will not fail to detect the development of the principles ever fatal to all true individual success. The want of veracity and the studious suppression or misconstruction of the truth which characterized the utterances of the press and public men of the South, with rare exceptions, will strike the general reader as offering a singular subject for consideration; but, the more thoughtful inquirer will find, in the fact mentioned, simply a confirmation of our hitherto emphasized postulate -that of a steady growing necessity for false report to prevent a lapse of the old Southern ardor against the North. This Presidential comThe Only Hope. munication was notable for presenting no encouragement for an early cessation of the struggle. In former messages a speedy triumph for the Southern arms, was predicted; but such prophecies could no longer be hazarded; and to nerve the people to the inevitable future the Executive said: "The hope last year entertained of an early ter mination of the war has not been realized. Could carnage have satisfied the appetite of our enemy for the destruction of human life, or grief have appeased their wanton desire to inflict human suffering, there has been bloodshed enough on both sides, and two lands have been sufficiently darkened by the weeds of mourning to induce a disposition for peace. "If unanimity in a people could dispel delusion, it has been displayed too unmistakably not to have silenced the pretence that the Southern States were merely disturbed by a factious insurrection, and it must long since have been admitted that they were but exercising their reserved rights to modify their own government in such a manner as would best secure their own happiness. But these considerations have been powerless to allay the unchristian hate of those who, long accustomed to draw large profits from a union with us, cannot control the rage excited by the conviction that they have, by their own folly, destroyed the richest sources of their prosperity. They refuse even to listen to proposals for the only peace possible between us-a peace which, recognizing the impassable gulf which divides us, may leave the two peoples separately to recover from the injuries inflicted on both by the causeless war now waged against us. Having begun the war in direct violation of their constitution, which forbade the attempt to coerce a State, they have been hardened by crime, until they no longer attempt to veil their purpose to destroy the institutions and subvert the sovereignty and independence of these States. We now know that the only reliable hope for peace is in the vigor of our resistance, as the cessation of their hostility is only to be expected from the pressure of their necessities." And with this peroration this able but most disingenuous State paper closed: "The patriotism of the people has proved equal to every sacrifice demanded by their country's need. We have been united as a people never were united under like circumstances before. God has blessed us with success disproportionate to our means, and, under His divine favor, our labors must at last be crowned with the reward due to men who have given all they possessed to the righteous defense of their inalienable rights, their homes and their altars." The Anti-Davis Fuction. This document was favorably received by his its several suggestions were acted upon withpeople and Congress, and out delay. In and out of Congress a powPresident's shortcomings, some of which has erful anti-Davis faction freely canvassed their worked serious detriment to the progress of his armies, if the aspersions of his critics could be credited. A very personal attack on the Executive was made in the House, Dec. 11th, by Mr. Foote, representative from Tennessee, in the course of which he said: "I charge him, not with want of valor, but with want of confidence in the opinions of others; with gross mismanagement; with contempt for the sentiment of the people of the country. I told him twelve months ago that unless Bragg was removed Tennessee would be in the hands of the enemy, and now my bleeding State attests the truth of my and the whole country's prediction. The President never visited the army without doing it injurynever yet, that it has not been followed by disaster. He was instrumental in the Gettysburg affair; he instructed Bragg at Murfreesboro'; he has opened Georgia to one hundred thousand of the enemy's troops, and laid South Carolina liable to destruction. I charge him with having almost ruined the country, and will meet his champion anywhere to discuss it. Would to God he may never visit the army again; would to God he had yielded to the public sentiment of the country; would to God he had been able to appreciate the truth that when confidence is once lost by the people in an officer it is suicidal to re tain him." But, however much distrust the President may have excited in certain circles, as to his capacity for directing affairs, it was not betrayed in the action of Congress. That body THE CONFEDERATE DEBT. 215 accepted his financial suggestions, the special | dates, of 33 per cent.; The Confederate Debt. The amount of indebtedness, Sept. 30th, exclusive of the Foreign Loan, as represented by the treasury's various issues, was tabulated as follows: Five per cent call certificates....................................... Total. Deduct amount of treasury notes funded and cancelled, about Total..... The Confederate Debt. paper money, and provided for the public revenues by heavy taxation on the sale of five hundred millions of six per cent. bonds." A somewhat singular way of paying debts, it had to be confessed, but excused as a measure of necessity; and, we may add, was enforced by a little aside legislation, which made it an offense for any class or condition of men to refuse Government paper; but the Confederate Congress could not vote to make it equally reprehensible to accept the "Greenbacks" of the Federal Government-for which circulating medium the Confederates seem to have entertained that instinctive preference which leads men to appropriate what is 627,450 122,582,200 best.