DEATH OF STONEWALL JACKSON. 27 first on the ground, on Jackson's right. With | prived of his most original and effective field a true soldier's self possession, the cavalry | lieutenant. officer led his men to the front. His artillery, strengthened by guns drawn from the rout, soon was playing with appalling fury upon the foe. Ereng Sickles, with his divisions, got into position for work. Every man of that command felt himself a hero, apparent y, for all fought with furious zeal. At the critical moment, too, Hooker h mself rode to the front. His own old division, then commanded by General Berry, being called for, responded with enthusiasm, and, with fixed bayonets p'anted itself between Jackson and Chancellor's. A section of the 12th Corps, artillery, under Capt. Best, hurried to the point of danger, and, directed by General Warren, in person, was served with unflinching nerve and precision, on Jackson's front. Death of Stonewall Jackson. After nine o'clock the fight was waged chiefly with artillery-the Federal forces carrying sad havoc into the rebel lines. No movement in the darkness, on the part of the enemy, was possible, save that of retreat-which, evidently, was no part of that desperate adventure to save Lee and the Confederate capital. Throwing up works on their front, under the command of Stuart, the enemy prepared for their morrow's work, which was to fulfil Jackson's design of holding the position covering Chancellor's, and to close the avenue of retreat by the United States Ford. Anticipating as much, Hooker checkmated his confident adversary by ordering a new line of occupation and defense. He said: Hooker's Second "I directed Generals Warren and Comstock to trace out a new line, which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, as I should not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy should renew his attack the next morning. the key to my position, and had very much embarassed me by contracting my sphere of action. The position which had been held by the left of that corps was the most commanding one in the vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his artillery to enfilade the lines held by the 12th and 2d Corps. He could drive from the plain in front of the Chancellorsville house, all the artillery posted to command the junction of the plankroad and the old pike, and he could drive from the plain all the force that might be upon it. To wrest this position from the enemy, after his batteries were established on it, would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it." "The bad conduct of the 11th Corps had lost me Thus confronted, the Confederate Corps commander found his victory but half won. It remained for him both to hold the line wrested from Howard, and also to push a co umn in between Hooker and the river; thus to sieze the United States Ford and to effect a junction with Lee. In the execution of this latter purpose, he rode to the front to reconnoitre, attended by a portion of his staff. Instructions having been given to "fire on all cavalry approaching from the direction of the enemy," he was received, on his sudden return, by the fire of his own pickets. Three balls pierced his person. Captain Babcock, his aid, was killed; several others of the staff were wounded. Jackson was borne from the field, to suffer amputation of the left arm. Pneumonia supervened, and, on the eighth day, he was no more. In him the Confederacy lost a most valued officer: next Strange, indeed, that this important point to Lee, he was regarded by the Southern--the "key" to the plain-should have been people as their hope in their struggle for left so open to surprise and successful flank “independence." By his death Lee was de assault! The arrival on the ground, late that evening, of Reynolds' corps from Sedgwick's column, gave Hooker greater strength than all his loss, and with his new line he conceived it impossible to fail in repelling Lee, particularly if the enemy could be placed between two fires. Sedgwick was, therefore, instructed to move forward without delay, first to seize Fredericksburg and then to advance * along the Orders to Sedgwick. plank-road to a junction with the main column. Upon this cooperation Hooker, it would appear, greatly relied, offering, indeed, Sedgwick's failure to accomplish his task, as the prime excuse, next to the 11th Corps' panic, for the failure of the movement over the river. A second dispatch, in the person of one of his aids, was started at midnight, to see that all was done "that the urgency of the case requires." General Warren was sent to Sedgwick, in order to make assurance doubly sure. The necessity for rapidity was imperative; Lee was not to have time to re-enforce Early, then holding Fredericksburg with not more than ten thousand men. Sedgwick's corps was fully twenty-two thousand strong, without counting Gibbon's strength, which was to be regarded as the reserve. This Hooker deemed powerful enough for the work alloted, while the enemy's main attention was centered in supporting Jackson's movement, upon whose success Lee's hopes rested. But, whatever the cause, not until daylight of Sunday (May 3d) was the assault on the town made, and Marye's heights, the key to Early's position, was not stormed until eleven