determine Federal columns. At the hour named a train where Lee's left then was, whither it was of cars arrived from Culpepper, bearing a moving, &c. Early on the morning of June strong body of rebel infantry, with additional 9th, without the expected assistance from artillery. A retreat therefore became imperStahel's cavalry, then acting as an additional ative: Gregg joined Buford's column, and "cover" to Washington, the Federal cavalry Pleasanton retired to the north bank of the and infantry columns crossed at Beverly and river, before dark, quite unmolested. Kelley's Fords, and moved by two roads upon Culpepper. Buford, advancing by Beverly, soon encountered the horse brigade of Jones, and a severe conflict followed. The cavalry fought as such, and, with sabre and pistol, rode down upon the enemy's lines, backed by Ames' veteran infantry brigade. Jones was pressed back for two miles, when Stuart's main body, having advanced from Culpepper, was thrown into action. The brigades of Wade Hampton and W. H. F. Lee, checked Buford's advance. The second Federal column, under Gregg, composed of the cavalry brigades of Kilpatrick and Wyndham, and the infantry brigade of Russell, crossing at Kelley's Ford, struck one of Stuart's brigades under Robertson, but advanced quite rapidly, making his appearance before Brandy Station by half-past ten A. M. Seeing this, Stuart drew off a portion of his command from Buford's front, and a furious combat was waged for possession of the Station. Though at first successful in carrying the position assailed, Gregg was staggered by Stuart's onslaught, and his hold upon the place was broken, his column slowly retreating. Kilpatrick then first betrayed his fitness for command. Gathering his brigade-composed of the Harris Light Guard, the Tenth New York and the First Maine-he put it to a charge by regiments. The Tenth New York recoiled and gave way; the Harris Light Guard was broken, faltered and fell back; when, in person, the Brigade-commander led the men of Maine —a regiment of stalwart fellows, equal to all that men could do. Before this third shock the enemy recoiled. Wyndham's men also fought with splendid zeal, and had the satisfaction of recovering their guns, lost during Stuart's assault. It was now 4.30 P. M-Buford's command had been held firmly where The Rebel Plan Unmasked. There now could be no doubt of Lee's object. The presence of Ewell's corps at Culpepper, and all of Stuart's cavalry at Brandy Station, as well as the information obtained from prisoners and captured dispatches, revealed the initiative of a second march over the Potomac. Again Hooker conferred with the President, re-suggesting the stroke upon Lee's right, by the bridges still down at Franklin's crossing: again the Executive replied negatively. His reply, dated 6.45 P.M. June 10th, read: "If left to me I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point. If he comes toward the Upper Potomac, follow on his flank, and on the in side track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is fret him and fret him.” Thereupon Hooker gave up all idea of a counter attack, and assumed a purely defensive. Reynolds, on the 12th, was assigned |