Meade's Difficulties. The Rebel Advance. tunes of the war, by con- | of the Rappahannock. In effect it was a mastant National success in nœuvre for position, yet full of hazard, since, Tennessee and on the Mississippi, had deter- | had Meade been able to strike at once for mined the summer's campaign, in spite of the Fr dericksburg, the way to Richmond must wishes of the General-in-Chief to annihilate have been opened and Lee's own line of retreat the Army of Northern Virginia and thus sacrificed. The Confederate, doubtless, well open the way to Richmond. The draft was knew of his antagonist's inability to leave relied upon to fill up the exhausted ranks. It Washington to care for itself. was a poor reliance, at best. Said Meade : "The conscripts who came in deserted in considerable numbers, soon after arriving. The most of them were raw and unreliable, and could not be considered by me as being practically of much value, until they had been some time in the army." They proved to be of but little value, at any time. Men forced into service fight under constant protest. Their presence is a source of disaffection in the ranks. If the Army of the Union had been largely composed of such material, it must have failed, in all quarters, before the enthusiasts of secession and Southern Independence. Stroke and Counter Gathering his lines well in, Lee crossed the upper fords of the Rapidan, Oct. 9th. This threw him upon Meade's right, at Madison C. H. Stuart's cavalry, on the advance, struck the Federal outposts at James City, disclosing the nature of the movement. "I became satisfied," said Meade, "that the enemy were moving on my right flank, with the determination of getting in my rear and cutting off my communications. If I had believed that the enemy would have attacked me at Culpepper C. H.-around which and toward the Rapidan my army was posted-I never should have moved from there." Ordering a retrograde, the army started, on the morning of the 10th, for Warrenton. The main body passed the Rappahannock during the day, and at nightfall, the bridge at Rappahannock Station was destroyed. This gave Meade the vantage, providing Lee's purpose was to flank him. Having the inner line to Warrenton and Centreville under his control, he could anticipate the enemy in any march in that direction. Lee reached Culpepper Oct. 11th, to find Meade gone; whereu; on the rebel commander was constrained to make a wider detour, by way of Sperryville and Woodville, which he at once ordered. Having received such accessions as determined him to active operations, Meade, about the middle of October, arranged for an advance; but was met, in its incipiency, by a counter-stroke from Lee. Informed of the Federal programme, the Confederate assumed the initiative by a march upon Centreville Observing the withdrawal of Lee's pickets along the line of the Rapidan, the impression prevailed that, aware of the Federal designs, the enemy was retiring. Meade, however, did not trust appearances, and made dispositions to test the question whether Lee was withdrawing from the Rapidan, or whether Informed of Lee's preshis movement was a manœuvre for some other ence in force at Culpepper, purpose. These dispositions consisted in Meade believed his enemy to be there, and at putting the cavalry and two infantry corps once arrested his own retreat to advance across the Rapidan; but, before their passage again to that point, hoping thus to bring on of the stream, Meade ascertained that Lee a battle. "The army reached the Rappawas on his right flank and passing around to hannock," he said, "and in the afternoon I his rear. had prepared the necessary instructions and This march was bold but well-conceived, orders to move that night, or the next mornconsidering the object in view; the designing, and occupy the line of Warrenton and being not to seize or menace Wa-hington, but Warrenton Junction, which I hoped to reach to keep the Potomac Ar y at home," and in advance of the enemy and there give him enable Lee, with ranks reduced by detach- battle. Before these orders were issued, ments to the Southwest, to preserve the in- however, the rear guard of my army returned tegrity of his position on the old outward line under the command of Major-General Pleas 6. Meade's Mistake. Meade's Mistake. THE MARCH AND COUNTER MARCH. 139 Meade's Mistake. anton,commanding the cav- | as possible. He had, in alry, and General Sykes, reality, the start in the race, commanding the infantry. From the representation of these officers as to the manner in which they had been followed in their retreat, and from the appearances which they had seen on the field, it was their conviction that the enemy had moved into Culpepper, and had really occupied it, and were in my rear.