A. M., when, having discovered his danger, the Confederate leader partially withdrew from Hooker's front, and Sedgwick's efforts to surprise his foe were met by readiness and strength which held him at bay. The new line ordered for occupancy during the night of Saturday, was taken before daylight of Sunday. The design was to draw the corps more closely together, cover* The order, dated from Chancellorsville, nine P. M., May 2d, said: The Major-General commanding directs that you cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, on the receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road, until you connect with him, and will attack and delay any force you may fall in with on the road. "You will leave all your trains behind except pack trains of your ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the General by daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between you and the Major-General commanding, he expects to use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail." The Battle of May 3d. ing the river ford's debouches, yet sustaining the Chancellor's house as a point d' appui as long as it was possible. Should the enemy's main attack be to force the Federal right, the Chancellor house might be retained; should the rebel column swing around to their right, Chancellor's must become untenable, but the Federal concentration would then be perfect, and the diversion effected by Sedgwick's approach would enable Hooker to determine his offensive and final action. The Confederate attack was by their right. Reaching out to the plank-road, from the position of the previous night, Stuart pressed Sickles at so early an hour as to catch the Federal division in process of movement into their new location. Making the onslaught with extreme energy, Hooker's right was driven in. Sickles contested Stuart's advance with a sublime resolution, and deemed himself fully competent to hold the enemy firmly where he then was, (at eight A. M.,) if judicious supports were put forward. Stuart's advance by three columns had again secured for him the heights wrested, the day before, from the 11th Corps; from whence, with his rifled guns, he reached the Chancellor house, Hooker's headquarters. The building began to crumble over the officers' heads. At about eight o'clock a section of the portico was thrown upon the General commanding, by a ball. He was knocked senseless by the blow, and so remained for a half hour or more. During that time Sickles' aid arrived but found no one in command to respond to his request for supports. General Couch, as senior corps commander, assumed, for awhile, the personal direction of affairs, but the neglect to answer Sickles' call, or to take steps to throw new troops into action, compelled the withdrawal of the 3d Corps to the new line. It was the corps commander's opinion that the failure to accord him supports lost him a great victory. His resistance had, he averred, broken up the enemy's formation-the rebel columns presenting to the eye "the appearance of a mass, a crowd without definite formation;" and, but for the injury to Hooker, he conceived the crushing blow would have been struck then and there. This, however, is but conjecture. THE BATTLE OF MAY THIRD. 29 20 Berry's division of Slocum's The Battle of May 3d. (12th) Corps, and French's division of Couch's command, were cooperating with the 3d Corps (facing westward) in repelling Stuart's advance. The rest of Couch's and Slocum's forces, facing south, constituted the Federal centre and left, covering the two roads leading from Chancellor's to Fredericksburg, to confront Lee's expected co-operative assault from that quarter-a portion of Hancock's division facing to the east, to cover the United States Ford communication. The fight made by French, on Stuart's right, was obstinate and threatening, compelling the enemy to put all his resources into that section of the field, when French was forced to retire. It was after that event that Sickles was re-assailed and gave way, his ammunition quite exhausted. In retiring in the face of the enemy, the covering brigade (Mott's) repelled two assaults, taking several colors, and making over two hundred prisoners. move along the river, to conjoin with Sedgwick, upon his rear approach, take Lee in the flank and to press the pursuit when the rebel defeat came. Sedgwick's movements were, it is assumed, ordered to impossible time, although Hooker's retirement to his new line gave the 6th Corps a liberal margin in which to execute its march upon the rebel rear. At eleven A. M., of Sunday, May 3d, all the corps (1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 11th and 12th) with Pleasanton's cavalry, were moved in an irregular semi-circle, reaching from the Rapidan, at Hunter's creek, around to the Rappahannock, at Scott's dam, below the United States Ford. This placed the Nationals in a strong defensive attitude, though the denseness of the surrounding woods rendered it impracticable ground for general battle. The men there collected were powerless as a mass, as much so as they had been around Chancellor's; but divisions enough could be made serviceable, in conjunction with Sedgwick's approaching column, to break the rebel lines. That done, a left movement by columns