GILMORE'S OPERATIONS

BEFORE

CHARLESTON.

143

Gilmore's Operations before Charleston.

command of that agent are wholly within his | placed in position. Rapidprovince. Grant's grand victories grew quite ly a second parallel, six as much out of the remarkable sagacity with hundred yards in advance which he chose his men, as from superior of the first, was run, from which shot and practical and tactical management of his shell were thrown upon and into Fort Sumter compaigns. McClellan's, Pope's, Burnside's, with considerable effect. A battery was also Hooker's and Meade's want of success arose, erected in a marsh westward of Morris island. in no small degree, from the inbarmony of This marsh, overgrown with reeds and grass, councils and the detail of men to commands at high tide was covered with four feet of for which they were not adapted; and no water. Scows laden with sand bags were signal victory followed the movements of the floated by night to the spot selected for the brave, long suffering, pertinacious Army of battery platform, and, after almost incredible the Potomac, until headquarters in Washing- labor, the Marsh battery, mounting a single ton ceased to assign its favorites to division gun, called by the soldiers the "Swamp Anand corps commands. We learned many les- gel," was established. Several other batteries sons from experience, but none more costly, were erected, at good executive points. and, therefore, more priceless than this-to have but one head to an army of operations, holding him entirely responsible for its acts. This return to the old cantonments along the Rappahannock was not contested by the enemy. Both Meade and Lee went into win ter quarters; and, save occasional cavalry reconnoissances, all the Federal forces in Virginia had a long, unbroken rest.

Gilmore's Operations before Charleston.

August 17th, Gilmore opened fire on Sumter from twelve batteries of heavy guns, at distances varying from two to two and a half miles, while Dahlgren's gunboats and ironclads co-operating, directed their missiles against Wagner and Gregg, silencing them for the time being. The bombardment was continued for a week, with unabated fury, when, the face of Sumter presenting a mass of ruins, that fortification was reported by | General Gilmore, as no longer of avail in any the defense of Charleston. Said Pollard :

In Gilmore's "Department of the South," operations during the summer and fall were pressed with a vigor which must have brought victory had not the initial idea been impracticable. To approach Charleston from the sea was simply to encounter a series of batteries which, with good spirit in complete that it was no longer of any avail in the

their defense, must prove impregnable. But, the fiat having gone forth, to thunder away at the defenses, and destroy them, seriatim, until the city was under the range of Federal guns, Gilmore strained every nerve to effect his purpose, bringing to bear, as we shall see, most commendable skill and energy.

Our last chapter referring to his operations left Gilmore engaged upon his parallels-the second bloody repulse in the assault upon Fort Wagner having demonstrated the infeasibility of all attempts to storm. The parallels thrust through the easily movable sand rapidly advanced, albeit Beauregard's .guns swept the level plain with a scathing fire. Within a few days after the repulse of the 18th, a cutting was opened two hundred yard in advance of the front, a bomb-proof magazine constructed and a siege battery

"On the 24th of August General Gilmore announced in dispatches to Washington that 'Fort Sumter was a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.' His chief of artillery reported its destruction so far

defense of Charleston. But in this there was some mistake. Fort Sumter was in one respect stronger

than ever; for the battering down of the upper walls had rendered the casemated base impregnable, and the immense volume of stone and debris which protected it was not at all affected by the enemy's artillery. It had been held through the siege and cannonade by the First South Carolina artillery, under Colonel Alfred Rhett, until its armament had been disabled; and the services of the artillerymen being elsewhere required, General Beauregard determined that it should be held by infantry. On the night of the 4th of September, the Charleston bat

talion, under Major Blake, relieved the garrison;

Major Stephen Elliot relieving Colonel Rhett in command of the post."

