In the cottage all is silent save for a woman's weeping, a woman kneeling by a bed, gazing at the pale, still face on the pillow, with the love of years in her wet eyes. Her breast is heaving with the sobs she is choking back, with something of a man's shame for his weakness. Her hands have closed the kindly eyes,

and pushed back the gray hair from the forehead where death's touch is smoothing out the lines Life's hand had printed, and a softness and peace comes into the worn and sorrow-stricken face as she looks upon that one where lingers still the smile with which he met the Lord.

THE golden sentence in the second Inaugural of President Grant, in our judgment, was, in more senses than one, that in which he avowed his anxiety to bring our currency to a fixed (gold) value. It was the expectation of the country that this consummation, so devoutly to be wished, would be reached during his first Presidential term. The preservation of the faith of the nation by paying its debts in coin, when due, was almost ostentatiously prominent among the issues of the canvass, or declaration of principles, which raised him to power. That this has been neglected till a terrible financial panic forces attention to it, is deeply to be deplored,-nay, to vast multitudes it is the one profound regret in regard to the movement of our National politics. Of course we still more deeply deplore the developments of bribery, embezzlement, and rapacity in public office. But this we conceive has closer implications with the demoralization involved in this virtual, if as yet partial, repudiation of some of our national promises, than might at first sight appear. If the nation has promised, and does promise in its legal tender notes to pay three hundred and fifty millions of dollars, be the same more or less, and not only declines, but makes no serious attempt, or indication of a decided purpose, to pay them, is it keeping faith? Is it practicing honesty? Is it not delinquent in duty? Is it not setting an example of faithlessness through its government, the supreme exponent and executive of its will, which must inevitably spread its gangrene through its people, officers and servants of every grade? How deplorably do the States lately in rebellion, but subdued and reconstructed, follow this great example in reference to their own debts?

We plead for the resumption of coin payments, at the earliest day practicable

without producing serious financial stricture or commercial panic, because the national faith, morality, and honor require it. Surely the faith and honor of the nation require that it fulfill its promises and obligations voluntarily assumed. But this is precisely what the nation promises in its legal tenders. It promises to pay dollars. What dollars? Surely coin dollars, precisely what had always been meant by the dollars promised on every bank-bill or other paper then circulating as currency. That this is so, and cannot be otherwise, appears. 1. Because no other conceivable meaning attaches to the word. 2. The legal tender act did not undertake to demonetize the precious metals, or abolish the coin standard of value. It was simply a mode of deferring payment under constraint of overbearing necessity, by requiring the nation's, and other, creditors, for the present distress, to accept, in lieu of money, or rather as money, the promise to pay that money—no time of payment being named because it was the mutual understanding of all that it should be done as soon as government could command the means. It was like the case of other debtors of ample ultimate means which they cannot for the time realize in cash, whose creditors are therefore compelled to take up with promises to pay cash in future, instead of getting it at once.

That this is so, appears still further from the fact that the government even then maintained the coin standard without interruption in paying the interest and principal of the public debt, and in its receipts for custom dues. By excepting these from the operation of the legal tender measure, it most emphatically declared that measure exceptional and temporary-only for the present exigency-and this was still further indicated by making these legal ten

ders themselves, convertible into bonds at par, payable principal and interest in coin. Thus coin was recognized as the true and enduring standard. It is therefore past all doubt that the greenback promises to pay dollars, are promises to pay coin dollars to the bearer on demand, at the earliest time reasonably practicable.

If there could be the shadow of doubt on this subject, Congress, speaking the mind and will of the nation, removed it in the solemn declaratory enactment which was the first bill signed by President Grant after his accession to the Presidency. As follows:

"NONE of said interest bearing obligations not already due shall be paid or redeemed before maturiay, unless at such time United States notes shall be convertible into coin at the option of the holder, or unless, at such time, bonds of the United States bearing a lower rate of interest than the bonds to be redeemed can be sold at par in coin; and the United States also solemnly pledges its faith to make provision at the earliest practical period for the redemption of United States notes in coin."