* Under this belief, and being anxious to give him battle, it not being my desire at all to avoid a battle, except to avoid it upon his terms-instead of ordering the movement upon Warrenton-which I had previously designed, I directed the movement of three corps early the next morning (11th), amounting to about thirty thousand men, with which I marched back again in the direction to Culpepper." notwithstanding the day's loss in the return movement. "If I had known this," said the Federal chief, "at the time, I would have given the enemy battle the next day, in the position that I had occupied at Auburn and Greenwich. But, under the conviction that he was moving on, and had moved on, I that night (12th) gave orders for a further retrograde movement, until I occupied the line of Centreville and Bu 1 Run." It was not until late in the evening of that day, when these three corps were all over the Rappahannock and in position, that Meade learned of Lee's continued march around his right, in the direction of Warrenton. This again changed the order of things, and Meade once more retired, having lost a day's time. He moved rapidly, taking position at Auburn, Greenwich and Catlett's Station, on the 12th. Lee, unaware of the divided condition of the opposing host, made no use of his advantage. His knowledge of the fact must have been fatal to the National army. On the morning of the 14th, Lee advanced from Warrenton in two columns, but not by the "pike." The left, under Hill, moving by the turnpike to New Baltimore, was ordered to strike the railroad at Bristoe Station; the right column, under Ewell, taking a more easterly route, was directed to effect a junction at the same point. When Hill approached Bristoe, Meade's army, with the exception ef Warren's corps, had passed that point. As the head of this column came up, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, had just crossed Broad Run. Hill at once formed a line of battle to attack the rear of that corps, when Warren came up, and, by a bold onset, drove the enemy back, securing four hundred and fifty prisoners and five guns. The National army, having won the race for position, and obtained possession of the heights of Centreville, Lee's movement was at an end, and he had but to retire to his old line again. Throwing his lines forward, as far as Bull Run, as a further menace to cover the retreat, he destroyed the Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Broad Run to the Rappahannock, and, on the 18th, began his retrograde movement. Conceiving that the Confederates would move by the Warrenton pike, in order to cross Bull Run and get possession of Centrevillethus to interpose between the Federal army and Washington-Meade retired as speedily * “Our main body arrived at that place (Culpepper) on the 11th October, and discovered that the enemy had retreated toward the Rappahannock, The following day Meace commenced purremoving or destroying his stores. We were com- suit, with the intention of attacking the pelled to halt during the rest of the day, to provision enemy on his retreat, but did not overtake the troops, but the cavalry under General Stuart him, being detained by a heavy rain storm, continued to press the enemy's rear guard toward which so raised Bull Run as to render it unthe Rappahannock A large body of Federal cav-fordable. As soon as the swollen waters subalry, in the meantime, had crossed the Rapidan sided, the army was put in motion and after our movement begun, but was repulsed by General Fitzhugh Lee, and pressed toward Brandy Station. Near that place the commands of Stuart and Lee united, on the afternoon of the 11th, and, after a severe engagement, drove the enemy's cavalry across the Rappahannock, with heavy loss."Pollard. advanced to Warrenton. Active cavalry skirmishing was maintained, with no decisive results. The most important of these combats resulted in the repulse of Kilpatrick's division by Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, on the 19th. When the Army of the Retreat of Lee. Fight on the Rappahannock. Potomac was, at length ad- | fire, the temporary works vanced to Warrenton, the enemy retired across the Rappahannock unopposed, since the Federal army was detained at Warrenton some eight or ten days, until the railroad between Broad Run and Warrenton Junction could be repaired, in order that Meade might receive his supplies. This work being accomplished, on the 7th of November the whole army was put in motion toward the Rappahannock, along which river the enemy was in position at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford. In two columns Meade advanced toward these points. Gen'l French, commanding the left wing-composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps-was directed to cross at Kelly's Ford, while the right wing -comprising the 5th and 6th Corps, under General Sedgwick-marched upon Rappahannock Station. The 3d Corps, under Birney, led the advance on Kelly's Ford. Reaching that point, without waiting for pontoons, Birney crossed his own division by wading, carried the rifle-pits, captured five hundred prisoners and prevented the enemy re-enforcing their troops at the Ford, by means of batteries which he planted on the hills that commanded the crossing. At the same time the right wing was contending against more formidable obstacles at Rappahannock Station. Early's division of Ewell's corps, occupied a series of works on the north side of the river, consisting of a fort, two redoubts and several lines of riflepits, all of which offered serious resistance. Gaining a good position, commanding the fort from the rear, Sedgwick planted his guns and opened a fierce cannonade upon the enemy's several batteries. Under cover of this * Meade, upon Lee's retreat, proposed what strategy had suggested upon Lee's advance-to move down and seize Fredericksburg. This being a change of base would have necessitated no delay to await repairs of the Orange railway. Meade said: "If he followed me down there to give me battle, that would be just what I wanted; if he did not, then I could take up my position there, open my commu. nications and then advance upon