On the 21st, arrangements for opening fire from the Marsh battery being completed, Gilmore summoned Beauregard to evacuate Morris island and Fort Sumter, within four hours' time, on penalty of the bombardment

Meanwhile operations on Morris island had progressed rapidly, and the trenches were pushed forward to within one hundred yards of the fort. At this point the work of the besiegers was checked. The island being but a few yards wide, the enemy was able to concentrate the fire of the fort upon it, rendering it certain destruction to the sappers by day, and, in consequence of the full moon, equally hazardous by night. It became necessary, therefore, to silence the fort by an overpowering fire, which was begun on the morning of Sept. 5th, and continued vigorously, driving the garrison into the bomb-proofs, until the sappers had extended their works beyond the south face of the enemy's work. "For three days and nights," said the Southern chronicler, "battery Wagner had been subjected to the most terrific fire that any earthwork had undergone in all the annals of warfare. In these nights the whole of Charleston harbor had been lighted up in a scene of terrible beauty. From Fort Moultrie almost to Secessionville, a whole semicircle of the horizon was lit up by incessant flashes from cannon and shell. As peal on peal of artillery rolled across the waters, one could scarcely resist the belief that not less than a thousand great guns were in action." Everything being now in readiness, Gilmore-directed an

assault to be made, on the morning of the 7th; but the rebels did not wait this final attack, having effected their scape in small boats during the preceding night, thus leaving our troops in undi-puted possession of Morris island-a barren prize for fifty-seven days of immense struggle and heavy sacrifice. So hasty was the enemy's departure that it was not discovered until all but seventy had escaped. These seventy were taken prisoners. Eighteen spiked guns were left in Wagner and seven in battery Gregg.

The surrender of these sand forts dia not involve the evacuation of Sumter. That fortress, though scarred and battered, still defiantly floated the Confederate flag, and firmly resisted every attempt to reduce it. To Dahlgren's summons for its surrender, Sept. 7th, Beauregard responded, through its commander, Major S. Elliott, that the Yankees "could have Fort Sumter when they took it and held it, and that, in the meantime, such demands were puerile and unbecoming" -a refusal and a taunt to which Dahlgren responded by organizing an expedition for a night storm-assault. Of this attempt Gilmore knew nothing. It was a naval adventure, encouraged by the apparently approachable condition of the fort. On the night of Sept. 8th, a flotilla, led by Commander Stephens, of the Patapsco, started for the assault. The boats having been towed well toward the fortress then were pulled rapidly but silently to their points of landing. Three of them, led by Commander Williams, more expedi * Confederate authorities charge Gilmore with tious than the rest, reached the huge pile of having acted with undue atrocity in thus firing into the city. Beauregard wrote a note to the Federal debris and ruins, when their crews immedi commander, furiously denunciatory of the act. No ately attempted to clamber up over the rugConfederate journal during the war used severer ged mass. The daring fellows were met with language than Beauregard, when characterizing the a deadly fire of musketry and hand grenades, acts or character of "the Yankees." This note to from the wide awake garrison, while the ConGilmore was quite in the rebel's best vein. As Gil- federate gunboat Chicora and three batteries more did not fire into Charleston until the night fol-being signalled opened upon the flotilla with lowing his four hours' demand, the assumption that he fired upon a city filled with women and children, without warning, was but an assumption. It may be added, the "Swamp Angel" expired at its thirtysixth discharge; thenceforth Charleston was free from fear of Greek fire" or hostile shells. The gun was a veritable monster, using a projectile weighing one hundred and fifty pounds, impelled by a charge of sixteen pounds of powder. To reach the city its ball described an arc measuring over five miles.

such fury that the entire expedition was compelled to retire in haste. The crews of the first line which had landed, were soon overpowered and surrendered. The Union loss in this untoward attempt, was about two hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

For many months no progress was made toward taking Charleston. A slow and irregular fire was maintained upon the forts for

"

ROSECRANS' OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE.

weeks, but the iron-clads | shaped steamer, and driven against the vessel did not attempt to pene- at full speed. An explosion immediately foltrate the harbor, and Sum-lowed, which, beyond throwing a large body of water on the iron-clad's deck, caused no serious damage. In a gale, December 6th, the Weehawken, which was anchored in the harbor, owing to her hatches having been left open, foundered, and carried down thirty of her crew. No other events of importance occurred in this Department during the succeeding weeks of the year.

ter, though apparently crumbled into ruins, resolutely maintained its position of resistance. The retention of that fortress by the enemy forms one of the most gallant records of the war. October 6th, an attempt was made by the enemy to blow up the formidable Ironsides, by means of a torpedo, which was suspended from the bow of a small cigar

CHAPTER II.