Could words be plainer? Is it to be disputed longer what the nation has promised? or that it pledged itself to redeem these promises at the earliest practical period? What efforts have been made to redeem these pledges? The process contemplated in these promises has been completely reversed; not an effort has been made, or a step taken towards "the redemption of United States notes in coin." But means ample and more than ample to do this have been applied to redeem "those interest bearing obligations not already due," which it is declared shall not "be paid or redeemed before maturity, unless at such time United States notes shall be convertible into coin at the option of the holder." Nor has the other alternative allowing such redemption occured-for notoriously the new five per cents could not be "sold at par in coin." The syndicate who paid nominal par, paid really between 98 and 99 through a dexterous arrangement for a three months' use of the money without interest. We have little doubt that if government had fulfilled its pledge to provide for its obligations due, it could have saved far more than the cost in the better terms it could have made for exchanging at a lower rate of interest its obligations not yet due-as we trust will yet more decisively appear. Why the government during the last four years should thus have gone back upon its own solemnly declared purpose, policy and

promise, has not yet appeared. We can conceive no shadow of a reason for it.

Still further, the legal tender act was nothing else than an extreme exercise of the war power, in order to save the national life. From overbearing necessity it took this method of raising a forced loan to be repaid at the earliest practicable moment, by a law impairing the obligation of contracts, such as the constitution expressly prohibits any State to pass. It destroyed the obligation of the contracts on the part of debtors to pay coin dollars. While justifiable as the exercise of a war power, and as one of the anomalies of war, (inter arma leges silent), its indefinite continuance, after the exigencies growing out of war no longer necessitate it, is no more defensible than continued conscriptions, military occupation and seizure, martial law, or suspension of habeas corpus.

We plant ourselves first of all then here, on this perfectly impregnable position. The national faith is pledged. National morality requires the fulfillment of the nation's promises "at the earliest practicable period." Not to struggle for it, with all its power, is national dishonor. This is enough. If all other arguments were adverse, this more than outweighs them. Even if it could be shown, as it cannot, for the contrary is true that it is hostile to national wealth or material interests, still the national faith, honor, and morality are more and higher than all these. What! will the nation unhesitatingly spend hundreds of millions to vindicate the honor of its flag against insult, and shall it grudge any sacrifices necessary to keep its word and pledge of honor untarnished? If once the mind of the nation is brought fairly to apprehend and face the alternatives involved, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt the issue.

But we are prepared to vindicate this measure from the lower stand-point of expediency as respects the material interest of the nation. Indeed, in the long run, honesty is always the best policy for nations as well as individuals.

The credit of the government would be so improved that it would speedily gain. more than the cost of resumption in the improved terms it could make with its creditors. There is no question that the rates at which government can borrow, as in the case of individual borrowers, will be low in proportion to the confidence of lenders in the markets of the world, that it will religiously and punctually discharge

every pecuniary obligation or promise according to the tenor thereof. And on the other hand, in proportion as a nation staggers at or shrinks from the fulfillment of any of its promises, or leaves .their fulfillment in doubt, will its credit be lowered, and the cost of, or interest on, all its loans enhanced. This is self-evident and evinced by all experience. Nor is the bearing of this on our own nation parried by the claim that our gold-bearing bonds and legal-tender notes stand on a different footing, and that the non-payment of the latter is no argument against the certain payment of the gold explicitly promised in the former. For have we not proved that the nation has just as explicity pledged itself to pay the latter in coin as soon as practicable? If, therefore, it shrinks from doing this, or attempting to do it, "at the earliest practicable period," what guarantee have lenders that it may not shrink from paying other dues, when it becomes severely onerous? In our judgment, there is not the slightest question that the resumption of specie payments would enable the government at once to fund the national debt in the markets of the world at lower rates of interest.

Not only so, but our own people would much more eagerly seek these securities, both on account of the increased credit of the government, and because, even at a higher specie price, they would be more cheaply purchased in the actual currency of the country. As we now write, with gold ruling at 116 at 117*, if a creditor collects a mortgage in legal tender and invests it in U. S. 5 per cent. gold, he must pay full one sixth of his principal as premium -i. e. reduce his principal in that proportion, since when due they will be paid only for the amount of their face. This he will be slow to do, when so many forms of perfectly secure investment are open to him, which will yield him from 7 to 8 per cent, and in the end make good, and more than make good, the original investment. A 5, probably a 41⁄2, if not 4 per cent., gold interest. U. S. bond at par, free of taxation, would be a favorite form of investment, in multitudes of our tax-ridden towns-and with free banking organized with proper safeguards, a still larger stimulus would be

*This paper was written when gold was ruling at these rates, and subject to the other phenomena noticed hereafter. The recent financial panic has served to illustrate and confirm several positions taken in this paper, and in that on Banking and Currency in the April number of this Magazine-both written months before its occurrence.

given to the home demand for these securities.