* 4,887.095 $207,128.750 42,745.600 41,006,270 2,035,000 $292,915,620 .$603,632,798 65,000,000 .$701,447,519 26,240,000 *With unsurpassed shamelessness, brokers in $766,447,519 the Confederacy exposed the currency of the North for sale, and demanded for it ten hundred per cent. premium over that of the Confederacy! This act of benefit to the Yankees was openly allowed by the government. A bill had been introduced in Congress to prohibit this traffic and to extirpate this infamous anomaly in our history; but it failed of enactment, and its failure can only be attributed to the grossest stupidity, or to sinister influences of the most dishonorable kind. The traffic was immensely profitable. State bonds and bank bills to brokers, and the rates of discount were readily subthe amount of many millions were sent North by the mitted to when the returns were made in Yankee paper money, which, in Richmond shops, was worth in Confederate notes ten dollars for one."-Pollard's Third Year of the War. This debt, after Sept. 30th, increased at about the rate of twenty millions per month. For its redemption, or the payment of interest thereon, it devolved upon Congress to discover the ways and means. Calling to its aid the combined wisdom of the chief financial men of the South-who assembled in convention Dec. 16th, to discuss the situation -nothing better than the funding systein was suggested and adopted by Congress in a law which required the currency to be funded, under the penalty, within certain 66 CHAPTER VI. AFFAIRS IN THE NORTH, CIVIL AND POLITICAL, FROM AUGUST FIRST, 1863, то JANUARY FIRST, 1864. What was Determined. THE questions which sprang from the enforcement of the Enrollment Act of the Thirty-seventh Congress, from Arbitrary Arrests, etc., as we have seen, were numerous and of signal political interest. Upon their decision rested the future exercise of the " war powers," by the Executive and Congress, as well as the interpretation to certain provisions of the Constitution which never before were submitted to the test of application and vindication. The case of Vallandigham, and Mr. Lincoln's views thereon, will be treated as a precedent to define not only a citizen's right of free speech but a citizen's responsibilities; the enforcement of the draft by National authority ever must be viewed as a definition of jurisdiction over the citizen as between the General Government and the several States; the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, by order of the President, will be regarded as determining the power of the Executive, in the presence or absence of Congress, to execute Art. I. § 9 of the Constitution; and if the arrests made by military authority did not stand the test of the civil courts, the Congressional act of Indemnification (justification) cannot fail to give the arrest the force of a precedent at any future time of imminent public or State peril.* *As much weight is given by what the 'Fathers of the Republic' thought and did, in their hour of trial, we should cite Washington's views of the right and duty to make arbitrary arrests of citizens who yet were enemies of the State. In a letter to Gov. Trumbull, in 1775, the Commander-in-Chief wrote: "As it is now very apparent that we have nothing to depend upon in the present contest but our own strength, care, firmness and union, should not the same measures be adopt ed in your and every other Government on the continent? Would it not be prudent to seize on those tories who have The Opposition. During the exciting summer and fall of 1863 the Administration was assailed with various degrees of bitterness by seven classes of persons, viz. : 1st. Those opposed to the war from the stand point of Judge Black's opinion [see Vol. I., pp. 66-69]. 2d. Those sympathising with the South from having profited by commercial relations with it. 3d. Those hating the negro, and sustaining the divine and natural right of slavery. 4th. Those who were for the war, but with the qualification of McLellan's letter of July 7th, 1862 [see Vol. III., pp. 296–97]. 6th. Those who did not believe the South could be conquered and would let it go, in peace, to its own ruin. 7th. Those who were inimical to the "Black Republicans," of whom Lincoln was regarded as the exponent and representative. Of this latter class were the Irish, as a body. Many of them were enthusiastic admirers of the 'Stars and Stripes' as the emblem of a free country-many of them had gone to the war as volunteers and substitutes; but, almost to a man, they were negro haters and opponents of the Emancipation policy, and their organs, with few exceptions, were among the most virulent of all the opposition press. United these several opposing elements been, are, and that we know will be active against us? Why should persons who are preying upon the vitals of their country be suffered to skulk at large, while we know they will do us every mischief in their power? These, sir, aro points I beg leave to submit to your serious consideration." Herein the public safety is treated as supreme, and arbitrary arrests are vindicated so far as the acts and views of Washington can avail. PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S SPRINGFIELD LETTER. 217 never were, yet each waged | did, in a letter to the Chairman of the Illinois The SpringfieldI etter. EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, "Aug. 16, 1863. "Hon. James C. Conkling: "MY DEAR SIR,-Your letter, inviting me to attend a mass meeting of unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois, on the 3d of SepIt would be very agreetember, has been received. able to me thus to meet my old friends at my own home, but I cannot just now be absent from this city so long as a visit there would require. "The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union; and I am sure that my old political friends will thank me for ten dering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partizan malice or partizan hope can make false to the nation's life. There are those who are dissatisfied with me. The Opposition. extent which rendered the sum of their opposition a source of infinite disquietude