COMBINED MOVEMENT OF ROSECRANS
CHATTANOOGA.

AND BURNSIDE UPON

The Advance to
Shelbyville.

tween you and Grant, and it is for their interest, not | not move until Grant was on the way to Jackours, that they should fight at different times, so as son, the strategy of this inaction, whether to use the same force against both of you. It is for wise or not, must be regarded as his own.* our interest to fight them, if possible, while divided. The General-in-Chief, in If you are not strong enough to fight Bragg with a his Report (1863), after expart of his force absent, you will not be able to fight pressing his disapproval him after the affair at Vicksburg is over, and his of the failure to move, yet was constrained to troops return to your front. admit the masterly conduct of the campaign which resulted in planting the Federal army in the strong and desirable position of Chattanooga, saying, in his graphic summary:

"There is another military maxim, that councils of war never fight.' If you say that you are not prepared to fight Bragg, I shall not order you to do so, for the responsibility of fighting or refusing to fight at a particular time or place must rest upon the general in immediate command. It cannot be shared by a council of war, nor will the authorities here make you fight against your will. You ask me to counsel them to caution and patience. I have done so very often, but after five or six months of inactivity, with your force all the time diminishing, and no hope of any immediate increase, you must : not be surprised if their patience is pretty well exhausted. If you do not deem it prudent to risk a general battle with Bragg, why can you not harass him, or make such demonstrations as to prevent his sending more re-enforcements to Johnston? I do not write this in a spirit of fault finding, but to assure you that the prolonged inactivity of so large an army in the field is causing much complaint and dissatisfaction, not only in Washington, but throughout the country."

"When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance he was permitted to select, without restriction, his own line of operations by which to reach Chattanooga. On being directed to connect his left, so far as practicable, with the army of General Burnside, and to report daily, by telegraph, his movements till he crossed the Tennessee river, General Burnside was also ordered to connect his

right as much as possible with General Rosecrans' left, so that if the enemy should. concentrate upon either army the other could move to its assistance.

"General Rosecrans, on the 25th of June, commenced a forward movement upon the enemy, well entrenched at Tullahoma. covered in front by the defiles of Duck river, a deep, narrow stream, with few fords or bridges, and a rough, rocky range of hills, which divides the barrens from the lower level of Middle Tennessee. Bragg's main force occupied a strong position, north of Duck river from ShelbyStill, Rosecrans deferred to move until it ville, which was fortified to Wartrace, all the gaps became known that Grant had made his mason the road leading thereto being held in force. ter stroke for Jackson and Vicksburg. "I General Rosecrans determined to render useless felt it my duty," said the Cumberland com- their entrenchments by turning their left and moving mander, "to sacrifice all personal gratification, on their communication at the railroad bridge on even to fall in the estimation, temporarily, of Elk river, thus compelling a battle on our own the country and friends who had high hopes ground or driving them in a disadvantageous line of and expectations of the Army of the Cumber- retreat. By an admirably combined movement he land, to secure General Grant in his opera- deceived the enemy by a threatened advance in force tions before Vicksburg from the consequences on their left at Shelbyville, while the mass of his of compelling Bragg to retire, when it would army, in reality, seized Hoover's, Liberty and the other gaps by hard fighting, and moved on Manchesnot be possible for us so to pursue as to pre-ter, thus turning the right of the enemy's defense of vent him from re-enforcing Johnston, whose relative numbers to our troops under General Grant was deemed more formidable than I subsequently learned it to have been. The confidence of the country in the Army of the Cumberland seems to have reconciled it to a

delay, the cause for which the mass of its

citizens could not understand."

This somewhat singular statement shows that Rosecrans regarded himself as the proper judge of the relations of his movements to those of Grant, and considering that he did

Duck river, and directly threatening Bragg, who was compelled to fall back to Tullahoma, hotly pur sued by Granger, who had brilliantly carried Shelbyville. Dispositions were immediately made to turn Tullahoma, and fall upon the enemy's rear;

*Not a little discussion has transpired, in military circles, in regard to Rosecrans' conduct of his cam

paign; and for years to come the discussion doubtless will continue. Judged by results, the delay was equivalent to Bragg's retention and to the non-reenforcement of Johnston-thus immeasurably contributing to Grant's progress.