to the open country would follow. Lee's attack on Slocum's and Couch's forces was as energetic as his troops in hand would permit. Anderson's entire division confronted Slocum's half corps, and McLaw's The policy of a withdrawal to that location division was pitted against Hancock, This may be questioned; yet, having forfeited the latter was but a diversive attack-Lee's de- fruits of the first advance, won by Sykes, sign being to move around to a junction with May 1st, covering Banks' Ford, the recession Stuart. This junction was effected about from Chancellor's to the river became a mathalf-past nine. Before these combined forcester of course, considering the kind of conflict Sickles and Slocum finally gave way. Han- Hooker had resolved to wage. To have callcock was left, quite on the advance, to the ed up the 5th and 1st Corps, to move forward east of the Chancellor house, with orders to in full force to the Tabernacle or Salem church, hold his ground firmly until the new lines and there to have fought the battle on ground were formed. This he did, with skill and which must have given the superior force a coolness. His battle lines, at one time, faced complete victory is, by certain critics, declarboth east and west, and his powerful artille-ed to have been the only true military course; ry was so directed as to hold McLaws at bay. but, whatever the position into which the When all the troops on his right were with- Army of the Potomac had drifted on the 3d, drawn, this covering force retired to its new victory was, by no means, forfeited by that position, three-fourths of a mile in the rear, situation. toward United States Ford. During all this severe preliminary fight, Meade's and Reynold's corps were not engaged. Hooker's plan presupposed the rebel main and concentrated attack on his new location, where he hoped for an easy victory with Sedgwick's approach upon Lee's rear. These two corps were placed with reference to that attack, and were so disposed as to Sedgwick moved into Fredericksburg before daylight of the 3d, meeting with but feeble opposition. Feeling of the heights covering the town, he found the enemy occupying that line in considerable force. Early, with four brigades, held the Confederate right below the town, and Barksdale's brigade, of McLaw's division, the left, as indicated by Pollard, in the extract already quoted. Sedgwick's Opera. tions. Marye's hill was a commanding height, along the base of which ran the stone wall that Burnside failed to secure. Having entered the town, Sedgwick, strengthened with Gibbon's division, proceeded cautiously, as became his conduct of the per lous advance. Several powerful reconnoissances were made, to develop the proper point for attack. These parties found every approach fully guarded and nothing was left, apparently, but a direct assault of those heights, before which the | Federal army once had been so signally repulsed. Adding to Barksdale's force the brigade of Hays, Lee thought these two brigades would be able to hold the position, considering its easily defensible character. At eleven A. M., Sedgwick moved to the assault by two columns, composed of six regiments from Newton's division. As these pressed up the plank road and to the right of it, the full Federal battle line quickly advanced on the left of the road. It encoun tered a murderous fire from the rifle-pits and stone wall, but with a wild huzza the advance took the first line of works at the bayonet's point. Newton's regiments carried the crest most gallantly, capturing all the guns there in position and several hundred prisonersthe Sixth Maine planting the first Union colors on the summit. Thus the key to Fredericksborg was won. It only remained for Sedgwick to march, without delay, upon Lee's rear. Abandoning his lines to the east, Early hung upon Sedgwick's flank and rear; and when, at about five o'clock P. M., the 6th Corps reached Salem heights-the junction of the old turnpike and plank road-it was confronted by a powerful body of the enemy. Wilcox's brigade (rebel), withdrawing from Banks' Ford threw up a light line of works near Salem church. Early's five brigades still were on Sedgwick's flank. Soon Lee, in person, came up with four brigades withdrawn from Hooker's front. The Federal corps leader attacked the heights at once, and made some progress, but Lee then coming up with re-enforcements, forced Sedgwick back, yet he was not powerful enough to press the National artillery, which was served with heavy loss to the Confederates. Sedgwick's Operations. The fight only ended with darkness. Sedgwick's losses had been heavy, and the hard day's work had worn the troops so as to render his situation anything but safe should Lee attack on the morrow in force. The corps commander therefore informed Hooker of his position, and received for answer not to attack again unless he, Hooker, attacked-to look to the safety of his corps→ to fall back on Fredericksburg or cross at Banks' Ford: "You can go to either place you think best, but Banks' Ford will bring you in supporting distance of the main body and would be better than falling back on Fredericksburg," read the dispatch. Early re-ocupied the heights at Fredericksburg again, on the morning of May 4th, and Lee brought