to the actively loyal majority. The Southern people, misled by the violence of the first three classes, and having much faith in the power of the old Democratic party to combine the anti-Administration factions, looked hopefully forward to the approaching fall elections in Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, etc.; but, as in 1860, the power of the Democracy, as such, was overrated. Nominally in a majority, in some representative districts, when the issue was squarely made between loyalty or disloyalty to the Union, the uncompromising Unionists were overwhelming ly in the ascendant, as results proved. The General Government never overtrusted the people's patriotism. One grand secret of To such I would say, You desire peace, and you Northern prosperity and Federal success was that the President had unlimited confidence in the majority, and by his sagacious action so allied himself to them as to seem their advocate rather than their ruler. He who writes the biography of Abraham Lincoln, and fails to give full recognition to this political sagacity, 'will prove his unfitness to comprehend one of the most distinctive attributes of the man whom time will regard as the Preserver and Regenerator of his country. Among the most interesting of his papers are those wherein, laying aside the severe dignity of office, he bantered words with his opponents or wrestled with his friends, as in the controversy with Governor Seymour, with Vallandigham's friends in Ohio and New York, with the Chicago Committee who (Sept. 1862), urged the issue of a proclamation of emancipation, his epigramatic letter to Horace Greeley, etc., etc. Usually letter writing from the Presidential chair is not successful in satisfying an opposition, but it may be said that Mr. Lincoln's correspondence was eminently judicious for the time-that it produced good results. As the fall elections gave promise of unusual interest and excitement, it was desirable for the President to place the issues involved before the people so plainly that no subterfuge of the opposition could set them aside or create immaterial tests. This Mr. Lincoln blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways. First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms, This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so we are agreed. If you are not for it, a this. If you are, you should say so plainly. If you second way is to give up the Union. I am against are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginary compromise. "I do not believe that any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military, its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. "Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present; because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were made with them. "To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace mea of the North get together in convention and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing the restoration of the Union, in what way can that compromise be used to keep General Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? General Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania; and I think can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise, to which the controlers of General Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we would waste time, which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage; and that would be all. "A compromise, to be effective, must be made The Springfield Letter. either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from the rebel army, or from any of the men controling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and intimations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself to be the servant of the people, according to the bond of service, the United States Constitution; and that, as such, I am responsible to them. "But, to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while you, I suppose, do not. Yet, I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent even with your view, provided that you are for the Union. "I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied that you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means. "You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think that the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? "And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies the world over destroy enemies' property, when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female. "But the Proclamation, as law, is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think that its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? to suppress the rebellion before the Proclamation was issued, the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the Proclamation as before. "I know as fully as one can know the opinions of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important victories, believe the emancipation policy and the aid of colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the rebellion; and that at least one of those important successes could not have been achieved when it was, but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called Abolitionists, or with "Republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit their opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith. 'You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem to be willing to fight for youbut no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively, to serve the Union. I issued the Proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. "Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare that you will not fight to free negroes. "I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of their freedom. And the promise being made, must be kept. The signs look better. The Father of waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it. Not yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot their part of the history was jotted down in black and "There was more than a year and a half of trial white. The job was a great national one, and let |