him or threaten Richmond. But, upon proposing this plan to the General-in-Chief, it was not approved." Hence the non-change of base and a reversal of the campaign on the upper waters of the streams named. November 8th was lost in getting forward the trains, and in reconnoitering. Under cover of that night Lee withdrew across the Rapidan. Taking position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, Meade remained quietly and undisturbed for two weeks. Finding Lee indisposed for action, the Federal leader resolved once more to try and bring on a general engagement. It was ascertained that, while resting the right of his army on the Rapidan at Morton's Ford, Lee had left the lower river fords, at Ely's, Culpepper, Mine, Germanna and Jacob's Mills, uncovered, depending for defense upon entrenchments along the banks of Mine Run, a tributary of the Rapidan, which flows into that stream at Morton's Ford. The Confederate army having gone into winter quarters, was located over a wide extent of country. Ewell's corps held a position from Morton's Ford to Orange C. H.; Hill's corps was distributed along the railroad nearly to Charlottesville. An interval of several miles existed between the two wings. This separation of the enemy's corps, led Meade to hope that, by crossing the lower fords of the Rapidan, and advancing rapidly on the plank and turnpike roads to Orange C. H., he could concentrate his army against Ewell's corps, cripple or destroy it, and then be able to turn upon Hill, and in this way break Lee's army in detail. Then he could secure an effective lodgement at Orange C. H. and Gordonsville. In pursuance of this plan, Meade cut himself loose from his base of supplies, and prohis movement early on the morning of Nov. viding his troops with ten days' rations, began 26th, in the following order: the 5th Corps, followed by the 1st, was to cross the Rapidan at Culpepper Ford, and proceed to Porter's store, on the Orange plank road; the 3d, followed by the 6th, was to cross at Jacob's Mill THE MINE RUN FAILURE. 141 The Mine Run Failure. The Mine Run Failure. Fords, and take position at | enemy, who at once concenRobertson's tavern, on the trated his entire force beturnpike parallel to the plank road, while hind Mine Run, having also time given for the 2d Corps, crossing at Germanna Ford, was additional entrenchments along the menaced to form a junction with the 3d and 6th. points. The enemy's position was found to These projections, by keeping the army in be exceedingly strong by nature, and further close communication on parallel roads, ren- perfected by the skill of busy hands. The dered safe an advance toward Orange C. H., | line held embraced a series of hills, extending and made it feasible to turn the Mine Run north and south about six miles. These hills defenses, which did not extend so far south gave all the essential elements of a fortificaas to cross the turnpike and plank roads. tion. From their angles and crests the As the assigned points of concentration were enemy could enfilade the approaches. The not more than twenty miles from the different flanks were well and strongly positioned. encampments, General Meade confidently ex- To the rebel rear a forest of heavy timber pected that each corps commander would be presented both a barricade, and a cover in able to make the march by noon of the 27th. case of retreat. In front was Mine Run, a Various circumstances, however, defeated this shaliow stream, but difficult to cross on acwell devised plan. The 3d Corps, under count of its steep banks, the marshy nature General French, did not reach the Rapidan of the ground, and the dense undergrowth until three hours after the other corps had with which it was flanked. arrived. Jacob's Mill Ford, the place selected for crossing, was found impracticable for artillery and wagons. The 3d Corps, therefore, on reaching the river, had to send the artillery and ambulances to Germanna Ford. Another obstacle was the result of a mistake of the engineers in estimating the width of the Rapidan; the pontoon bridges were found to be one boat too short, and it became necessary to provide trestle-work to fill out the bridge. The high, steep banks of the river rendered the passage of the trains both tedious and difficult. The army, thus detained, instead of making the pa-sage early in the day, did not get over until the morning of the 27th. The divisions were then pushed forward rapidly. General Warren, with the 2d Corps, reached Robertson's tavern about one o'clock, engaged the enemy's guard stationed there, and occupied the position. By the original plan the 3d Corps was to join the 2d at this point, and no serious attack was to be attempted until General French should arrive. That officer, after crossing at Jacob's Mill, took the wrong road to reach Robertson's tavern, by which he was led too far to the right, and on the way met Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, with which he had a brisk skirmish. He did not reach his position until night. That day's delay frustrated the object of the movement; it disclosed Meade's intention to the The National army was put in position in front of these defenses on the morning of the 28th, when reconnoissances at once were made to determine the point of attack. Each corps commander was instructed to be ready to attack the enemy in his immediate front, and also to ascertain and report the most feasible point for the assault. While these