This brings us to the next great headviz., that the early resumption of specie payments is expedient and economical, not only for the government and for the people as represented and acting through the government, but for the people in their private material interests, and in all their business transactions as concerned in the production, exchange, and consumption of commodities.

1. Our present inconvertible and capriciously fluctuating currency greatly enhances the risks and other costs of legitimate business, and consequently the cost of all articles of subsistence. Over and above all other risks is that arising from the varying premium on gold to the importer, who must pay for his goods in gold or its equivalent at the price of purchase. Now, suppose that between the day of sale in this country, on time, for currency prices, and of getting his pay with which to discharge the foreign debt incurred in the original purchase, the price of gold rises five or six per cent., as more than once within the past twelve months, there is that amount of loss from this source. This repeated upon the vast amount of purchases and sales by importing houses, turning over their capital repeatedly during the year, is enough to make all the difference between large profits and heavy losses as the result of their trade. It makes no difference in the end, as to the ultimate effect on the cost of trade, if the importers sell exclusively for specie. The effect of this is to transfer the risk to the jobbers. It falls upon some stage of the trade so long as our legal currency is not of the standard adopted by the whole commercial world, or in any fixed ratio of approximation to it. Now, risk always enhances the cost of business, and of all the goods which that business is instrumental in bringing to the consumer. The profits, in the long run, and taking the average of business, must be so gauged as to insure against it, even as they must suffice to cover all kinds of risk or insurance-in other words, the expense of keeping the capital good, besides a net gain after these and all other expenses are paid. This capricious and volatile element in business in like manner affects our exports, here bought and sold on our legal tender basis, but exchanged in the markets of the world upon a gold basis.

It throws another uncertain element, therefore, into all domestic products which enter the markets of the world. Thus all commodities of home or foreign production become dearer to the consumer, in consequence of the uncertainties and variations which aggravate the hazards and cost of trade. And this pernicious influence penetrates every industrial occupation, every department of production, and exchange. How greatly has it aggravated the unsatisfactory results of business for the last year?

2. This is closely connected with one of the financial pests growing out of our irredeemable currency-the gold exchange of New York city-an institution which lives and thrives, not chiefly upon the legitimate trade in specie rendered necessary in such circumstances, (this were enough,) but were enough,) but upon all manner of piratical raids and tricks to aggravate it. It opens a new field to the Nimrods of Wall street. The supply of gold is usually so closely graduated to the exigencies of the demand to settle foreign balances, that it is as easy to force an artificial scarcity and rise of price, by purchasing and segregating a few millions of it, as to tighten the loan market by locking up greenbacks, and forcing the banks below their legal tender limit, which disables them from further loans. Our inconvertible currency generates a class of speculators who thrive by preying upon the commerce, the industry, and the resources of the country. Their vocation is to unsettle values, and foment financial derangements. This sort of speculation, after luxuriating upon real and groundless panics and disasters of the war, which it used every bad and lying device to aggravate, reached its malign climax during peace, in the Black Friday made memorable in Wall street for a generation. But it is constantly felt now as a disturbing force, producing twinges and strictures of its own, which aggravate all other causes of financial disturbance in the country. Now, a return to the coin basis would make an end of this most mischievous, often nefarious, occupation.

3. For the reasons already mentioned, it would abridge the scope of vicious speculation. We say vicious speculation, for there is such a thing as legitimate speculative investment in commodities, which, there is reasonable ground for believing, will rise in price, without incurring unwarrantable risks, or resorting

to gambling adventures, or unprincipled methods of enhancing prices. But there is an illegitimate speculation, which differs little from gambling, and tasks the energies and resources of large numbers of men. A few of these, like keepers of gambling-houses, win large fortunes, and swallow up the fortunes of the great mass, who are enticed, by their glittering success, to make a like plunge for fortune, which is only a plunge to ruin. Now, this vast body of gambling speculators work unmitigated evil. They force stocks, and other commodities which they touch, up or down, by devices wholly irrespective of their real value; by monopolizing a given kind, and tempting large numbers to agree to sell and deliver the article to them at a certain figure, they themselves, meanwhile, having so manipulated or monopolized it that the dupe of their tricks is compelled to buy of them, at rates far above what they agreed to pay him, in order to fulfill his contract. his contract. Or vice versa; they agree to sell for delivery at a future time, at what seems a low rate, to others whom they tempt to agree to take it at this rate. Then they resort to the opposite device of contriving by various arts, prominent among which are damaging fictitious reports, for the purpose of unduly lowering the price; so that thus they may buy at a low rate what others have agreed to take from them at a higher rate.