forward, to dispose of the antagonist in his rear, the three remaining brigades of Anderson's grand division. Thus, at noon, the 6th Corps, reduced by over four thousand men, was opposed by a body more than its equal in numbers, but Sedgwick, reinstructed to hold his ground, did so, and Lee commenced a movement toward the river to close Banks' Ford. This flank operation was stubbornly and bloodily resisted by the National division, but darkness alone finally stayed it. That night Sedgwick crossed at the ford; and Tuesday morning, May 5th, found Lee free to throw his entire strength against the Federal main force. Sedgwick's Withdrawal. The withdrawal of Sedgwick was a source of dis appointment to Hooker. After re-instructing the corps commander to hold his ground, the General commanding had arranged to throw a powerful force across the river, to march down to Banks' Ford, there recross, and, by taking Lee in flank, to have him at a disadvantage—a very feasible enterprise. The withdrawal resulted more from a misinterpretation of dispatches and non-delivery of messages than from any lack of willingness or ability to hold the south bank, at the point indicated; and, though both the Investigating Committee and General Hooker charge Sedgwick with dilatoriness and want of energy in his movement, we fail to discover any just cause for the censures said and implied. Had Hooker CAVALRY OPERATIONS OF STONEMAN. 31 Sedgwick's Withdrawal. himself attacked, on his own part, after 11 A. M., of Saturday, or on Monday, Sedgwick would have been relieved of the pressure against his position; and his, retention of his ground all day Monday, with the full consciousness of the dangers surrounding him on three sides, demonstrated his desire to accomplish all that was possible. The failure of Hooker to move out on Monday, or to re-enforce the only fighting column by one corps-as could readily have been done at any hour after Sunday noonwas the true cause of the 6th Corps' repassage of the river. "During the 3d and 4th," said Hooker, "reconnoissances were made on the right from one end of the line to the other, to feel the enemy's strength and find a place and way to attack him successfully, but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he could destroy as fast as they were thrown on his works." If this were true on Monday, when two rebel divisions were detached, operating against Sedgwick, it was doubly true with all the Confederate force re-concentrated for a grand attack on the last position. Such an attack Lee had ordered, and all day Tuesday his divisions were being made ready for the onslaught. During the afternoon, however, a heavy rain set in which greatly interfered with their operations. But, Hooker had, after A Council. learning of Sedgwick's withdrawal, resolved to retire to his camps and depots of supplies at Falmouth, with the intention, he afterward stated, of hazarding an engagement at Franklin's crossing (bel w Fredericksburg), where he would have more elbow-room; and where, as he wrote to the President [May 7th], all the corps operations would be under his own immediate supervision. A council was called, to obtain an expression of opinion. Meade and Reynolds voted to advance, not to retreat. Slocum was not present. Sickles and Couch voted to withdraw, deeming their position impracticable for successful operations. Howard expressed a desire to fight it out there. To mask the retirement a line of abatis The Return. was constructed, covering Over this failure, after the brilliant ope ing movement, the livliest feeling was exhibited throughout the country. It was viewed as a disaster rather than as a defeat; and Hooker's statements of readiness to move again, coupled with the assurances of the Secretary of War, in his bulletins to the public, that the army was as efficient as ever, while they allayed public excitement, did not satisfy; and the old want of confidence in the Potomac Army again began to make itself felt. Cavalry Operations of Stoneman. Excitement, for the moment, was diverted by the cavalry operations projected by Hooker as a part of his well-laid schemes. Stoneman (April 12th) had been ordered, with Buford's brigade and Averill's and Gregg's divisions, to make a raid on Lee's rear, to sever his communication with Richmond, to crush out his cavalry, to cut the canals, &c., &c. Proceeding to Kelly's Ford the waters of the rivers ran so high as to render advance there impracticable, and it was not until the army was ready for moveinent that the horsemen were over the stream. Stoneman's orders were imperative. Hooker stated, in his own defense, before the Investigating Committee: "By instructions of April 12th, General Stoneman was informed that from Gordonsville it was expected that he would push forward to the Aquia and Richmond railroad; and again to understand that I considered the primary object of his movement to be the cutting of the enemy's com munication with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines, and that I wished him to make everything subservient to that object.' And in his modified instructions of April 28th, he was directed to regard the foregoing as unchanged. "In a letter addressed to that officer (Stoneman), April 22d, he was advised as follows: After break |