THE ADVANCE TO 8 HELBYVILLE.

147

but Bragg abandoned to us his entrenched camp. | which, in the order of
and rapidly fell back toward Bridgeport, Ala., pur-
sued as far as practicable by our forces.

"In the words of General Rosecrans' official re

port: 'thus ended a nine days' campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions and

The Advance to
Shelbyville.

march, was the last to start.
McCook's advance division
--that of Johnson's-reaehed Liberty Gap to
find it strongly held. The brave, impetuous
Willich's brigade at once went forward, sus-
tained by Carlin's regiments; and both bri-
gades, supported by Davis' division, on the
right, swept through the gap like a tempest.
The contest for possession was short, bloody
and decisive. The division occupied it, and
the road to Shelbyville lay open.

gave us possession of Middle Tennessee, conducted in one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that period of the year, ovor a soil that becomes almost a quicksand. Our operations were retarded thirty-six hours at Hoover's Gap, and sixty hours at and in front of Winchester, which alone prevented us from getting possession of his communications and forcing the enemy to a very disastrous battle. These results were far more sucried by Wilder's mounted brigade of Reynolds' cessful than was anticipated, and could only have been obtained by a surprise as to the direction and

force of our movements.'

"Our losses in these operations were eighty-five

killed, four hundred and sixty-two wounded and thirteen missing-making in all five hundred and sixty. The killed and wounded of the enemy is unknown, but we took one thousand six hundred and thirty-four prisoners, of which fifty-nine were commissioned officers. We captured, besides six pieces of artillery, many small arms, considerable camp equipage and large quantities of Commissary and Quartermaster's stores.

“After the expulsion of the rebel army from Middle Tennessee, Bragg retreated across the Cumberland Mountains and Tennessee river upon Chattanooga, which he fortified, and threw up defensive works at the crossing of the river as far up as Blythe's Ferry."

The Advance to
Shelbyville.

This brilliant movement well illustrated the inutility of defenses. Bragg for months had labored to render his Duck river line impregnable. A rasher mind than that of Rosecrans might have moved direct upon the Shelbyville and Wartrace entrenchments and have won them as Murfreesboro was won; but, the objective point being Chattanooga, the true policy of course was to flank the rebel works, yet holding the army so closely in hand as to strike the enemy when opportunity offered. This the Federal commander did. Thomas' 14th Corps moved upon Manchester; Crittenden's 21st Corps struck out for McMinnville; Cook's 20th Corps marched direct for Shelbyville. Granger remained in reserve to support either corps, as exigencies might require. The cavalry, under Stanley, kept to the Federal right-Turchin's brigade remaining to move with Crittenden's corps

Hoover's Gap, on Thomas' front, was car

division. It dashed through the long pass
with such gallantry that the enemy was both
surprised and defeated before the Federal
infantry came up to hold the important de-
bouch into the valley beyond.
Rosecrans Manchester, which place was occu-
pied by Thomas, June 27th. There McCook's
column concentrated on the 28th and 29th.

This gave

Granger's column moved from Triune, on the extreme Federal right, during the afternoon of June 23d, by way of Middleton. At Christiana, on the main Murfreesboro' and Shelbyville road, he was joined by Stanley's cavalry, and advanced, June 27th, upon Grey's Gap, also commanding an approach to Shelbyville, from the northeast. A heavy skirmish ensued for its possession, when Stanley, with full force, rode through the contested way. Before this charge the enemy made rapid steps for the rifle pits outlying the town. Thither Stanley pursued, closely followed by the infantry. Granger, seeing evidences of the enemy's weakness, surmised that he was evacuating the stronghold. This induced an advance in full force. Charging over the approaches, Stanley bore down the rebel skirmishing line, secured three guns, which had cut his ranks severely, and dashed into the town. It was found evacuated-only Wheeler's cavalry holding it as covering guard. A regiment of these hardy troopers, which had tarried to cover their leader's escape by swimming Duck river, was taken prisoners.

This won the rebel line. Whither had Bragg withdrawn? was the question. Reconnoissances alone could determine. Wilder was dispatched to move as far as Elk river,