This gambling speculation is evil, and evil only, in all its aspects-moral, ecoLomical, commercial. It has all the pernicious excitements of gambling. It instigates a multitude of immoral strategems. It contributes in no way to the production of a tittle of wealth. It subserves no end useful to society. It is simply a process by which a class of men, who contribute nothing to the support of society, manage to seize the wealth produced by others. The railroads, for example, that have been so largely gulped by speculators, were the products of the industry, earnings, and savings of others. The collossal fortunes of the former consist of what they have wrenched, by the deal and throw of their cards, from the vast number of weaklings foolish enough to play with them, and of the earnings of others who sunk their money and labor in the road thus passed into the possession of the speculator. As a stupendous example, whose money built the Erie Railroad, and who have made fortunes by grasping or robbing it? Pro

lific, however, as this subject is, we will not be seduced from our main topic into any lengthened discussion of this or any merely subsidiary point. It may safely be assumed that gambling speculations are among the great moral, social, and financial evils of the country. Now, an inconvertible currency, of variable and uncertain value, immensely increases the facilities and temptations to a vocation which thrives on uncertainties. That specie payments would put an end to such speculation, and its enormous evils, it would surely be chimerical to maintain. That it would abate them, and the great loss to the industry and wealth of the nation caused by them, is undeniable.

4. The mischiefs of a currency not conformed to the monetary standards of the commercial world are already developing in formidable proportions, which seem to us but the beginning of the end, in the shape which railway and other loans are taking. In order to improve our vast undeveloped regions and resources, it is necessary to attract capital here from the great loan-markets of the world. This is especially necessary to the construction of the vast lines of railways, inchoate and projected, without which, in this era, all other means for developing resources are unavailing. In order to attract this capital, not only are high rates of interest necessary, but the medium of payment, principal and interest, must be in what the commercial world recognizes as the only money-i.e., the precious metals. The consequence is that nearly all recent railway and, more or less, other loans, are made with the pledge of payment in gold, principal and interest. Now, these, added to the gold loans of the government, create a great and increasing demand for coin, even to meet the semi-annual interest. Only the loans of old-established and prosperous railways can of late be negotiated on any other basis. Even these are rapidly coming to it. One effect of this is already apparent, along with other causes yet to be noted, in the frequent raising of the premium on gold, and depreciation of our currency. This tendency, it seems to us, must continue and increase till rendered unnecessary by earnest and real movements towards the resumption of specie payments. The disastrous consequences must be more pervading than appears on a superficial view. It not only means all the mischiefs of every kind resulting from a

depreciation of the currency going lengths which none can foresee, but it means enormous and constantly-increasing rates of interest for these railway loans. The average net yield of these loans to the roads is not over eighty-five per cent. in currency. On this, seven dollars, or about eight per cent. interest, in gold, must be paid, while the ultimate payment of the principal must be in gold for their face. Now, it is easy to see that, if the gold premium advances, the annual interest charge for these loans must become prodigious. The consequence is that their charges for transportation must be increasingly severe, in order to keep out of bankruptcy, much more to earn any profit on the share capital. Not only so; but these enormous rates for so large a class of the loans of the country must stiffen the rates of interest universally. They compete with all other loans. How much they have to do with the present (March, 1873) dear rates of money may be conjectured, but not certainly known. We cannot forecast how far this may run. It is quite certain that, with our present currency system, railway loans will be pushed till they directly or indirectly exceed the capacity or the disposition of the loan markets of the world to take them, or, under the thin disguise of seven or eight per cent., gold, at our indefinitely advancing premiums, reach a grade of currency interest virtually ruinous.

When these last and the following sentences were written, gold was rising at the rate of 3 or 4 per cent. a week with panicky predictions of a further rapid and indefinite rise. The default of interest payments on railroad loans has since gone so far as to render the negotiation of bonds of unfinished roads impossible. The floating railroad debentures which awaited the sale of such bonds for their liquidation have therefore gone to protest, the whole culminating in the commercial panic which reached its terrific climax on September 20th. In its antecedents and consequents this has more than verified our predictions and reasonings.

5. The absence of specie payments removes one of the chief checks to the excessive accumulation of foreign indebtedness, as well as other forms of feverish and exaggerated commercial action. We are not of those who entertain a rabid dread of all foreign indebtedness. long as capital can be borrowed from the old world, at rates which enable us to em

So