several reconnoissances were being made, General Warren, with the 24 Corps, increased by a division of the 6th Corps, was dispatched to the rebel right, with directions to ascertain how far Lee's lines extended, and, if possible, to outflank and turn him. Moving southward, on the Catharpin road, Warren at length reported that he had taken a position by which Lee's line could be outflanked, and that everything favored an attack from that point. Sedgwick, on the extreme Federal right, reported that there was a point of the enemy's left which he thought weak and assailable, that an attack evidently had not been expected there, as the defenses had not been prepared with the same care, as other portions of the lines. The engineers, also, reported that, in front of the 3d Corps, commanded by General French, an opportunity offered for an attack, more practicable than in other portions of the line. General Meade, influenced by these several opinions, determined to assault the enemy at the three points indicated—right, centre and The Mine Run Failure. left. The Mine Run Failure. corps commander's opinion Word, meanwhile, was received from Sedgwick that the enemy, alarmed by the cannonade, had made the position on his front as strong as any part of their line, and that every hour it became more questionable about making an attack there. Before orders were issued for carrying out this plan, Warren came to headquarters, confirming all that had been reported, regarding the feasibility of an attack upon Lee's right. It was his opinion that the enemy would not be found there the next morning, but would be compelled to fall back. Under these circumstances, two divisions were detached from the corps of French-who had given his opinion against a movement on his own front-and sent over to Warren, thus making the latter's force some twenty-six thousand men. The centre advance was abandoned. French, with the remaining division of his command, and two divisions of the 1st Corps, under Newton, were to hold the interval of four miles between the two wings, and act as a corps of observa-cember. I had consumed about one half of the suption and reserve. Two days were consumed in making these dispositions-two days precious to the Confederate commander, who employed them to strengthen his position and to mass his forces at effective points. The alternative now presented was, to move still farther to the left, and obtain a position where Lee could not entrench before an attack. But, owing to the lateness of the season, when bad weather might be expected at any moment, such a movement, Meade as umed, could not be seriously entertained. He said: "When this period arrived it was the 1st of De plies I had brought with me; I had abandoned my communications entirely. And, in view of the season of the year, the impossibility of moving from that place if there came on even a couple of days of rain; having failed in my first plan, which was to attack the enemy before they could concentrate; and then having failed in my plan to attack them after they had concentrated, in the manner which I have related, I concluded that, under the circumstances, it was impossible for me to do anything more." Late on the 29th orders were issued for an attack at eight o'clock the next morning. It was appointed that, after a heavy artillery fire, Warren, on the left, should commence the movement, and that, after he had been engaged for an hour, Sedgwick should assault And this was the end of a movement, which, on the right. Early on Monday morning, the like Hooker's advance to flank Fredericks30th, the artillery of the right and centre burg, opened with fair promise of success, opened upon the works of the enemy. A and, like that advance, was a failure from indivision crossed Mine Run and took the first cidents which the situation permitted rather line of rifle-pits, but soon was recalled. The than asserted. Hooker, fearless at the outset, hour's cannonade having been made, the time won his first point by his celerity and boldfor Sedgwick's movement came, and that ness, achieving a real surprise. Meade did es commander was preparing to move when he much-Lee was surprised at the appearance received word to halt. There was a break in of the Federal army before his winter quarter the programme. defenses beyond the Rapidan. Hooker halted Awaiting the fulfilment of Warren's ad- when further advance was a necessity of vance, Meade, about nine A. M., received a success. Meade did likewise; but, retiring message from that commander, to the effect before a battle, avoided a repulse which Hookthat a close inspection of the enemy's line re- er courted by fighting in an unequal position. vealed the fact that not only had he not de- Both commanders in a great measure threw camped but had been re-enforced, and so the responsibility of failure upon subordi strengthened his works as to make an attempt nates; and though, by the evidence, these infeasible. He, hence, had not attacked but subordinates may be amenable to the censures awaited orders. This news arrived in time made or implied, the head of the army must to suspend Sedgwick's movement, which was still be held accountable for the want of suc done, and Meade rode over to Warren's posi-❘cess. Public opinion is inexorable. He who tion to take observations. A brief survey accepts positions of trust must bear the weight convinced the Commanding-General that his | of an agent's mistakes where the choice and |